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1SUMMARY
This thesis compares the political careers of Burma's U Nu (1948-1962) and 
Cambodia's Norodom Sihanouk (1941-1970) during the post-colonial period, when both 
men were icons and initiators of their countries' nation-building efforts.  
Similarities
Although the lengths of their tenures were not identical, U Nu and Sihanouk 
mirrored each other in their career development, leadership style and policies.  Both were 
fortuitously thrust into power as symbols of national unity, but grew to embrace a highly 
personalized style of leadership that was influenced by their character, beliefs and their 
predecessors’ legacies. In their choice of policies, both men drew meaning and symbolic 
significance from their countries’ history and traditions.  As such, both adopted 
“Buddhist Socialism” as an economic ideology, and “Neutralism” as a strategy of non-
alignment, which not only had historical relevance, but were also useful for 
distinguishing their countries from Cold War allegiances and developmental models. As 
symbolic leaders, both men were highly popular with the general public; as politicians, 
however, neither was able to maintain his legitimacy and leadership position amongst the 
elite. When they were eventually removed from power by respective military coups, it 
was due to a combination of circumstances, character and choice.
Differences
U Nu and Sihanouk were seeming opposites in character, and were subject to very 
different national circumstances.  Where Nu’s public image was one of humility, 
2sincerity and moral piety, Sihanouk was internationally renowned for his vanity, erratic 
personality, and combative nature.  In terms of national realities, U Nu struggled with 
crises of ethnic and political disunity throughout his tenure, but never had to face the 
intensity and spillover conflict of the Indochina War that Sihanouk did in the 1960s. 
Obviously, these collective differences affected their choices in domestic and foreign 
policy. Through a comparative analysis, the gravity of each man’s situation, as well as 
the impact of his flaws, can be better understood and assessed.
Thesis 
This thesis comprises six chapters, which collectively chart the rise, stagnation 
and eventual decline of each man’s career.  Against this parallel backdrop, comparisons 
are made between their policies, their circumstances, and the reasons for their downfall. 
Chapter 1 compares U Nu and Sihanouk’s elevation to power, and the impact of the 
legacies they received.  Chapters 2 and 3 give a backdrop of how each man tried to move 
from being merely a symbolic leader, towards consolidating state and political power, 
before settling into a stage of stagnation when their plans for economic progress or 
national security had come to a standstill.  Chapters 4 and 5 then examine these plans in 
detail, comparing the respective ideologies of “Buddhist Socialism” and “Neutralism”, 
and how despite the common terminologies, each man interpreted and practiced the 
policies in varying ways.  Finally, Chapter 6 compares the reasons for each man’s 
decline, and suggests that although one of their most important contributions was in 
having brought, and sustained, symbolic national unity during their tenures, such 
symbolic leadership could not create an enduring nation and state.    
3Chapter 1: Symbolic Leaders
Asked about the significance of U Nu's move, a Western diplomat in Bangkok said: 
"He's a good figurehead rather than a leader at this point. It will depend on who 
his advisers are and also on the attitude of the military..' His (U Nu) main value 
will be as a symbol,' said another Western diplomat.”He seems to enjoy the 
support of the majority.'   (10 September 1988, The Dallas Morning News , “Ex-
Burmese Prime Minister forms Rival Government”)
Crowned King in 1941, buffeted by insurgencies, a coup, the Pol Pot takeover and 
the Vietnamese invasion, the Prince has remained for 50 years the symbol of 
Cambodian independence and nationalism. He is seen as the unifying tie and the 
symbol of hope in the midst of chaos.  But apart from that, he is weak. He used to 
be a powerful, authoritarian leader. But he is not the same leader in this 
government.    (16 October 1998, The Washington Post, “Sihanouk Retains 
Respect but Little Power; With Government in Turmoil, Weakened Cambodian 
King Seen as Potential Mediator”)
Decades after their political careers had ended, two of Southeast Asia’s prominent 
post-war leaders, U Nu and Sihanouk, were each described as national symbols. Nu, a 
symbol of nationalism and the ‘Father of Democracy’ to Burma, had been ousted by the 
military in 1962, but had re-emerged in 1988 to declare a parallel government, insisting 
that his office as Premier was still legitimate. Sihanouk, the professed ‘Lion of Southeast 
Asia’ and a symbol of unity and moral authority, had been removed from power in 1970 
by a right wing military coup, but was reinstated as King in 1993 as part of a UN plan to 
4set Cambodia on the road to recovery after the devastation wrought by the Khmer Rouge, 
the Vietnamese invasion and civil war. Cambodia in the 1990s faced a potential civil war 
due to political strife, most notably between Hun Sen and Prince Ranarridh, and hopes 
were high that  Sihanouk, as a symbol of the monarchical tradition would restore a 
semblance of national unity  to Cambodia. Despite this “revival” of the symbolic roles of 
U Nu and Sihanouk however, observers were quick to add that they were now more 
useful as figureheads rather than as leaders with any real clout or political power..
The symbolic significance that U Nu and Sihanouk retained was possible largely 
because of the legacy each man had established during their tenures as post-colonial 
nation-builders.   The careers of U Nu and Sihanouk during the  1950s and 1960s thus 
represent an interesting perspective on the political history of Southeast Asia, and useful 
comparisons can be made on various fronts.   
Basis for Comparison
To begin with, among the various Southeast Asian nationalist forces that emerged 
during the region’s transition from colonial rule to independence after the Second World 
War, U Nu and Sihanouk represented opposite “spectrums” of the legacy of colonial rule.  
Prince Sihanouk was an example of the traditional indigenous elite that “governed” under 
colonial influence, while U Nu was an example of the “new elite” that had emerged under 
the colonial administration after the traditional hierarchy had been removed (the British 
effectively ended the Burmese Monarchy when they dethroned the king after annexing 
Burma in 1886)  
5Despite these different starting points, both U Nu and Sihanouk also shared 
political traits that were typical of Southeast Asian nation-builders.  Their aim, like other 
post-colonial leaders, was to guide their countries’ transition from the uncertainty of 
fledgling independence towards a vision of political and economic stability.  In 
envisioning and articulating the roadmap towards such stability, both men drew 
inspiration and legitimacy from national traditions and historical circumstances, so as to 
ease their countries’ transition into modern concepts of statehood.  This was most evident 
in U Nu and Sihanouk’s seeming “convergence” upon two key nation-building ideologies 
– Buddhist Socialism and Neutralism.  In practice, although each man’s interpretation 
and implementation of these ideologies differed from the other due to differences in each 
man’s character and circumstances, their efforts ultimately ended in failure when they 
were overthrown by respective military coups.  
The aftermath of their downfall saw the situation in their countries worsen, with 
Burma subject to military rule, and Cambodia veering towards the right, which in turn set 
the stage for subsequent violent reaction from Marxist left.  To draw a further comparison 
between U Nu and Sihanouk, one might interpret their downfall and the events that 
followed as a backlash against the “excesses” of their rule.  U Nu was regarded by the 
military as having been excessive in tolerating the breakaway aspirations of minority 
factions that threatened the Burmese Union.  Sihanouk was seen by the military right as 
having leaned excessively towards appeasing Communist Vietnam and putting the 
country (and their status) at risk.  Within recent Southeast Asia history, Burma and 
Cambodia were examples of two countries that missed the opportunity for successful and 
stable development made available by the end of colonialism.  
6The question then is the extent to which either U Nu or Sihanouk was responsible 
for such failure and missed opportunities? Were there common characteristics or 
circumstances of each man’s leadership that jeopardized their chances?  Post-colonial 
Southeast Asia was a hotbed of political activity and political “experimentation” for 
alternatives to the colonial systems of government; if we regard U Nu and Sihanouk’s 
forays into “socialism”, “democracy” and “neutralism” were “experiments” that went 
wrong, what can we learn about the conditions and components of each man’s 
experiment that contrasted them from other success stories in Southeast Asia?   What 
were the consequences of their application of modern concepts of statehood to their 
respective traditional societies?  What was it about the circumstances, character traits or 
choices that each man made, that resulted in a failure from which their countries have yet 
to recover?  Did they somehow sow the seeds for their countries’ further decline?  
This first chapter will examine the extent to which the different origins and the 
legacies they inherited might have influenced the eventual outcome of their political 
fortunes.  Were Sihanouk and U Nu largely doomed to fail from the outset?  To address 
this question, it is necessary to first chart each man’s rise to power.  
1.1 Trails to Prominence
Neither U Nu nor Sihanouk began with ambition or affinity toward politics. Their 
respective trails to prominence were trademarked by a circumstantial, almost fortuitous, 
thrust into power, followed by transformation from unlikely candidates into dominant 
political actors.  Throughout this process, both had to grapple with the legacies left by 
their respective predecessors, a struggle made more difficult as what they inherited often 
7seemed more burdensome as tripping stones than they were useful as guiding markers.  
From the outset, neither their character nor circumstance seemed to indicate that either U 
Nu or Sihanouk would be able to develop careers as political leaders.  
Interestingly, both Sihanouk and U Nu were initially called to serve primarily as 
symbols for their fledgling nations so as to  restore order and stability: Sihanouk was first 
appointed King by the French in 1941 in the hope that his youth and seeming lack of 
ambition would allow the colonials to manipulate his symbolic aura to better manage the 
protectorate at a time when French power was weakening. 1  U Nu was pressed by 
outgoing British governor Hubert Rance to take over the government in the wake of 
Aung San’s assassination in 1947, it was less for his ability, and more for his status as an 
unassuming and generally well-received figure who could appease and rally the various 
groups jockeying for position within the power vacuum.  Both U Nu and Sihanouk were 
thrust into prominence and power by forces outside their control.   Opportunity found 
each man at a point in his life when the transition to public life seemed unlikely for the 
private paths taken by U Nu and Sihanouk prior to this gave no signs as to the heights to 
which they would rise.  
U Nu’s Path
U Nu had initially seemed more geared towards writing than politics.  Born to a 
middle class family in the Myaungmya district, Nu’s formative years saw him change 
from a wayward alcoholic youth to a young man whose encounter with Buddhism turned 
him into a pensive, if somewhat impulsive student who had a passion for literature. 
                                                
1 France had surrendered to Nazi Germany by this time and protecting French interests against the 
threat of Japanese incursion from Thailand was important to France.
8During the 1920s, Nu was swept up in the wave of student nationalism that enveloped 
Burma, and found himself increasingly involved from the 1930s onwards, from 
demonstrations in high school, to joining the Students’ Union in University, the Youth 
League, and, eventually, the Dobama Asiayone – the one organization whose aim was 
early and unconditional independence for Burma.2 Throughout, even though U Nu had 
displayed oratory and leadership skills, and had a desire to overcome injustice, he was 
never regarded a dominant or authority figure.  Some of his contemporaries in the 
Students’ Union considered him instead a mere figurehead, with two others, Kyaw Nyein 
and Raschid, being accorded more importance.3 Within the Dobama Asiayone, he was 
popular for his pleasant personality and piety, but, being outranked by 3 other men: Aung 
San, Than Tun and Thakin Soe, U Nu willingly assumed a secondary position.4  U Nu’s 
willingness to relinquish leadership to others was evident even as he participated in the 
nationalist movement. He repeatedly claimed to have little desire for politics; his aim was 
simply to remove the ills and injustice of British imperialism in Burma, after which he 
would become a writer. 
This attitude continued during the Japanese Occupation of Burma, where U Nu’s 
involvement, importance and initiative in political leadership paled in comparison to the 
likes of Dr Ba Maw – Prime Minister in the wartime government – and Aung San –
whose efforts in the Anti-Fascist Organization gave life and legend to the resistance 
movement.  U Nu saw himself as one too indecisive to be a politician, and too inept with 
                                                




9weapons to join in the fighting.5 Even when he was persuaded by Dr Ba Maw to become 
Foreign Minister in August, 1943, it was, according to U Nu, with great reluctance and 
upon the condition that he be allowed to retire from politics after independence was 
achieved, that he acceded.  Based on these indications, U Nu’s path seemed, by the end of 
the war, to be one that would lead away, rather than toward, a dominant role in Burma’s 
political scene. The two indicating factors were U Nu’s self-professed disinterest, and the 
presence of other more capable and willing individuals.
Sihanouk’s Ascension
These two factors could also be used to describe Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s 
ascension to the Cambodian throne at the tender age of eighteen in 1941.  Sihanouk had 
not been, in terms of birthright and importance, the next in line for succession to the 
throne.  There were at least two other more obvious candidates, his father, Prince 
Suramarit, and his uncle, Prince Monireth, and another Norodom named Norindeth.6  
Having grown up with a deep sense of loneliness and vulnerability –he had been been 
distanced from his estranged parents and sent away at an early age to study in Vietnam –
Sihanouk did not show any inclination toward the throne, and busied himself with 
recreational activities like sports, music and movies.  From the outset, there was no 
indication that he would be king, much less the dominant and fiery politician of the 
1960s. Even after the French bypassed all other candidates to place him on the throne, 
arguably in the hope that he was malleable and could be bent to their will, Sihanouk did 
not disappoint in his subservience to the colonial powers, and continued his self-
                                                
5 U Nu, Burma under Japanese rule: Pictures and Portraits, edited and translated with introduction 
by John Sydenham Furnivall. London: Macmillan, 1954, p.106  
6 John A. Tully, France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia, 1863-1953. 
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003, p.351
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professed antics as a ‘playboy’ and a ‘useless young man’. As described by Milton 
Osborne, ‘from the time he was named king in September 1941 until the Japanese coup 
de force in 1945 that temporarily eliminated French control over Indochina, the essential 
feature of Sihanouk’s life was his readiness to play the part the French planned for him.’7  
Sihanouk proved useful to the Japanese as well, who, after the coup in 1945, tried to 
develop Khmer nationalism as a defense against the allies by “encouraging” Sihanouk to 
declare “Cambodian Independence” on March 11 and appointing him Prime Minister. Up 
till the end of the war, there was no reason to see Sihanouk as a man with his own 
political agenda, much less one who could lead or dominate Cambodian politics.
Comparison
By the end of the Second World War, U Nu and Sihanouk found themselves in 
positions that would lead to deeper political involvement.  U Nu had ‘drifted this way and 
that and, little by little, without being a politician, he found himself –by agreeing to join 
Dr Ba Maw’s Preparatory Committee –entangled in the world of politics.’8 (Nu agreed on 
the condition that he would be dropped once the committee was expanded into a
government council.)  After the Japanese surrendered, Nu was again persuaded out of 
retirement by Aung San to join the AFPFL as his lieutenant in the final drive for 
independence.9 Though he still ranked behind other leaders, U Nu’s active nationalism 
saw him rise to AFPFL Vice President in 1947.  Comparatively, Sihanouk was also 
becoming accustomed to his role. After installing him as king, the French had encouraged 
him to journey to different parts of his country, to interact with the people.  Out of this 
                                                
7 Milton Osborne, Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness, (NSW, Australia: Allen & 
Unwin), 1994, p.30
8 U Nu, Burma, p.29.
9 Butwell, U Nu,  p.51
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grew a genuine belief within Sihanouk regarding the symbolic importance of his person 
and the monarchy to his people.  The wartime experience allowed Sihanouk to‘dabble’ 
briefly in state affairs as ‘Prime Minister’, such that  he even emerged at the end of the 
war calling for a form of constitutional democracy through universal male suffrage.10
Despite being ushered into the political process, however, both U Nu and 
Sihanouk still remained largely on the periphery in many ways. For instance, Nu 
organized the campaign, but did not stand for election to the Constituent Assembly in 
April 1947 despite Aung San’s urging him to do so.11 Nu’s reluctance was obvious from 
his repeated hope for a ‘divorce from politics’.  Sihanouk, too, could not yet be “fully 
immersed” in Khmer nationalism; he remained subdued by his colonial loyalties –such as 
publicly declaring that the “Cambodian people had always loved France]12 – and was still 
described by British reports as devoting ‘a considerable amount of his time to personal
amusement.’ 13  As Constitutional Monarch, Sihanouk was also restrained from 
participating fully in Cambodia’s fledgling democratic process; and had to grudgingly 
back the Liberal Party and observe its contest with other emergent parties.  Neither U Nu 
nor Sihanouk remained at the periphery for long, however.  Having arrived at a position 
of involvement, but not dominance, it would take a combination of specific events and 
motivations to give each man that final fortuitous thrust into power.
                                                
10 Osborne, Sihanouk, p.51
11 Butwell, U Nu, p.54  
12 Tully, France, p.400
13 Ibid. p.415  
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1.2 Transition to Power
Sihanouk’s Transition
Sihanouk’s transition began in 1941, with his elevation to kingship at age 
eighteen. He could, however, have remained merely a symbolic king within a 
constitutional monarchy like his Southeast Asian counterparts in Thailand and Malaya, 
but due to a combination of personal motive and fortuitous events, he was able to step out 
of the conventional mold to gain both symbolic and political dominance. Although 
Sihanouk often attributed his transformation from ‘playboy king’ to patriotic statesman as 
a process motivated by his awakening to the ‘inequities of colonial rule’ and a subsequent 
decision to embark upon a crusade for Cambodian independence,14 this perspective is 
somewhat skewed. It was likely that Sihanouk joined the fray in an attempt to stem or 
manage the rising nationalistic tide he regarded as a threat to his image and 
indispensability.  For example, in July 1942, when several thousand nationalist Khmers 
took part in a demonstration inspired by the Nagaravatta – a Khmer-language weekly 
which had begun taking anti-French positions – to demand the release of a nationalist 
monk, Sihanouk neither supported nor sympathized with the protestors.  This event, 
known as the ‘Parasol Revolt’ was significant in establishing Son Ngoc Thanh, one of the  
Nagaravatt’s founders, as a leading figure in Cambodian nationalism.  In 1945, after the 
Japanese had surrendered and many of the ‘Parasol Revolt’ nationalists returned to 
Cambodia– Sihanouk ignored them, presumably because he was ‘jealous of anyone who 
would steal his limelight’.15




Sihanouk at this stage was less concerned for the nationalistic cause than he was 
for his status as Cambodia’s leader. He was astute enough to realize that the symbolic 
status he enjoyed as king could easily be replaced by alternative nationalists such as Son 
Ngoc Thanh.  Thanh had returned from Japan to Cambodia in March 1945 after the 
Japanese orchestrated Cambodia’s “Independence”, and had served as Prime Minister 
from August onwards. After the French returned in September, however, it was rumored 
that Sihanouk had a hand in having Thanh arrested and sent into exile.  Five years later, 
when Thanh was brought back to Cambodia–possibly as a wagering chip in Sihanouk’s 
negotiations with the French – the huge public welcome he received stirred Sihanouk’s 
jealousy. Thanh went on to to threaten Sihanouk directly by following other anti-
monarchical nationalists (Khmer Serei – “Independent Cambodians”) to join the wider 
Khmer Issarak (“Free Cambodians”) leftist rebellion against the French and the 
Cambodian monarchy. Milton Osborne suggested that if there was a single factor that 
gave Sihanouk the final motivational thrust from dilettante politician to a ruler committed 
both to gaining independence and to ensuring that he alone held the reins of power, 
Thanh’s affront would be that factor.16
Arguably, Sihanouk’s transition to power had developed gradually as a series of 
self-preserving motivations and reactions to other political players. It was, however, due 
to the fortuitous timing of political developments that gave him opportunities for 
maneuvering and manipulation.  One significant example was the death of Prince 
Yuthevong, leader of the Democrats, on 18 July 1947.  Formed in April 1946, the 
Democrats had become the best-organized political force in the country, and campaigned 
                                                
16 Osborne, Sihanouk, p.67  
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actively for a constitutional monarchy.  Led by Yuthevong, a capable intellectual who 
had studied in France, the Democrats were the most popular party during Cambodia’s 
period of constitutional parliamentary democracy in the immediate post-war period.  
After winning 50 of 69 seats in the 1946 elections, the Democrats seemed poised to 
dominate the continuing discussion about the form of Cambodia’s constitution with the 
goal of reducing the king’s power.17 At this point, Sihanouk was still largely uninvolved 
in Cambodian politics; though still believing in his divine right to rule, he ratified and 
agreed tacitly to a system of constitutional monarchy. With Yuthevong’s death, however, 
the Democrats not only lost a capable leader who might have rivaled Sihanouk in 
securing Cambodian independence, but the parliamentary system also suffered, as the 
loss of a strong liberal weakened the constitutional system, and paved the way for 
absolutism. Shortly after this, Sihanouk began moving away from the liberal values he 
had earlier espoused and began to interfere in the political process, realizing perhaps that 
the frailty of the parliamentary process was unproductive and dangerous to his position.  
Had Yuthevong survived, the possibility and extent of Sihanouk’s activities might have 
been significantly challenged or reduced.  
U Nu’s Transition
Comparatively, where it was the ‘timely’ death of a rival that played a part in 
Sihanouk’s transition to power, it was the unfortunate death of a friend that pushed U Nu 
into the limelight.  A day after Youthevong’s death on 18 July 1947, General Aung San, 
President of the AFPFL, and Deputy Chairman of Burma’s interim government, was 
assassinated along with a number of other executive councilors.  Although controversy 
                                                
17 Ibid, p.59
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remains over the identities and motives of the perpetrators, it was clear to British 
Governor Sir Hubert Rance and the AFPFL leaders that U Nu should succeed Aung San.  
Nu reluctantly acceded upon Rance’s insistence, but with the condition that it was a 
temporary solution, and that he would be allowed to step down six months after 
independence had been acquired.18 U Nu described the suddenness and significance of 
this event as follows:
“‘Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon 
them.’ Thakin Nu clearly fell into the third category. He did not have any special gifts 
at birth and strove for no qualities to fit him for the office of prime minister; 
circumstances alone put him there.  If at the time of General Aung San’s death either 
Thakin Mya or Deedok U Ba Choe had been spared, it would not have been possible 
for Thakin Nu to assume the premiership.  Thakin Nu himself, as vice-president of the 
AFPFL, would have proposed the name of either one or the other of these and got him 
elected.  As the Burmese might say, U Nu found himself above the shrubbery only 
because a wild ox flung him up there.”19
As leader of the AFPFL, U Nu threw himself passionately into the final push for 
independence, knowing that its reality would enable his departure from politics.  After 
further negotiations in London on the Aung San-Attlee Agreement of January 1947 that 
had committed the British to Burma’s independence, full authority was finally transferred 
on January 4, 1948. Instead of gradually relinquishing the leadership role that had been 
thrust upon him however, the 6 months thereafter saw U Nu becoming more involved as 
                                                
18 The Nation, June 6 1956
19 U Nu, Saturday’s Son, p.135
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Burma’s Premier.  In contrast to Sihanouk, who had feared he would become 
dispensable, U Nu found that his presence was increasingly perceived as vital to the 
stability and success of Burma’s fledgling independence. Similar to Sihanouk, however, 
was the fact that Nu’s transition from temporary Premier, to Burma’s most prominent 
politician for the next decade, was also a combined result of opportunity, political 
developments and personal motivations.  Although U Nu did have different values and 
reasons for taking up power, the one fortuitous event – that of Aung San’s death – not 
only pushed Nu into power, but set in motion a chain of developments over the next year 
that drew Nu deeper into a world he had tried to avoid.  
Aung San’s death not only placed the responsibility of leadership on an unwilling U 
Nu, but also saddled the new Premier with enormous shoes to fill, and even bigger 
problems.  The major challenge of Burma’s diverse and potentially volatile ethnic and 
political groups had been held in check by Aung San’s aura and vision.  In the vacuum 
left by the demise of the man popularly known as the Great General (Bogyoke), however, 
some sought to challenge the considerably weaker leadership and government of the 
inexperienced and introverted Nu.  The most significant of these, was the general-
secretary of the CPB (Communist Party of Burma), Than Tun, who, as an AFPFL 
founder, did not appreciate being relegated by Nu and the Socialists as Burma moved 
towards ‘independence’.  Than Tun denounced the Nu-Attlee Treaty of October 1947 as a 
sham, highlighting the defence arrangement which allowed a British military training 
mission to remain for 3 years, as evidence of British intention to subvert Burma’s 
17
sovereignty.20 When independence was declared in January 1948, it was without the 
support of the CPB, who had by this time decided to ‘intensify the struggle against the 
AFPFL government while the forces of revolution were strong.’21 The CPB’s undertaking 
of armed insurrection effectively forced Nu to remain in office, as he recalled, 
‘On 29 March 1948, seventy-six days after independence, the Communist Party of 
Burma rebelled.  As soon as this happened, Thakin Nu realized that his expectation 
of being able to quit politics by 4 July 1948 had disappeared in the twinkling of an 
eye.’22
Contrary to his initial aim, Nu was to stay in power for the next decade, as Than Tun’s 
revolution was but the first in a series of armed uprisings from various factions and ethnic 
groups that plunged Burma into civil war. 
Both Sihanouk and U Nu had stepped into politics under certain fortuitous 
circumstances, and both had been motivated by fears of national insecurity and 
instability. However, where Sihanouk’s driving fear was that political chaos would 
threaten his position if left unchecked, U Nu’s concern was to maintain the fragile unity 
of the Burmese nation.  Nu stated that his motivation for remaining in office longer than 
intended, was to fulfill a moral and national duty, rather than his own political ambition.  
Whether or not his intentions were sincere, it is clear that Nu did not actively scheme to 
expand his political influence, but was swept along by forces beyond his control; this 
contrasted with Sihanouk’s self-serving motivations and manipulation.  
                                                
20 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, London: Zed Books. 1991, 
p.103
21 Ibid.
22 U Nu, Saturday’s Son, p.147 
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1.3 Inherited  Legacies -  Help or Hindrance?
U Nu and Sihanouk also inherited the historical and political legacies of their 
respective predecessors.  Ushered into power as guiding symbols in the midst of 
uncertainty, both men drew legitimacy and lessons from the past.  On the other hand, 
these legacies also shaped their leadership styles and ideologies, as the transfer of power 
also brought past burdens that affected their political circumstances, choices and 
calculations.  For U Nu, stepping into the shoes of a nationally-revered martyr meant he 
would inadvertently be compared to Aung San and judged by his ability to fulfill the 
“Bogyoke’s” promises and vision.  This ultimately affected Nu’s own actions and 
fortunes as Premier.  Sihanouk, while not having a predecessor’s mission to fulfill, had 
been raised under the larger overlapping influences of French colonial rule and 
Angkorean kingship.  As such, the legacy he inherited was in the form of inculcated 
worldview and traditions.  In comparing the respective mandates that came with their 
leadership mantles, one question was whether these legacies served as useful guiding 
markers, or whether they had potential to become stumbling blocks. This can be analyzed 
in the three issues of national unity, domestic political system and foreign policy.       
National Unity
U Nu’s predecessor, Aung San, had felt that the best way to surmount the 
challenge of uniting the myriad of ethnic groups within Burma was through “unity in 
diversity”, which stressed local autonomy and limited separation among the non Burman 
19
ethnic groups.23 In this regard, Aung San called for the establishment of a Union based on 
a Federal system ‘with properly regulated provisions as should be made to safeguard the 
rights of the National Minorities’.24 To secure cooperation for the Burmese government’s 
push for independence, Aung San promised the Shan, Chin and Kachin groups, at the 
Panglong Agreement of 12 February 1947, that their financial and administrative 
autonomy would not be compromised.  On the specific issue of separate states, the 
agreement stated that a ‘separate Kachin state within a unified Burma…is desirable’.  
Aung San further extended his vision to other groups when, less than two months before 
his death, he stated that: 
“Nobody can deny that the Karens are a national minority…Therefore we must 
concede to them the rights of a national minority…Now when we build our new 
Burma shall we build it as a Union or a Unitary State? In my opinion, it will not 
be feasible to set up a unitary State.’25
Although Aung San died before he could explain how the Union was to be achieved in 
practice, his promise and goal of a Federal Union, resided in spirit and principle with all 
the ethnic groups thereafter.  Aung San believed his achievement at Panglong was an 
‘important guidepost for Burmese seeking a permanent answer to the vexing problem of 
majority-minority relations.’26
This guidepost, however, turned out to be more a barrier for U Nu in his pursuit of 
national unity.  The fact that Aung San was trusted by the minorities because he was fair 
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and had a clear view of their rights and place in the Union of Burma doubtlessly helped 
shape U Nu’s own sincere approach towards the other races.  Beyond that, however, 
Aung San’s legacy proved more a hindrance than a help to U Nu.  Due to Aung San’s 
revered status, Nu had to follow – or at least pay lip-service to – his predecessor’s 
policies.  In practice, however, Nu’s ideas about what constituted and the means of 
achieving national unity differed from Aung San’s.  Where Aung San believed in unity 
within diversity, U Nu was fundamentally opposed to the implications of this principle, 
and to the idea of separate states, that could result in the Union’s disintegration.  
Although Aung San had seriously considered the possibility of separate states within the 
Union, a few months after Aung San’s death, U Nu stated that he was “cent per cent 
against the creation of Autonomous States for Karen, Mons and Arakanese.”27 U Nu’s 
preference for assimilation and the formation of a unitary state would ultimately alienate 
the ethnic groups who felt that Aung San’s promise had been betrayed. 
In comparison, Sihanouk did not have to deal with ethnic issues of such 
magnitude.  Although he had to resolve hostilities between Cambodians and the minority 
Chinese and Vietnamese, there were never pressing demands for statehood in the like of 
Burma’s ethnic nationalities.  Rather, the legacy he received from the French was one 
that had instilled a sense of historical unity and past greatness into the Cambodian people. 
The Cambodian notion of national unity in the wake of the French departure was not one 
simply based on the homogeneity of the Khmer population.  Rather, through the French 
“discovery” of the past glories of fourteenth century Angkorean kingdom, a notion of 
Cambodia was created that ‘bequeathed to the Khmer the unmanageable notion that their 
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ancestors had been for a time the most powerful and most gifted people of mainland 
Southeast Asia.’28 This historical perception of using past grandeur as a framework for 
the present, impacted Sihanouk’s leadership style.  Not only did he use Angkor’s past 
glories to rally his people and give purpose to his policies, but, as David Chandler points 
out, Sihanouk’s thinking was colored by a notion of the essential “innocence” of the 
Cambodian people.   Given that a corollary idea of Angkor was that anything that went 
wrong in Cambodia could be blamed on foreigners29  (where Angkor’s decline in the 12th
century had been a direct result of invasion, first from the Chams in the East, then from 
the Thais in the West) it was no surprise that Sihanouk would be extremely suspicious 
and sensitive towards external criticisms and threats.  This, coupled with an inherent 
resistance towards critical self-examination, ultimately hindered Sihanouk’s ability to 
discern the symptoms and causes of internal discontent and disorder. 
Political System 
In terms of domestic political system, U Nu agreed with Aung San that “true” 
constitutional democracy was the best political structure for Burma’s development, as 
well as the solution to Burma’s quest for national unity.30  ‘By true democracy, Aung San 
meant a state which was based upon the consent of the people and was identified with 
their interests in theory and in practice. Democracy alone, he held, was the foundation 
upon which real national progress could be built.31  After becoming Premier, U Nu built 
on this idea, stressing that democracy not only allowed the individual freedom and the 
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opportunity to develop fully, but also enabled men to choose and change their leaders and 
programmes through peaceful means. 32  Considering the volatile nature of Burmese 
politics after independence, Democracy seemed a necessary way for opposing groups to 
interact through non-violent means.  
U Nu’s emphasis on consultation and consenus however, limited the Burmese 
government’s effectiveness in restoring order..  As opposing personalities in the AFPFL 
wrestled for clout within the democratic framework during the 1950s, the lack of 
consensus paralyzed the civilian government, such that the Army, under General Ne Win, 
had to be called in to form a temporary caretaker government after the AFPFL split in 
1958.  When the Army mounted a coup in 1962 to take full control, it was partly because 
they had lost faith in the effectiveness of Nu’s democratic leadership style that had only 
resulted in a disjointed government, and a Union at the verge of disintegration. The 
‘experiment’ of parliamentary democracy that Nu inherited and was obliged to see 
through, did not bode well for his political fortunes.  Burmese political culture was 
characterized by a deep-rooted authoritarian tradition33, and U Nu faced an uphill task 
from the outset in his attempt to fulfill Aung San’s vision of building democracy in 
Burma. 
In comparison, authoritarianism was the hallmark of the political system left to 
Sihanouk. As described by John Tully, ‘French colonialism did not leave behind a 
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representative government, an independent judiciary, still less a guaranteed free press.  
On balance, colonialism probably strengthened the existing tendencies in traditional 
Cambodian society towards autocracy and the exclusion of the general population from 
decision-making.’ 34   The French had ruled their protectorate in Cambodia as a 
‘dictatorship of police and civil servants’35, and this, perhaps, influenced Sihanouk to 
reject liberal values in favor of authoritarianism; during his career, Sihanouk repeatedly 
dissolved parliament, refused to entertain dissenting opinions, and centralized power by 
creating a political party – Sangkum – to rubber stamp his decisions, and by eventually 
appointing himself Chief of State for life.  The French had governed in a paternalistic 
style, regarding the general population as powerless to advance their own cause; 
Sihanouk seemed to mirror this in the way he considered Cambodians his ‘children’, and 
that he, as their King, knew what was best for them.36 This self-absorption not only 
blinded him to personal failures and mounting public disaffection, but also fuelled 
political dissension in the long run.  The eventual military coup which toppled him, and 
the simultaneous unrestrained rise of subversive Cambodian leftist forces during his 
tenure, were direct reactions to Sihanouk’s one-man rule. The legacy of an authoritarian 
tradition proved disastrous when carried to myopic extremes by Sihanouk.
 Where U Nu inherited a political legacy that aimed to function on the basis of 
popular vote and consensus, Sihanouk received one that compelled him to embrace 
autocratic practices. Both were to find that each political system had its shortcomings 
and consequences.  
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Foreign Policy
One legacy that was relatively more positive and useful as a guide for both 
Sihanouk and U Nu, however, was that of foreign policy.  In posturing and portraying 
their nations within the realm of international affairs, both men relied largely, for better 
or for worse, on the guiding principles laid down by their respective predecessors.
U Nu’s practice of foreign policy was possibly influenced by his predecessor’s 
worldview.  Aung San’s ideas about Burma’s relations with the outside world were based 
on two propositions – firstly, that Burma must be strong internally – politically united, 
economically viable, and administratively effective – in order to protect its people from 
dissolution and external threats; and secondly, that Burma must be allied with friendly 
neighbors and other powers in order to deter or defend against a large-scale attack.’37  
Aung San’s propositions and principles seemed to be reflected and expanded in U Nu’s 
decisions.  Aung San had advocated active participation in the United Nations (UN); U 
Nu took heed, such that when he faced the problem of Chinese Nationalist troops using 
Burma as a base against Communist China, he brought the problem to the UN for 
resolution in 1953.  Aung San had advised regional cooperation with other nations’ 
multilateral interests as means to maintain Burma’s security; U Nu did this, not only by 
taking leading roles in regional initiatives – such as the 1955 Bandung Conference and 
the Non-Aligned Movement –, but also by meeting other leaders to share his views on 
global peaceful coexistence.  Where Aung San had urged rival Chinese political factions 
to find a peaceful solution to their internal disputes, U Nu broadened the ambitions of 
Burmese arbitration efforts by offering to mediate between cold war rivals, US and 
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China.  In this sense, U Nu seemed to build and expand on Aung San’s vision for 
Burma’s place in the world. More significantly, U Nu’s choice of non-alignment and 
friendship to all nations as a means of navigating the dangers of Cold War allegiances, 
also reflected Aung San’s desire for Burma to avoid making enemies.  
In Sihanouk’s case, however, legacies of animosity and aggression were the 
central influences on his understanding of foreign policy.  In addition to the deep history 
of Cambodia’s antipathies and geographical vulnerabilities with regards to its neighbors, 
Thailand and Vietnam, Sihanouk also inherited French regional perceptions and 
experiences.  During the 1930s, France was involved in a territorial dispute with Thailand 
over Battambang and parts of the Siem Reap province in Cambodia.  In 1940, Thailand 
took advantage of French capitulation to Nazi Germany, and took the territories by force 
in a skirmishing war.38 Although the territories were returned to France in 1946 after the 
war, the direct affront to Cambodian territorial sovereignty was reason for future 
suspicions towards Thai intentions. 
With regards to Vietnam, even though it was, like Cambodia, part of French 
Indochina, the French never sought to alleviate the animosity between the two cultures. 
Prior to the French arrival in the 19th century, the Khmers and Vietnamese had long been 
at odds over the fertile lower Mekong delta, where there were no natural topographical 
barriers to Vietnamese expansion, 39  and Vietnam had actually colonized the largely 
Khmer-populated Mekong since the 17th century  It was partly due to Sihanouk’s 




grandfather’s (King Norodom) fear of encroachment from the east, that played into the 
hands of the French colonials seeking to establish a “protectorate” in Cambodia.  Under 
the French however, these fears and suspicions continued.  For instance, as Cambodian 
nationalism developed in the 1930s, a pro-Cambodian newspaper, Nagaravatta, stated 
that Cambodia’s main enemy was not the French, but the “Annamites” who intended to 
take over the country via large scale emigration’.40  When Sihanouk took power, he 
continued this trend in Cambodian nationalism in playing up anti-Vietnamese sentiments 
to garner support. Perhaps the most significant legacy the French left, was that they had 
established a ‘Protectorate’ on the pretext of defending Cambodia from traditional 
enemies;  once the French departed, Cambodia’s fear –whether real or imagined – of its 
neighbours naturally re-emerged.  This could partially explain why Sihanouk eventually 
chose a neutralist path instead of the pro-US stance that Thailand and South Vietnam 
took. Unlike U Nu, Sihanouk did not receive a legacy that advised goodwill and regional 
cooperation; but rather, he was reminded to be wary and, where necessary, aggressive.  
As Sihanouk’s foreign policy developed within this combative and suspicious mold, 
Cambodia became increasingly isolated from neighbours and superpowers alike.  
While their understanding and approach to foreign policy were influenced in 
different ways, both U Nu and Sihanouk inherited the task of ensuring their countries’ 
survival.  To that end, both adopted a form of “neutralism” in dealing with external 
relations – albeit with varying definitions and goals.  Where U Nu’s understanding of 
‘neutralism’ was to avoid entering pacts that would portray Burma as a threat to either 
side in the Cold War, Sihanouk’s aim was to lean Cambodia towards the side that best 
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served Cambodia’s needs at any moment; to use Cambodia’s non-committal status as 
leverage against the different blocs to prevent them, or their proxies, from encroaching 
upon Cambodia’s status and territorial sovereignty.  This will be further discussed in 
Chapter 4.  On the surface, however, U Nu’s approach seemed more sincere and 
straightforward than Sihanouk’s opportunistic and mercurial methods. This difference 
could be partially traced to the differing legacies they each inherited regarding the way 
their respective predecessors approached foreign relations.
1.4  Doomed from the Start?
On balance, the political legacies that U Nu and Sihanouk inherited, and the 
circumstances they found themselves in at the outset, did not bode well for their careers. 
These problems were compounded by the nature of their entry into politics that ensured 
each would face an uphill struggle for legitimacy and effective control throughout much 
of their careers.  Although U Nu and Sihanouk were brought onto the scene to quell 
political divisiveness, the way each man had been ushered to prominence ironically 
resulted in each having a greater potential to divide rather than unite their countries. .     
U Nu for instance, had been thrust into leadership entirely by accident, by the 
“virtue” of being one of the key AFPFL leaders who had escaped assassination.  Aung 
San was still the symbol of Burmese nationalism and this meant Nu began with virtually 
no political currency with which to galvanize either the people or the different interest 
groups within the Union.  The lack of political legitimacy at the outset made it expedient 
for Nu and those who looked to him, to meld his political status with that of traditional 
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Buddhist rulers.  Nu did not exploit his religious beliefs, but the lack of political clout 
meant he was “destined” to be less a symbol of Burmese nationalism than he was a 
symbol of religious revival.  As a proponent of Buddhism, Nu’s political station could be 
somewhat legitimized among the majority Burmans, but would eventually become a 
point of division with the non-Buddhist groups.   
As for Sihanouk, his entry into politics was not achieved by building consensus, 
but by largely sweeping under and over the other political interests in Cambodia.  
Sihanouk exploited his royal status to the maximum, especially in galvanizing support 
from the common people, and made no effort to seek conciliation amongst the political 
interest groups in Phnom Pehn.  Having been regarded a mere “puppet” of the French 
since his appointment to the throne, Sihanouk was already alienated from the existing 
political movements within Cambodia from the outset.  This “outsider” status would 
continue to shape his political approach for the rest of his career, as Sihanouk saw 
himself above the political fray, ruling entirely on the basis of the peoples’ support.  Yet 
it would be the eventual backlash from Phnom Pehn’s political elites that would 
eventually lead to his downfall. 
It is fair to conclude therefore, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, that the seeds 
for  Nu and Sihanouk’s failures were sown from the outset of their political careers.  
Although neither man could change the natural or historical circumstances they received 
– eg. Burma’s ethnic problems; Cambodia’s vulnerable geographical position between 
two traditional rivals – there was nevertheless potential to maneuver in terms of 
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developing their own ideas and policies. In this regard, as their careers progressed, both 
men did seek, at varying levels to ‘free’ themselves from perceived inhibitions, transcend 
past ideas and chart independent paths.  
1.5 A Different Trajectory
 As U Nu and Sihanouk sought to move beyond the roles and molds that had been 
cast by their predecessors, both men realized that to govern effectively, they could not 
remain merely ‘symbolic’ leaders.  The path from symbol to strongman required each to 
prove that his political legitimacy was based on more than inherited mandate or mantle.
For instance, Sihanouk decided to break from his colonial links when he realized 
that his association with the French made him a target for the communists and 
nationalists. The British Foreign Office in Cambodia reported in 1953 that ‘the Vietminh 
and the Khmer Issaraks have preached not only liberation from the French, but the 
overthrow of a King and Government who were mere puppets of France.’41 The rising 
popularity of Son Ngoc Thanh and his radical brand of anti-French nationalism  in the 
early 1950s not only overshadowed Sihanouk’s more conservative, gradualist style,42 but 
also compelled Sihanouk to abandon the sinking colonial ship, and align himself with the 
current of anti-French sentiments.  To cut off the legacy of colonial affiliations, Sihanouk 
not only undertook a ‘Crusade for Independence’ against the French to capture the 
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initiative from other Cambodian nationalists, but even abdicated his throne two years 
later in order to rule independent of monarchical constraints and implications.
U Nu also chose to go his own way at times, not in terms of severing ties with his 
past, as Sihanouk had done, but in altering or sidestepping the ideological legacies that 
had been left him.  For instance, Nu not only substituted Aung San’s ‘unity in diversity’ 
for an approach to nation building based on assimilation; he also extended his religious 
beliefs into politics, whereas Aung San had urged a rigid separation between church and 
state.  Nu saw the state’s role in religion as twofold: to ensure religious freedom and to 
encourage religious interest to instill moral and social values to end insurgent activity.43
Even though Nu generally espoused religious freedom, he also believed and advocated 
that Buddhism held the key to Burma’s social cohesion and enhancement.  As a result, 
his nation-wide promotion of Buddhism led to extensive pagoda-building; the hosting of 
the 6th Buddhist World Conference from 1954-1956 in Rangoon; and eventually, the 
establishment of Buddhism as the state religion in 1961.  These initiatives served–
whether intentionally or otherwise – to ground U Nu’s political legitimacy and public 
image in the mold of Burma’s traditional Buddhist kings and rulers; from this angle, Nu 
was no longer just a substitute or symbol for Aung San’s vision. Although U Nu began 
his political career with the intention of fulfilling Aung San’s goals, the methods and 
ideology he adopted were not always in line with his predecessor’s directives.  
Although both men tried to move away from past ties and influences, the reality 
was that their careers often had to shift and balance between the poles of tradition and 
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modernity. On one hand, the heavy legacies of the past were not entirely hindrances, as 
history and tradition contained ideas and images that most of their people could identify 
with. On the other hand, newly independent countries like Burma and Cambodia were 
under tremendous pressure to transcend past antiquities in order to be recognized as 
modern sovereign nations in a post-colonial world.  This “tension” between past and 
present was reflected in the policies that U Nu and Sihanouk adopted.   Although they 
introduced modern concepts such as Socialism and Neutrality into their political 
terminology; these present-day ideas were often guided by past ideals .  ‘Neutrality’, for 
instance, seemed like a modern idea that developed only in the 1950s as an alternate 
option to taking sides in the Cold War; but neither U Nu nor Sihanouk could separate 
their foreign policies from historical concerns and dynamics – such as the traditional 
“vassal-patron” relationship between Burma and China44, and Cambodia’s deep-rooted 
rivalry with Thailand and Vietnam.  In terms of economic policy, U Nu’s Socialist vision 
of a “Pyidawtha”, was based on the traditional golden-age ideal of a “happy” Burmese 
kingdom built on Buddhist values, where there was neither lack nor sorrow.  Sihanouk’s 
golden-age imagery hearkened to the past glories of Angkor, when Khmer civilization 
was highly advanced, and its rulers governed as revered and beloved god-kings.  In a 
sense, such retrospection by both men may have led to unrealistic perceptions and 
unattainable goals.  The concepts of Socialism and Neutrality will be further discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, against the backdrop of how each man rose and eventually 
fell from power. 
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The following chapter will chart how U Nu and Sihanouk grew from being mere 
symbols, towards becoming strongmen in their respective countries.  After being thrust 
into prominence and transiting successfully into power, U Nu and Sihanouk began their 
careers with much promise and potential.  Yet for both men, it took less than two decades 
before they were unceremoniously removed from power, pushed out even more suddenly 
than they had been ushered in. Were they overcome by a combination of their inherited 
legacies and changing political, social and economic situations? Or were the paths they 
charted for themselves misguided and badly navigated, thus leading them to misfortune? 
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Chapter 2:  From Crisis to Control
Despite their success in securing independence for their respective countries, U 
Nu and Sihanouk were unable to consolidate their respective positions, as they still faced 
challenges and crises. Sihanouk, for example, had to deal with growing political 
uncertainty during the first year of Cambodia’s Independence in 1954 as the time 
approached for him to hand power back to an elected assembly.1 (Sihanouk had dissolved 
the Democratic government in 1952 and had governed without Parliament on the basis 
that decisive leadership was necessary to carry out his “Crusade for Independence.”) For 
U Nu, the departure of the British opened the door to a series of insurrections that began 
with the Communists, and later, the PVO, and the Karen National Union (KNU) and its 
affiliated groups which did not trust their interests in the hands of a predominantly 
Burman government.  Comparatively, the crises they faced differed in severity –
Sihanouk’s domestic political rivals seemed almost mild in comparison to the thousands 
of armed rebels who fought against U Nu’s government.  For both men, however, the 
threat of being displaced or overthrown was very real in the initial stages of their 
leadership.   
This chapter will compare the parallel paths they took in overcoming these crises 
to reach respective milestones of consolidation and control.   As both U Nu and Sihanouk 
moved from weakness to strength, their successes were often lauded as indicators that 
their countries had entered a new phase of nationhood; the perceived stability within their 
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countries also gave them confidence to push their domestic agenda, as well as to venture 
into global diplomacy.  One critical question is whether such confidence was misplaced 
from the outset; did each man merely achieve a semblance of consolidation that only 
papered over political problems and social divisions?  
2.1  Milestones – Established Leaders
The transition from crisis to a milestone of calm and confidence was certainly 
noted by foreign observers in each country. In Burma, for instance, the British Foreign 
Office made a bleak observation in 1950 that the previous year had seen a ‘steady and 
general deterioration…in every aspect of Burmese internal affairs.’2 This contrasted with 
the positive picture at the end of 1954 where there was ‘relative stability and increased 
security’ in Burma as compared to the previous three years of civil war and border 
encroachments from Chinese Nationalist KMT forces in the north.  The marked change in 
tone and optimism suggested that Nu had somehow managed to turn his country’s 
fortunes around and consolidate his position, all within a span of five years.  
  As domestic stability increased, so did U Nu’s authority and this enabled him to 
exert his influence in religious and economic affairs.  For instance, Burma hosted the 
Sixth Buddhist Synod in Rangoon on May 17, 1954 – an event which U Nu had first 
envisioned in 1951 as part of Burma’s Buddhist Revival.3 The event was an indication of 
Nu’s standing at home and in the wider Buddhist world. Similarly, as the relative stability 
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allowed the government to embark upon the Pyidawtha (“Pleasant Royal Country”) 
Scheme to mold Burma into a self-supporting Welfare state, Nu’s elevated role was 
apparent in 1955, when he took charge of economic policy to balance Burma’s foreign 
budget.4  Such domestic consolidation fuelled confidence abroad, as 1955 marked a year, 
‘more than at any other time since independence, that Burma concerned herself with 
international affairs.’5 Through a series of high profile overseas trips and visits by foreign 
dignitaries, U Nu’s international prestige was enhanced to a point where he could single-
handedly conduct Burma’s foreign policy.6 This was affirmed by his contemporaries 
abroad who credited Nu as one of the principal conveyors and moving spirits of the 
landmark 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung.7  Given Burma’s stability and U 
Nu’s personal clout in the mid-1950s, the British Foreign Office could state confidently 
that ‘Burma… has the best Burmese Government it has ever had.’8
In Cambodia, the 1955 British Foreign Office report warned that Sihanouk’s three 
years of personal rule was nearing its end, as power was due to be returned to 
Parliament. 9   Sihanouk had promised to achieve independence and internal security 
within three years, and had used the pervading tide of nationalistic fervor surrounding his 
kingship to maintain his power. Not content with remaining a constitutional monarch, 
Sihanouk had moved –with tacit French support –against the Democrats; he launched a 
political coup in June 1952, took the helm of a mission to liberate Cambodia, amended 
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the constitution and generally tried to consolidate his position by increasing his hand in 
internal politics. Now that Sihanouk had ‘fulfilled’ his promises, he found himself facing 
a bleak and uncertain future.  Despite his popularity, the departure of the French left the 
Prince vulnerable as the Democrats and other political rivals – including the jungle-based 
rebel Son Ngoc Thanh – seemed poised to challenge him. To make matters worse, 
‘having won independence, Sihanouk was uncertain how to proceed; he had no program 
for governing Cambodia – no foreign policy, no priorities, no economic plans.’10
This pessimistic view contrasted with the situation 5 years later, when in 
December 1960, the Prince, as Cambodia’s dominant international representative, 
returned from official visits to Czechoslovakia, USSR, Outer Mongolia and China, 
having garnered warm receptions and personal promises of increased economic aid to 
Cambodia.11  Along with major developments in infrastructure and services, Cambodia 
was commended in 1960 for its considerable economic progress, sound financial 
position, and significant increase in trade.’12 Such relative stability and success were 
indicative of Sihanouk’s firm domestic standing.  Earlier that same year on 20th June, 
about two months after his father, the King, had died, Sihanouk put an end to the debate 
over the issue of succession by appointing himself Chief of State for life.  The fact that he 
did this relatively unopposed, and could even portray it unabashedly as ‘giving way to 
popular demand’ showed how far he had come since the tenuous years of having to share 
the limelight with other political rivals.  
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With these milestones in mind – the mid-1950s for Nu, and 1960 for Sihanouk – it 
becomes clear that both men had been relatively successful in consolidating power. In 
comparing the way and extent to which each man did this, it becomes clear how different 
their circumstances and personalities were on one hand, yet how similar some of the 
methods and vehicles they employed were on the other.  
2.2 From Independence to Instability
A major turning point in U Nu and Sihanouk’s respective careers was the securing 
of national independence.  Thereafter, the level of their power and prestige, as well as the 
complexity of the challenges they faced, rose to new heights.   In this regard, the 
transition from colonial rule to nationhood was a crucial period which conditioned their 
leadership styles and which set in motion circumstances that would influence the rest of 
their careers.  
Sihanouk’s Crusade
For instance, Sihanouk’s desire to dominate Cambodia’s political scene was 
partly a result of the personal vulnerability and political instability he experienced in the 
lead-up to independence. As the role of the Khmer monarchy came under increasing 
threat from nationalists –including party politicians, communists (Viet Minh supporters), 
leftist guerillas (Khmer Issarak) and anti-royalist rebels (Khmer Serei), Sihanouk 
embraced the goal of Cambodian Independence as a prize that  would give him 
legitimacy over his rivals.  This fervor for independence contrasted with his previous lack 
of interest when the Japanese had ‘granted’ Cambodia ‘Independence’ in March 1945, 
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when the most ‘nationalist’ act Sihanouk did was to abrogate two French laws to restore 
Cambodian culture– by reverting to the original Khmer alphabet and the Buddhist 
calendar. After the Japanese left, Sihanouk even welcomed the French back, and worked 
with them to outline a new constitution for Cambodia.  This tone changed dramatically 
once Sihanouk realized that the growing nationalist movement was threatening to 
overtake him.   
Following the French decision in 1946 to allow the Cambodians to form political 
parties and to hold elections for a Consultative Assembly, the resultant constitution 
vested powers in a popularly elected National Assembly, and reduced Sihanouk to a 
constitutional monarch.  With his status downgraded, Sihanouk nevertheless tried to take 
advantage of the ineffective Parliamentary system.  For instance, when the National 
Assembly was dissolved in September 1949, Sihanouk agreed to a French proposal for a 
“limited” Cambodian independence within the French Union that gave Cambodians most 
administrative control.  Despite Sihanouk’s claim that this was tantamount to “fifty 
percent independence”, the treaty was never ratified by the National Assembly, and the 
dominant Democrats derided Sihanouk for giving in to the French.  
By 1950, although the Democrats continued to be the strongest political party, the 
National Assembly’s weakness was noted by foreign observers, that ‘political jockeying 
among the parties in the Council and rivalries between Ministers continued to weaken the 
Government and prevent it from applying its energies to the real task in hand.’13  Two 
years later, the criticism continued that ‘the Democratic Party Government of M. Huy 
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Kanthoul failed altogether to live up to its promise on paper and in a riot of impotence, 
ineptitude and inexperience degenerated rapidly into demagogy.’14 Fearing that Son Ngoc 
Thanh or the underground Khmer Issarak movement would usurp the nationalist 
movement if parliamentary political infighting continued to divide the peoples’ loyalty, 
Sihanouk seized the initiative to rally the nation.  Using his constitutional status as the 
‘spiritual head of state’, Sihanouk dismissed Huy Kanthoul’s government on 15th June, 
formed a new ministry under his leadership to reform the country, and a year later, 
launched his Royal Crusade for Independence.  Riding on the wave of nationalistic 
emotions generated by his promise to obtain full and complete independence within 3 
years, Sihanouk enjoyed a relatively free hand in ruling without Parliamentary 
hindrances.15  
In latter years, Sihanouk would claim that it was this popular mandate and his 
personal aggressiveness that forced the French to leave Cambodia.  To his credit, 
Sihanouk did provide a powerful voice for Cambodia independence that caught the 
French by surprise, and forced them to realize belatedly that Sihanouk was no longer the 
subservient symbolic ruler they had earlier handpicked to legitimize colonial rule.  
Between February and November 1953, Sihanouk pressured the French by drawing 
international attention to Cambodia’s situation through overseas trips – including visits to 
France, US, Canada and Japan –; through dramatic and volatile anti-colonial radio 
broadcasts; and by mobilizing demonstrations to demand the transfer of sovereignty. 
Sihanouk was determined to force France to grant the same kind of independence 
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enjoyed by Britain’s former colonies,16 no doubt drawing inspiration from the examples 
of India, Pakistan, and Burma.  
U Nu and Sihanouk compared
Unlike Sihanouk, U Nu did not have to fight as hard to either control the tide of 
nationalism or secure independence.  Burmese independence had already been 
guaranteed under the Aung San-Attlee Agreement of January 1947; after a visit by Nu to 
London in October for final negotiations, independence was declared on January 4, 1948.  
While it seemed that Sihanouk played a more pivotal role for Cambodia’s independence 
than U Nu did for Burma, the extent of Sihanouk’s contributions is debatable. When 
Sihanouk launched his Crusade, French regional power and presence was already 
declining due to their conflict with the Viet Minh. After the French government decided 
in July 1953 to wind up the “dirty war”17, which in turn accelerated their withdrawal from 
Indochina, it was a matter of time before Cambodia’s independence became reality. 
Sihanouk’s public ranting was not the reason for French capitulation; limited resources 
were. In this sense, Sihanouk’s efforts, like U Nu’s, could be considered as putting the 
‘final touches’ to a process already initiated and well-advanced.
In this regard, the act of overseeing the transference of sovereignty by U Nu and 
Sihanouk could be considered more symbolic than substantial.  Sihanouk’s public 
posturing did more to create an image of himself as “Father of Independence” in 
Cambodia, than it did in reality to wrest his country from Colonial control; U Nu’s 
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successful negotiations with the British testified to the symbolic creation of a free and 
united Burma, but did not change nor reflect the reality of simmering political and ethnic 
division in his country.  In both Cambodia and Burma, the symbolic success of 
independence masked unresolved problems and challenges.  Sihanouk’s political rivals –
who felt they had as much, if not more, claim to Cambodia’s independent future –
remained as undercurrents that would eventually challenge him.  In Burma, the facade of 
unity that the AFPFL, its opponents and the various rival ethnic and political groups, had 
put up to convince Britain that Burma was ready for independence,18 was no longer 
cemented by the common goal of independence, and was ready to crumble.     
Although Sihanouk’s struggles to outmaneuver other nationalists and secure 
Independence contrasted with U Nu’s relatively straightforward task, Nu differed from 
Sihanouk in the aftermath of Independence, when Burma faced much greater instability 
than in Cambodia.  Where Sihanouk had been conditioned during his “fight” for 
Independence, Nu was molded by the chaos he faced in post-colonial Burma.  What they 
had in common, however, were the real challenges that emerged once the symbolic glow 
of independence wore off.  
Although each man stamped his political authority through his initial successes, 
the conclusion of the national quest for independence also opened the way for political 
infighting and instability. Up till then, both men had enjoyed tacit support, tolerance and 
even justification of their policies and positions.
                                                




After Independence had been achieved in Burma, not only was U Nu unable to 
step down within the first six months as he intended, but he found himself entangled in a 
struggle to preserve the fragile unity that Aung San had pulled together.  Independence 
marked the beginning of Burma’s tragedy, as the government did not have the 
administrative experience or strategy to handle ethnic diversity and political 
fragmentation.  Martin Smith stated that ‘few countries have had a more perilous 
transition to independence than Burma.19  Independence arrived with the Red Flags of 
Thakin Soe and various Arakanese and Mujahid guerillas already in the field; in March 
1948, the CPB’s mainstream White Flag faction under Than Tun went into open revolt.  
The communist uprising split the Peoples Volunteer Organization (PVO) – Burma’s 
diverse home guard that had previously been held together by Aung San’s leadership –
and sixty per cent of the PVO defected to join the rebels in May.20  Despite U Nu’s 
efforts to negotiate a 15-point Leftist Unity Plan in May 1948 to retain the PVO remnants 
and to woo the underground Communists, he met with a lukewarm response as 
ideological and personal differences between rebel leaders and the dominantly Socialist 
government proved too wide to bridge successfully.  Instead, the defections continued, as 
the All Burma Youth League decided to withdraw from the AFPFL in December 1948 to 
avoid the increasing politicking. Two months later, the crisis escalated exponentially 
when the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) – organized by the Karen 
National Union (KNU) resorted to armed revolt over the unresolved issue of an 
independent Karen state.  
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Faced with a series of insurrections, and further assailed by a nationwide 
Ministerial Services Union strike that began on February 7 and which soon spread to 
students and the Railway Union, ‘U Nu called February, March and April, 1949, the 
bleakest months; “All of us were kept in a terrible state of suspense.” He estimated that 
there were 10,000 rebels in the field in both the Communist and KNDO insurrections, 
about half of these deserters from the Army, police and other services.  The authority of 
Nu’s government literally ended in the outlying suburbs of Rangoon, and at one point did 
not even include the whole of the capital city itself.  For most of Burma, there was no 
government.’21
Sihanouk’s Challenges
Compared to U Nu’s post-Independence crises, Sihanouk’s domestic problems 
seemed trivial, but still posed a challenge.  Despite stamping his political authority by 
“winning” independence for the country, Sihanouk still faced dissension and uncertainty.  
In 1954, a British diplomat noted that ‘the popularity of the regime began to diminish 
through lack of public confidence in the oligarchy of Ministers and Privy councilors, 
nominees of the King or of the Queen Mother, who have been its instruments since the 
suspension of responsible government in June 1952.’22  Furthermore, the Democrats still 
had in mind a Cambodian political system that would relegate the monarch to a 
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secondary position.23  As patience from other political players towards Sihanouk wore 
thin, the politician-King realized he had to further consolidate his position. 
2.3 Conciliation and Consolidation
As their respective countries moved from independence to instability, Nu tried to 
bring about conciliation between divisive forces and Sihanouk sought to consolidate his 
leadership.  U Nu’s goal was to appease the various factions’ anger and distrust toward 
the Burmese government, and to prevent the disintegration of the Union; Sihanouk 
aimed to cement his position in Cambodian politics by quelling parliamentary and party 
opposition.  Naturally, conciliation led to consolidation and vice versa; U Nu’s push for 
national unity and cooperation helped firm up his position and indispensability, and 
Sihanouk’s push to suppress the voices of dissension resulted in seeming – albeit 
temporary – consensus and harmony in Cambodian politics. For both, however, their 
efforts were often reactive and impulsive, borne out of instinct, intuition and immediate 
necessity rather than long-term planning and foresight.  
U Nu: Conciliation and Compromise
U Nu’s instinctive response was to prevent armed rebellion through compromise 
and negotiation rather than force, but his good intentions ultimately proved futile.  This 
was evident in his engagement with the CPB, the PVO defectors, and the Karens.  The 
CPB had accused the Socialist-dominated AFPFL of producing only a ‘sham 
independence’ that ‘betrayed’ Burma’s sovereignty; the PVO majority (65%) faction   
that defected (“White Band” PVO) were unhappy at their demobilization and decline in 
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political importance.24 To appease both parties and maintain unity, Nu called for a new 
Socialist Party-PVO-CPB coalition; he tried to woo the PVOs who had defected, through 
a 15-point Leftist Unity Programme proposing increased socialism and closer relations 
with the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries. As a last resort, Nu even 
offered to resign as Prime Minister and AFPFL President if the various factions could 
agree on a peaceful solution.  Unfortunately, the talks failed amidst irreconcilable 
positions and the would-be rebels’ decision to strike while the Burmese government was 
still weak. The CPB took an increasingly militant line in backing mass strikes and 
mobilizing armed personnel; and in late March 1948, the White Flags Communists (led 
by Than Tun) broke negotiations and went into open rebellion.  Four months later, the 
PVO also chose to rebel. 
Even after talks had failed, Nu’s hope for a negotiated settlement with the 
Communists lasted into 1949,25 but despite a series of conciliatory gestures such as offers 
of government posts, and the promise of early elections, Nu failed to persuade the rebels 
to lay down their arms. Nu attributed his own tendency to ‘let the enemy strike him four 
or five times before he retaliated’ 26 to his indecision and lack of firmness; and it was 
perhaps this factor that delayed a conclusive solution to Burma’s mounting security 
problems.   Nu would only adopt force as a last resort; this was also evident in his 
approach to the Karen issue. 
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The Karens had never accepted the provisions for a Karen State under the terms 
of the 1947 Constitution27 so Nu tried to negotiate a peaceful solution with the KNU and 
its leader, Saw Ba U Gyi. Despite increasing evidence of Karen militia and KNDO 
operations, U Nu toured the Lower Delta regions with Ba U Gyi to try to stem the threat 
of communal war through dissuasion and discussion, such that ‘his efforts for Karen-
Burman unity earned him the uncomplimentary nickname of “Karen Nu’’.28 Even after 
the situation deteriorated to the point of a KNU-led KNDO open rebellion in January, 
1949, Nu still tried to ease tensions through radio and press statements, calling for calm 
and non-retaliation from the Burmans.   
Nu persisted in trying to achieve a peaceful solution – he continued to offer 
amnesty and negotiation to rebels in exchange for surrender of arms; but faced with 
opponents who were ‘determined to force the issue’, Nu decided ‘he would meet force 
with force.’29  In the second half of 1948, Nu formed auxiliary defence groups – which 
numbered over 100 by year’s end – known as the Sitwundans (“peace guerillas”), for 
territorial and rear deployment.30  To bolster his poorly-equipped forces, Nu requested 
military and financial assistance from abroad – in particular India. 31  Under the 
‘uncompromising personality’ of the new Army Chief-of-Staff, General Ne Win32 who 
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took advantaged of the rebels’ lack of coordination, 33  the better organized Burmese 
troops began to retake key areas.  Throughout, Nu still tried to avoid violence– for 
instance, by his own account he tried to persuade an army commander to avoid killing 
PVO rebels by controlling their artillery fire.34 Nu justified his use of force through the 
life stories of a Buddha-to-be, Mahawthada, who had said he would only ‘wage war in 
defence of the realm and its people, and to protect them against harm and not for self-
aggrandizement.’35
As U Nu hesitated and gave leeway to the rebels in the hope for a peaceful 
resolution, the result was a Burmese government constantly reacting to, rather than 
decisively dealing with, the insurgents. More than once, Nu stalled over warning signs of 
impending violence and only took forceful measures after his opponents struck first. This 
repeated surrender of initiative may have allowed the rebellions to drag on, which in turn 
distracted the Burmese government from formulating pre-emptive or long-term solutions 
to address the root causes of division.
   
Sihanouk: Consolidation and Confrontation 
In comparison, Sihanouk had no qualms about seizing initiatives, or adopting 
forceful measures for self-aggrandizement. In taking pre-emptive steps to consolidate his 
power, he displayed a ruthlessness that U Nu lacked, and a belief in his indispensability 
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that contrasted with Nu’s ever-willingness to exit the scene if that could pave the way for 
political conciliation.  
Unlike U Nu, Sihanouk did not have to deal with armed insurgencies, but he still 
faced resurgent political opposition.  The 1954 Geneva Conference that decided the fate 
of Indochina after French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, had left Cambodia’s territorial 
integrity intact and did not give special rights to its leftist rebels – unlike Vietnam and 
Laos –; but it did schedule a Cambodian General Election. 36  Sihanouk’s political 
opponents – including the Democrats, Communists, and Son Ngoc Thanh’s forces –
planned to use the elections to reduce the King’s power.  ‘Against all this, the seven or 
eight parties led by friends and associates of the King had no chance of obtaining a 
majority.  There was further danger that before long, the common people would lose 
patience with the corruption and self-seeking of professional politicians in general.’37 To 
reverse this dismal forecast, Sihanouk undertook a series of high-handed initiatives.  
These included, conducting a national referendum to build his political base and 
legitimacy, abdicating his throne to participate more freely and fully in politics, forming 
his own movement to subsume and suppress political alternatives, and even clamping 
down on the press.
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On 7 February 1955, Sihanouk submitted his recent ‘Royal Crusade’ to a national 
referendum; the result was an overwhelming affirmation of his leadership and policies.38
To gain this result, however, the referendum had been staged as a vote for or against 
Cambodia’s monarchy; hardly a fair choice for the majority of Cambodians that revered 
the country’s royal traditions and institutions.  Following this victory, Sihanouk arrested 
the editors of several Khmer newspapers that had challenged his claim to have won true 
and complete independence for Cambodia in 1953. 
Despite these advances, Sihanouk remained ‘distraught that his popularity might 
be manufactured and was frightened of being cast aside by the political parties in the 
unavoidable elections.’ 39  To ‘take command of Cambodian politics and cease being 
merely a ceremonial ruler’,40 Sihanouk abdicated his 14-year kingship on 2 March, 1955.  
The move surprised even his parents, but effectively freed Sihanouk from the labels and 
technical trappings of the monarchy, and allowed him to engage in politics without fear 
of being criticized by those who felt a king should remain symbolic and apolitical.  
Furthermore, by allowing his father, Suramarit, to become king, Sihanouk did not have to 
fear another person would abuse the throne for political power.    
With his newfound political freedom, Sihanouk began to prepare for the elections 
scheduled for September 1955. In early April, he formed a broad national political 
movement, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community) that sought to 
submerge party differences by requiring members to ‘abjure’ membership in other 
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political groups.  With loyalty to the throne and to Sihanouk’s policies as the only 
requirements for membership, the organization aimed at being broad and flexible enough 
to accommodate a wide range of political opinion.41 Through this, Sihanouk hoped to 
achieve both conciliation and consolidation; first by containing differing voices within a 
mass movement, then by uniting these voices in common support for him.  These aims 
came closer to reality during the September elections, when, under the auspices of terror 
tactics and widespread corruption, the Sangkum won 83 per cent of the votes cast, 
thereby ensuring the National Assembly would almost entirely be made up of Sihanouk’s 
supporters.  At the close of 1955, Sihanouk was “credited” with having ‘dealt with the 
problem of making democracy work without giving up personal power.’42 The decisive 
election results were a culmination of Sihanouk’s efforts to take over Cambodian politics 
and proved a turning point for his career.
Turning Points
  U Nu’s turning point was in 1950, when the threats of insurrection and political 
disintegration were significantly reduced.  In January, the Socialists and Yellow-Band 
PVOs returned to the Cabinet43 (they had withdrawn from the government the previous 
year when U Nu refused to bring some rebel leaders into the government.44)  In March, 
the PVO broke alliance with the Communists, thereby reducing the threat of a potentially 
dangerous combination.  In August, the Karen (KNU) leader Saw Ba U Gyi was 
ambushed and killed by an army patrol.  By the end of the year, all but one of the 
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administrative headquarter towns, along with many of the smaller towns and the main 
lines of communication were again in government hands45 and observers noted that ‘the 
authority of Thakin Nu and his supporters was more firmly established than at any time 
since they assumed office.’46
This positive turn in events was partly brought about, ironically, by U Nu’s failed 
attempts at conciliation.  With regards to the rebels, failed negotiations opened the way 
for the Burmese government to adopt more forceful – and effective –measures against the 
insurgents.  Within the AFPFL and central government, U Nu’s inability to prevent the 
mass defections and political infighting, left him as the central figure.  Despite such 
“prominence by default”, Nu’s presence, nevertheless provided the Burmese Union with 
a rallying symbol and the leadership necessary to tide through its early trials. Richard 
Butwell applauded Nu for his ‘survival and assertive performance as Burma’s leader’ 
despite the fact that his tenure in office was due primarily to the impossibility of finding a 
successor acceptable to the different groups (the Socialists, the PVO, the minority 
peoples and the Communists) involved in the Burma’s turbulent political process. 47
Martin Smith, too, attributed the survival of the Burmese government in 1948-52 to Nu, 
who, ‘despite frequent threats to resign, appeared at times to be single-handedly keeping 
together a viable government coalition in Rangoon.’48
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Comparatively, Sihanouk – as the dominant force in the majority Sangkum party 
– also seemed to be the central figure keeping the Cambodian government together after 
the 1955 elections.  Observers noted that ‘the force which holds the Sangkum 
together…is the personality of Prince Sihanouk himself. So long as he was leading the 
Government, his popularity diverted whatever disapproval some of their actions might 
incur’ and that ‘when the time came for a government to be formed it was obvious that no 
one else could command the allegiance of more than a fraction of the Sangkum elite, who 
were as ready to fall out among themselves as Cambodian politicians have ever been.’49
Like U Nu, Sihanouk had faced the risk of political infighting; where they differed, 
however, was that Sihanouk did not negotiate or compromise with his opponents. Rather, 
by continually seizing the initiative and placing himself at the forefront of Cambodian 
political processes, Sihanouk left his opponents little room to maneuver.  After the 1955 
elections, for instance, many Democrats were cowed into joining the Sangkum and 
ceased to be a viable threat to Sihanouk by 1956.50 Sihanouk further conceived the idea 
of a twice-yearly Congress of the Sangkum, which was in theory based on “ancient Greek 
democracy”, but proved to be a stage-managed way of neutralising political opposition.51  
Through the Sangkum, a political vehicle driven by the sheer force of his personality, 
Sihanouk overwhelmed and contained the diverse political voices and ambitions within 
Cambodia, thereby bringing a semblance of conciliation to the political scene 
surrounding his consolidated position.  On October 2, 1955, Sihanouk capped the year’s 
achievements when he became both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.
                                                





Although both U Nu and Sihanouk had surmounted domestic problems to reach 
unprecedented plateaus of stability and strength, their positions were established on weak 
foundations. It is arguable that U Nu and Sihanouk’s attempts at consolidating power, 
while seemingly successful, were neither conclusive nor sustainable.    
For instance, Sihanouk’s popularity managed only to divert or temporarily contain 
dissension. His consolidation of personal power was achieved less through consensus-
building than it was through the undermining of other political forces.  Sihanouk truly 
believed that his “relationship” with the masses kept him above the fray of political 
infighting. As Sihanouk placed his faith in this political base and sought to develop his
personal influence into an institutionalized autocracy, the political system he built around 
his popularity bolstered his self-belief and numbed him to the possibility and signs of 
domestic unrest that would later emerge.     
U Nu, too, had provided a temporary solution by quelling the violence and 
bringing a semblance of peace to Burma, but he had not been able to formulate a viable 
long-term policy to cultivate national unity.  Nu had tried to build consensus through a 
combination of acquiesance, appeasement, and ultimately, threat of aggression, but the 
fundamental division between Burma’s political center with non-Burmans and leftists 
could not be resolved conclusively.  More forebodingly, it was during this period that the 
Burmese army grew as a force that would later see itself as an alternative to the 
inefficient civilian government.  
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Despite these foreboding indicators which only become apparent with the benefit 
of hindsight, U Nu and Sihanouk did manage to tide through periods of uncertainty and 
this in turn emboldened them to  take greater personal control in domestic and foreign 
policies. 
2.4 Confident Leadership - Venture into Socialism and Neutralism 
After consolidating their positions, both U Nu and Sihanouk sought to advance 
specific ideologies that became trademarks of their respective countries’ development 
during the 1950s and 60s.  During this time, although both continued to face various 
levels of domestic and cross-border instability, their improved control at home gave them 
more confidence to advance their agenda in both domestic and foreign policy.  
U Nu: Political Stability 
In Burma, 1951 was a year of significant progress in the restoration of political 
and economic stability. During the year’s elections, the better-organized AFPFL 
combined the aura of Aung San’s name with Nu’s rising popularity to win 75% of the 
majority vote.52 By late 1951, the weakened rebels no longer stood as alternatives to the 
AFPFL Government, and with a fresh electoral mandate, Burmese leaders could begin to 
plan for the future instead of improvising from day to day. 53  With more peaceful 
conditions, acreage under cultivation began to rise, and work could be resumed on the 
solution of Burma’s economic problems.54 Observers in Burma that year noted that ‘the 
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government of Thakin Nu, drawing fresh confidence from its new-found 
constitutionality, may now feel better able to carry out more vigorous policies both of 
pacification and reconstruction.’55
U Nu began by re-stating the goal of building a Socialist Welfare State through 
ethical and moral transformation of the people.  In a 1951 speech, U Nu highlighted 
moral reform as one of the ‘the five main pillars of Health, Education, Morals, 
Economics and National Solidarity which must support a nation.’56 He even considered 
promoting a Buddhist revival that would give birth to the moral transformation he 
believed was necessary for economic progress.  Nu’s belief that collective social values 
could transform political and economic realities would later extend into foreign policy in 
his attempts to correct the global prejudices; but at the beginning of the 1950s, Nu 
continued to follow the line of relatively passive neutrality that was modeled after India’s 
foreign policy. At that point, ‘Burma’s attention was too much pre-occupied with internal 
problems for her to devote much time to international affairs; she was again more a 
spectator than an active participant.’57
One such internal problem was the presence of over 2000 KMT Chinese soldiers 
in the Shan State on Burma’s eastern frontier, who had sought refuge there since 1950 to 
attack the Chinese communist forces in Yunnan.  To reduce the risk of spillover conflict, 
the Burmese military tried to drive the KMT forces out, while U Nu tried to reach a 
political solution with Taiwan Nationalist and Chinese Communist leaders.  At the end of 
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1952, the Prime Minister declared that the insurrection was ‘95 per cent finished’.58 This 
claim was given further weight in 1953, when the United Nations passed a resolution 
mandating KMT withdrawal from Burma.  (With hindsight however, Nu’s optimism in 
the early 1950s was misplaced, as the problem continued to pose a risk Burma’s security 
for the rest of his tenure.) 
Politically, U Nu grew increasingly secure in his position at the head of a 
coalition government comprising the Burma Socialist Party (BSP) and a number of 
Independents, such that by 1953, he was acknowledged as the ‘personality that held the 
coalition together, and guided it in major matters.’59  That same year, as the government 
became more stable, Burma played a more active role in the international sphere than in 
the past.60 For instance, while continuing to project and promote her status of neutrality 
and non-alignment, Burma also became an advocate of Socialism, by holding the Asian 
Socialist Conference in Rangoon.   By 1955, this role expanded even further in inverse 
proportion to its domestic troubles; as the threat of insurrection was reduced, Burma’s 
government adopted a more active role in foreign affairs, and U Nu began efforts to 
mediate between the leading nations of the two Cold War blocs. 61
In essence, as the 1950s commenced, U Nu found his political footing and began 
to enforce his agenda in various spheres. Domestically, he set in motion a developmental 
plan based on socialist principles and the models of a welfare state that would be created 
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by a united Burmese people motivated by moral and cultural convictions.  In foreign 
affairs, he encouraged the promotion of international socialism and also a status of 
neutrality that encouraged all-round international goodwill without siding with positions 
or blocs that would antagonize others. 62   In both areas, the policies adopted were 
identified very largely with the personal philosophy of U Nu – such as his belief in 
socialist principles, and also his genuine and fervent religious piety.
Sihanouk: Dominant Personality
Such a reflection of personality onto policies was also evident in Sihanouk’s 
leadership.  Once consolidated in power, the choices and consequences of his policies 
were often linked to his personality and beliefs.  This was noted by observers in 
Cambodia who noted in 1956, the ‘strong reflection of the strong personality and prestige 
of Prince Sihanouk’ and stated that ‘the country’s continued instability, both in internal 
and external affairs, is largely attributable to the vagaries of the Prince’s character.’63
Internally, Sihanouk’s impatience and self-indulgence had aggravated the 
problem of governmental instability. For instance, within the span of one year, five 
different governments took office in succession, two of them headed by the Prince 
himself.64  The rapid turnover in leadership was due to the inefficiency and corruption 
within the Sangkum’s administration, and also to its President, Sihanouk’s impatience for 
results, and his misguided choice of Cambodia’s public servants.  Externally, 1956 
marked the increase of cross-border tensions between Cambodia and its historically 
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antagonistic neighbours; relations with South Vietnam soured over the issues of troop 
incursions into Cambodia, and also that of trade restrictions. Thailand and Cambodia 
were also ‘unable to reconcile their positions over a remote but religiously important 
temple on the frontier’65. Two years later, in November 1959, diplomatic relations with 
Thailand were broken off.  Cambodia’s ill relations with its neighbours were partly due to 
Sihanouk’s suspicious nature; Sihanouk was convinced that Thailand and South Vietnam 
were conspiring with the Khmer Serei against him.  He also posed domination by the 
Vietnamese as the ultimate threat to Cambodia, knowing full well that ‘resentment and 
fear of the Vietnamese was more potent to raise emotion in Cambodian breasts than fear 
of Communism.’ 66
Despite signs of government and border instability in the late 1950s, Sihanouk’s 
popularity and self-belief continued to grow. Like U Nu, Sihanouk looked past his 
domestic problems and endeavored to make an impact on the international scene.  Even 
as the government changed hands again, and Sihanouk decided to step down as Prime 
Minister in October 1956, he hinted, when relinquishing the post, that he felt that he was 
‘destined for some important international role.’67 By this time, Sihanouk had grown in 
his conviction that the neutrality Cambodia had adopted in 1954 was beneficial, not only 
in managing relations with the great powers, but also for the purpose of exerting leverage 
and influence within the international sphere.  Upon Cambodia’s admission to the United 
Nations in December 1955, Sihanouk had reinforced his country’s neutralist policy by 
stating that: “Cambodia wishes for friendly and diplomatic relations with all countries 
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which respect its sovereignty, its integrity and its ideal of peace; in general it will align its 
foreign policy with that of India and Burma;…”68 From this statement, Cambodia seemed 
to follow in Burma’s footsteps, even in endorsing the Five Points of Nehru and Zhou En-
lai.  In practice, however – as detailed in Chapter 4 –Sihanouk’s “neutrality” differed 
from U Nu’s. 
What Sihanouk had in common with U Nu, however, was the increased boldness 
to project himself abroad after achieving domestic stability.  Between 1954 to 1960, 
Sihanouk increasingly promoted his person and opinions on the world stage; he attended
the Bandung Conference on non-alignment  in 1954, visited various European countries 
in 1956 to proclaim his country’s neutrality, and in turn received visits from influential 
leaders – including Zhou En-lai in 1956 and 1960, and the Presidents of India and 
Indonesia in 1959.  Sihanouk even attempted to intervene in Laos’ political difficulties 
with the communist Pathet Lao forces, proposing at the United Nations that Laos and 
Cambodia form a neutral zone guaranteed by both Cold War blocs.  At this point, 
Sihanouk did not reveal the extent of the vindictiveness, volatility and aggressive 
posturing that would characterize his foreign policy in the 1960s. This period, 
nevertheless, provided him a sense of importance that would fuel his ambition for 
international prestige. 
Another area Sihanouk seemed to mirror U Nu was in his decision to embark on a 
program of “Khmer Socialism” in March 1956.  From one perspective, Sihanouk’s 
“Socialism” was similar to U Nu’s as an economic policy incorporating state intervention 
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to increase national production by which the country would learn to ‘stand on its own 
feet’.69  During the 1960s, Sihanouk would even term this policy, “Buddhist Socialism”, 
as U Nu had done. Unlike U Nu’s sincere understanding and approach however, 
becoming a Socialist was Sihanouk’s way of keeping up to date with his new friends –
Sukarno, Nehru, Zhou Enlai – rather than a response to ideological convictions.70 As in 
the case of neutralism, Sihanouk’s version of ‘Buddhist Socialism’ – to be discussed in 
Chapter 4 – differed from U Nu’s.  
Sihanouk and U Nu were alike, however, in that their policies reflected their 
increase in power and prestige.  In their choice of foreign policy – Neutralism –, and 
economic policy – Socialism –, the common emphasis was on national self-reliance. As 
they consolidated their positions, both U Nu and Sihanouk projected their confidence 
through policies that symbolized their countries’ ability to chart independent paths.  
Career Milestones
This display of confidence reflected the heights to which their personal careers 
had reached.  Sihanouk’s career milestone as mentioned earlier in this chapter, was in 
1960, when his popularity reached its peak.  At this point, power had not yet fully 
corrupted him, his parents still exercised a moderating influence over him, and opposition 
to his leadership was disorganized and mute.71  Following King Suramarit’s death in 
                                                




April that year, Sihanouk reached the ‘apogee of his power’72  two months later by 
declaring himself chief-of state.  
Comparatively, U Nu’s career milestone was marked less by a declaration of 
personal power, and more by a declaration of public peace in 1955, that the ‘insurrections 
had faded away to dacoity’.73 Unlike Sihanouk, whose extent of consolidation was based 
on the extent of personal control, U Nu’s efforts were reflected in the state of his country 
and government. ‘When it is recalled that in 1949, the authority of the Government ended 
in the outlying suburbs of Rangoon, and that the whole machinery of law and order was 
obliterated throughout the land by the havoc of the rebels, then the subsequent recovery 
and return to near-stability is seen as an achievement.’74
At the height of their power, both U Nu and Sihanouk were expected to deliver 
the solutions to their countries’ woes: Nu had temporarily quelled the rebellion and 
infighting and the next step was to develop a lasting peace and national unity for Burma; 
Sihanouk had won his country’s independence, had united Cambodian politics and power 
under his persona, and now surely had the means to guide the nation safely through the 
escalating Cold War.  Furthermore, both had promised that “Socialism” would lead to 
economic prosperity, and were internationally regarded for their seemingly pacifist 
choice of “Neutralism”.  Based on current status and past achievements, hopes were high 
that U Nu and Sihanouk would only climb to greater heights.  Unfortunately, as their 
visions and promises remained unfulfilled, and as geo-political factors worked against 
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them, the subsequent years were, for both U Nu and Sihanouk, a time of strife, and 
ultimately, decline from power.    
63
Chapter 3: From Success to Signs of Crises
By consolidating domestic support and stability, both U Nu and Sihanouk had, in 
their respective situations, achieved some personal success; but these early victories 
eventually gave way to periods of political and economic problems. Faced with 
subsequent combinations of internal and external pressures, neither U Nu nor Sihanouk 
could capitalize on their initial success to grow the seeds of the ideals and intentions they 
had sown during the fresh years of independence. 
Signs of Success
The early successes for both men were evident in their ability to consolidate their 
political positions. U Nu overcame the odds when he endured the storm of Burma’s civil 
war and managed to restore some semblance of order to his country.  At the peak of his 
prominence and prestige in 1955, U Nu was even included in the distinguished company 
of Nehru and Mao as the “Great Men of Asia” in Guy Wint’s Spotlight on Asia.1   For 
Sihanouk, the three years since becoming Chief of State saw him ‘rule Cambodia with 
confidence and brio.’ Until the end of 1963, there were no major political crises and the 
Sangkum’s institutions seemed sufficient for managing Cambodia.2 His opponents, such 
as the communists, and the former Democrats maintained a low profile, and at the end of 
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1962, foreign observers stated that ‘his personal domination of every aspect of 
Cambodian life was as strong as, if not stronger than ever.’3
Another strong – but later misleading – indicator of U Nu and Sihanouk’s success 
was the high personal popularity they each drew from the grassroots.  Writing in 1958, 
Frank Trager attributed Nu’s immense political popularity to his “sincere and informed 
piety, and his consummate ability to speak to the ludu (the people) in terms they 
understand and appreciate.”4 This was similar to Sihanouk’s political style of using his 
personality to  build  rapport with his ‘children’ or the ‘petit peuple’ – through tours of 
the countryside where he would explain policies or provide entertaining monologues.  
Although both U Nu and Sihanouk drew initial inspiration and self-belief from their 
connection with the people, it was also in the public sphere that they faced the first signs 
of instability and disapproval.
Opposition Grows
In U Nu’s case, this took place in 1956, when the elections for the Chamber of 
Deputies revealed that the government – based on its record for the past 8 years – had 
declined in popularity. Although victory was clear – it won 47.9 percent of the popular 
vote (as opposed to 49.5 percent in 1951) – the AFPFL was alarmed that its majority in 
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many districts was so slim.5  Opposition to Sihanouk came in February 1963, when a 
conflict between high school students and police in Siem Reap developed into a 
demonstration accusing the Sangkum of corruption and injustice.  Such an unprecedented 
public outcry against the Sangkum shocked the Cambodian government and the 
Sangkum-dominated cabinet resigned to accept responsibility for the disorder.  Although 
these separate developments in Burma and Cambodia seemed trivial, they were indicators 
of unresolved problems, and also the first signs of the stagnation that was to come.
Both men took steps to reverse the slide.  Concerned with the reduced confidence 
in the government and the AFPFL’s disunity, U Nu decided to step down as Prime 
Minister in June 1956 for a year to take full control of the League to reform it at all 
levels. Sihanouk, inherently combative, and over-sensitive to any form of opposition, was 
triggered by the 1963 demonstrations into launching ‘government sponsored terror’ 
against real and imagined radicals that lasted over the next few years.  Despite these 
efforts, however, neither man could stem the eventual slide from their initial successes. 
Slide from Success
In U Nu’s case, problems emerged in the form of political infighting that 
resurfaced in 1956.  Although U Nu remained the most popular statesman in Burma, he 
was only considered one among equals by his comrades within the Thakin movement.  
This difference in public and inner-circle sentiments resulted in friction with other 
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colleagues.6  It did not help that the profiles and ambitions of other Thakins, were also 
increasing.  For instance, the stature of U Ba Swe – the replacement Prime Minister and 
one who had long been alleged to harbor a desire to oust Nu as Premier 7 – ‘rose 
considerably after his active participation in the November meeting of four of the 
Colombo powers.’8 That same year, friction also increased between U Nu and deputy PM 
U Kyaw Nyein as evidenced in an angry and petty exchange of private letters between 
the two.9 (When the AFPFL split in 1958 Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein led the opposing 
faction.)  By 1957, Nu seemed exhausted by the political struggles that had rendered his 
government ineffective.  He was described as one who ‘seems to have given up as 
hopeless the task he undertook while out of office of reforming the corruption, jobbery 
and lack of drive and public spirit in the government bloc.’10
Sihanouk’s political problems developed as a result of his growing inability to 
discern the changes in demands and discontentment even amongst those he considered 
closest to him.  Although the 1963 crackdown campaign was aimed at leftist radicals, it 
also created fear and resentment in student circles, and the harsh restrictions on activism 
and public debate led many young people to join the underground Communist 
movement.11 With the communists driven underground, and the voices of opposition 
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stifled for the next few years, Sihanouk remained convinced that his leadership remained 
vital to the country’s survival. By engineering circumstances that reinforced his self-
belief in his dominance, Sihanouk remained out of touch with the reality and extent of 
political dissension that was brewing.
Political opposition towards U Nu and Sihanouk was also fueled by increasing 
frustrations over the lack of economic progress. When the Burmese Pyidawtha 
Government announced the Four-Year Plan – a revision and implementation of the old 
Eight-Year Plan – in 1956, it was an acknowlegdement that the previous economic 
programs had failed to change the traditional socio-economic system. The new 
developmental approaches selected – such as limiting the scope of state intervention in 
sectors of the economy – were in part, responses to the failures of the 1952-56 plan 
period.  As U Nu publicly admitted, that ‘because of our intense enthusiasm to achieve 
these ends (of a socialist welfare state) in the quickest possible time we have committed 
several blunders.’12 These blunders included an over-anxiety to reach the unrealistic goal 
of self-sufficiency, inability to maintain internal law and order, and a miscalculation of 
time required for development.  
Sihanouk also had to face the reality of limited economic progress. Widespread 
bureacratic mismanagement and corruption exacerbated the mounting budget deficit.  
Furthermore, the earlier years of ‘quiet progress’ 13 – in fields such as education, 
agriculture, housing and town-planning – had not translated into material success for the 
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general public.  Ironically, the expansion of educational facilities had not only failed to be 
matched by a similar rise in employment opportunities, but had awakened more 
Cambodians towards social inequality and injustice.  
Although Sihanouk tried to balance the budget deficit by shifting emphasis from 
development to production,14 his 1963 decisions to move Cambodia towards economic 
self-reliance by suspending aid from the US (in turn fuelled by Sihanouk’s aim to remain 
neutral in the face of war in Vietnam)  and by nationalizaing Cambodia’s main industries, 
proved disastrous.15  Cambodia’s economy was unable to adjust to the loss of American 
aid and budgetary support.16 By 1966, a combination of factors, including excessive 
government expenditure, reduced trade, public corruption, and a poor harvest in 1965, 
saddled Cambodia with serious financial difficulties.  By 1966 too, even the usually 
insulated Cambodian elite ‘had a strong sense that their personal economic position was 
endangered, and that Sihanouk was to blame.’17
Apart from political and economic difficulties, U Nu and Sihanouk also found 
their respective efforts to strengthen their nations’ security, grinding to a standstill.  
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U Nu aimed to improve Burma’s security by ending the insurrections, by 
incorporating the various ethinc minorities within the Union, and by securing Burma’s 
borders.  He was unable to fully fulfil any of these goals.  Despite his earlier successes 
against the rebellions, the core of the main insurrectionists remained largely intact, such 
that by 1957, it was estimated that three thousand communists under Than Tun, and two 
thousand Karens still operated effectively against the government.18  With regards to 
Nu’s second goal, to unite the minority states; despite a decade of his best efforts, many 
of the ethnic leaders remained discontent with the domination of Burman representatives 
in Parliament and began, in 1958, to push for constitutional reform towards a federal 
principle that would allow for parity with Burma, and equal representation (in the House 
of Nationalities) from all constituent states within the Union.19 Many of the minority 
leaders could not accept what they perceived as the central government’s efforts to 
“Burmanize” the people.20  U Nu’s third goal, to guarantee the security of Burma’s 
borders also met with limited success; his efforts seemed to have stalled by 1958, with 
the long untamed border with China continuing to be porous to incursions by Communist 
Chinese troops, KMT troops and illegal immigrants.21  By the end of the 1950s, Nu’s 
aim to consolidate a nation faced with ethnic and political divisions, had come to a 
standstill, and was no closer to reality than it had been at the peak of his power. 
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Sihanouk too, was unable to fully stabilize and secure long-tem guarantees for his 
country’s security.  Realizing that Cambodia would only be safe from the spill-over 
effects of the escalating war in Vietnam if its borders could be internationally guaranteed, 
Sihanouk’s goal had been to obtain signed recognition from the major Cold War players 
for Cambodia’s neutrality and sovereignty.  Despite years of balancing and shifting favor 
among the superpowers, and his personal attempts at both international and bilateral 
forums, to guarantee Cambodia’s borders in principle and law, these efforts had come to 
a standstill by the mid-1960s.  During the 1950s, Sihanouk had first sought support from 
the West, but poor relations with Thailand and South Vietnam made the relationship 
untenable 22  and eventually contributed to the break in Cambodian-US diplomatic 
relations in 1964.  Believing that communism would eventually dominate the entire Indo-
china region, 23  Sihanouk then tried to woo the Chinese and even tolerated North 
Vietnamese border activities and incursions in return for a guarantee of Cambodia’s 
borders..  Despite these mercurial shifts from one major power to another, Sihanouk, at 
the end of 1964, was still without any written recognition of Cambodia’s frontier line.24  
1965 continued to be a period of ‘intense frustration in international affairs for 
Sihanouk’.25  Faced with a combination of realities – being increasingly distanced from 
the US and her allies; regarding China as a friend, yet too far geographically to 
realistically bank on her support; no signs that the South Vietnamese or Thais would ever 
be other than irreconcilable antagonists, yet unable and unwilling to totally side with the 
Communists in Hanoi – Sihanouk’s earlier energy and optimism in carving a secure niche 
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for Cambodia began to seep away even as he realised that his country was gradually 
being isolated.     
Stuck in a Moment
Mired in challenges from various fronts, neither U Nu nor Sihanouk were able to 
build on the promise and potential of their earlier successes.  In less than three years after 
supposedly reaching a political and personal milestone, U Nu found himself paralyzed by 
the bog of political infighting, economic and administrative inefficiency, and unresolved 
insurrections and cross-border tensions.  Similarly, for Sihanouk, despite his ‘triumphant’ 
accession to the post of Chief of State in 1960, his control over the Cambodian state 
began to slip away between 1963 and 1966.26  As the Vietnam War escalated during this 
period, Sihanouk’s focus on foreign policy distracted him27 from the signs of domestic 
unrest and widening cracks in the political structure he had built around himself.     
More significantly, the period of slide from success for each man would pave the 
way for a further stage of disintegration.  In U Nu’s case, this stage was represented by 
the 1958 AFPFL split, and the period thereafter when the military caretaker government 
took over ‘temporarily’.  In the years leading up to 1958, the Army had become 
increasingly restless over the corruption and inefficiency of U Nu’s government and the 
Prime Minister’s handling of the insurgency problem;28 the ‘temporary’ military solution 
to the disorganized civilian government eventually led to a full military coup in 1962.  In 
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Sihanouk’s case, the 1966 elections – in which he decided not to adopt his usual practice 
of designating the Sangkum candidates – marked a turning point in Sihanouk’s fortunes.  
Although employed as a strategy to ensure the conservative elements in Cambodian 
political circles would supplant leftist opponents within the government, it was these 
conservative forces within the National Assembly who eventually resented Sihanouk’s 
rule and plotted his downfall.  From 1966 onwards, observers also suggested that 
Sihanouk began to stop caring about day-to-day Cambodian politics; and as his grip 
loosened, potential opponents became alert.29
Retreat and Refuge
Interestingly, when faced with difficulties, both U Nu and Sihanouk sought means 
of refuge and ‘escape’ for which they were criticized.  For instance, in conjunction with 
his country’s mounting problems, and especially after 1965, Sihanouk revived a hobby 
from his youth and became increasingly involved in film-making,30 ‘to the point where 
many in Phnom Penh saw his preoccupation as obsessional.’31 U Nu too, sought refuge, 
but in religion, rather than recreation.  Already renowned for his religious beliefs and 
meditative retreats at times of national or personal crisis, Nu again planned to spend one 
week in a monastery in June 1958 after he had barely survived a vote of no confidence in 
Parliament, but had to give this up when advised this would prevent him from standing 
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for election. 32  For this repeated tendency to retreat from political life in favor of 
meditation and spiritual self-renewal, Nu was criticized, not only for a lack of 
prioritization, 33  but also for alleged attempts to use religion and his pious image to  
garner votes.  Against a backdrop of stagnating circumstances, neither U Nu nor 
Sihanouk aided their respective causes by indulging in alternative pursuits rather than 
dealing with the problem at hand.  While Nu sincerely believed in the need for spiritual 
renewal when driven to a state of helplessness, Sihanouk sought to escape his problems 
through activities that catered to his pleasure and pride.  The periods of stagnation hence 
revealed specific aspects of each leader’s personality and temperament.      
Against this background of a slide from success, both U Nu and Sihanouk sought 
to incorporate certain ideologies and ideals within their nation-building processes.  The 
similarities were striking; both adopted Neutralism as a foreign policy, and translated 
their religious beliefs into a form of Buddhist Socialism as a national rallying call. Both 
leaders hoped that this dual strategy would lead to economic and social progress for their 
respective nations. Due to different circumstances and challenges, however, their 
interpretations and intentions varied.  
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Chapter 4: Buddhist Socialism
Both U Nu and Sihanouk tried to incorporate Buddhism into their political 
ideologies and policies, but in practice, while their ideas were often similar in form, they 
were different in substance. Writing in 1965 to describe his brand of Buddhist Socialism, 
Sihanouk stated that “Our socialism, as our politics, go hand in hand with our national 
realities.”  Though penned by the Cambodian leader, these words might just as well have 
come from U Nu, since both he and Sihanouk shaped their political ideas along national 
realities.  One common national reality the two leaders shared was the thriving Theravada 
tradition in both Burma and Cambodia.  In trying to build on the success of their 
consolidated positions, it was to this reality that the two men turned; as they tried to 
provide focus and meaning to nation-building efforts by marrying the traditional reality 
of Buddhism to the political modernity of Socialism.    
However, even though both men based their Socialism on this common religious 
reality, the influence of other national realities in Burma and Cambodia also brought 
variations to the way each man incorporated Buddhism into political practice.  The 
Buddhist principles they espoused and emphasized were almost always reflective of 
specific political concerns.  This was aptly summed up by Jerrold Schecter, who wrote 
that the ‘reality of Buddhism is to be found not simply in the written word and practice, 
but primarily in the men who have taken the doctrine, often usurped it and wielded it to 
their own ways.’1
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This chapter will address whether Buddhist Socialism, in practice, was able to 
provide either Burma or Cambodia with a concrete, sustainable development roadmap.  
Or did the process of having to amalgamate philosophical and religious ideas into an 
otherwise secular concept result in the ideologies becoming political slogans that were 
more rhetoric than practical?  To attempt an answer, we first need to examine the impetus 
for each man’s embracement of Socialism as a personal and political ideology.     
4.1 Relative Realities
U Nu and Socialism
Buddhist Socialism was, to U Nu, a logical pairing of his religious and political 
beliefs. U Nu, a devout Buddhist since he was eighteen, truly wanted to set an example 
of spirituality for his people through his life and in his government policies.  At the same 
time, having embraced Socialist principles since the 1930s, U Nu’s aim in the 1950s was 
to develop a self-sustaining welfare state supported by a strong partnership between the 
state and the workers, which would ‘nationalize all monopolizing capitalist 
undertakings’.  To that end, U Nu interpreted and projected Socialism through the lens of 
Buddhist ideals, because it made sense to him personally, but also because it was a 
useful spiritual compass to guide the nation’s economic and social development.  For 
instance, when U Nu began to further elaborate his vision on Buddhist Socialism around 
the early 1950s, it was at a time when Burma was beginning to recover from the most 
tumultuous stages of the civil war that had seen almost the entire country overrun by 
various factions of Communists, mutineers, Karens and other separatists.  With an urgent 
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need for structural restoration and national cohesiveness, U Nu, as ‘promoter of the 
faith’, used Buddhist concepts to motivate groups toward a common goal of a Socialist 
welfare state.  The aim of socialism, according to U Nu, was based on the  Theravadic 
principle of insight meditation and defined as a return to ‘an original pure state, prior to 
the appearance of the defilement of craving and the corruption of man, where there are 
no differences in gender, beauty or possessions’2  This moral principle was used to guide 
and justify socialist economic policies.  For example, U Nu supported land 
nationalization by arguing that by eliminating private ownership of land, the class 
struggle based on the illusion about the importance of property could be eliminated as 
well. U Nu also pressed for more redistribution of income on the grounds that this would 
increase the number of those economically capable of performing works of piety.3  
Sihanouk’s Socialism
Sihanouk, while perhaps not as pious as U Nu, also came to recognize the 
political value of merging his Buddhist tradition with Socialist ideals.  To distance 
himself and his country from Communism, yet without totally isolating Cambodia from 
the left, Sihanouk had, since the late 1950s, declared what he called at first "Khmer 
socialism" and later "Buddhist socialism". Economically, the system involved state 
intervention in many areas of life, while agriculture and commerce remained in private 
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hands.4  Politically, the purpose of this "socialism", Sihanouk explained, was "to prevent 
the triumph of Communism in Cambodia".5 Like U Nu, Sihanouk made reference to 
Socialism as a moral code, but for Sihanouk, it was less an attempt to preach ethical 
behavior, than it was a way to demonstrate to outsiders that Cambodia could embrace 
Socialist ideals (to placate his crtics on the left), but without Marxist influences.  In an 
interview with a foreign magazine, Sihanouk explained that the ideology of Cambodia’s 
government was “Buddhist Socialism”; he then stated that “by socialism, I mean we must 
have a social conscience and try to give an opportunity to everyone to better himself 
according to his ability.  And our regime has a religious connotation too: freedom 
brotherhood, love of peace, a sense of responsibility toward the poor.  Communists say 
there cannot be socialism without Marxism. Nonsense!”6   Sihanouk added that “Our 
Socialism differs from Marxian socialism or communism…it is essentially Kampuchean 
inspired directly by our religious principle extolling the ideas of mutual help and social 
action with an accent on the welfare and blossoming of the individual.”7 The essence of 
his doctrine, Sihanouk claimed, was to preserve "the barrier which preserves the 
originality of our race, of our traditions, of our religious faith, and which safeguards our 
independence vis-à-vis certain of our neighbours". In a 1960 statement made to the 
United Nations to explain why Cambodia should be free from external influences, 
Sihanouk stressed the value of Buddhist Socialism as a means to preserve Cambodia’s 
                                                
4 David Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History (Yale University Press, 1991) p. 87. 
5 Ibid.
6 Interview by William Attwood, “Responses of Norodom Sihanouk” in LOOK Magazine,2 April 
1968
7 Politique Economique du Sangkum Reastre Niyum, (Phnompenh), pp.1-2
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traditions and conception of existence. 8   Buddhist Socialism was thus a means to 
distinguish Cambodia from Cold War ideologies, and to emphasize that it should be 
allowed to follow its own path.
In practice however, Buddhist Socialism not only served to further cast 
Sihanouk’s image within the heralded mold of a traditional Khmer Buddhist ruler, but 
also became a means to justify his policies. Although Sihanouk had embarked on a 
program of Khmer socialism in March 1956, he only began to seriously incorporate 
Buddhist ideals into his political thought and rhetoric during the mid-1960s due to 
political necessity.  In 1963, Sihanouk had rejected United States aid and nationalised 
Cambodia’s banks and import-export trade in the name of ‘socialism’. By 1965, when 
faced with rising opposition over the economic stagnation resulting from his socialistic 
nationalization measures; and intensifying criticism of his foreign policy neutrality that 
resulted in the end of US-Cambodian diplomatic ties at a time of increasing Vietnamese 
threat, Sihanouk was hard-pressed for some form of justification for his decisions.  He 
found it through an amalgamation of socialist and Buddhist principles; his 1965 article, 
“Our Buddhist Socialism” defended his various domestic and foreign policy decisions on 
the basis of religious principles.9
                                                
8 Statement by Sihanouk to the 15th Session of the General Assembly of the UN, Sep 29, 1960, 
p.12 
9 Norodom Sihanouk, Our Buddhist Socialism, Kambuja No. 8, pp. 13-20, I965
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4.2 Buddhist Socialism: Comparing U Nu and Sihanouk 
Although both U Nu and Sihanouk incorporated Buddhist themes into their 
political ideologies, the specific form in which they did so was relative to and adapted to, 
the respective national realities they faced.  Such incorporation of religious elements was 
also influenced by individual outlook and personality. As a result, Buddhism was 
incorporated for different objectives – as a personal duty and means of mass motivation 
for U Nu, and as a means of political justification and of cultural distinction for 
Sihanouk.  Unlike U Nu’s vision of a Buddhist welfare state designed along Socialist 
principles, Sihanouk seemed more focused on using Buddhism to defend his decisions 
rather than articulate a blueprint for his country’s future.
This variance in realities and response is demonstrated in three inter-linked broad 
Buddhist “themes” incorporated by the two men that not only functioned to explain 
Socialism in terms of Buddhist precepts, but also reflected the national needs that such 
syncretic Socialism hoped to address.  They are, in order, the Alleviation of Suffering, the 
concept of the Middle Way, and the idea of Theravada “Individualism”.  
Alleviation of Suffering
Central to the broad spectrum of definitions for Western Socialism is the 
expectation to produce an egalitarian society where all are cared for and there is no need 
for poverty.  The utopian similarity of such an ideal society to Buddhism’s ultimate goal 
of alleviating suffering, was not lost on either U Nu or Sihanouk.  In explaining the 
reasons and means to attain the welfare state in Burma, U Nu promised hope of collective 
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prosperity – likened to the legendary Padaythabin (Tree of Fulfillment) – and freedom 
from class conflict – equivalent to the abolishment of the three evils of greed, hatred and 
ignorance – by placing Socialist terms within Buddhist contexts and imagery.  For 
example, in trying to implement the Land Nationalization Act of 1948, Nu defended land 
nationalization as not being equivalent to theft, but as the opportunity for landlords to 
make merit by means of charitable gift-giving. He stated, ‘Property is meant not to be 
saved, not for gains, nor for comfort. It is to be used by men to meet their needs in respect 
of clothing, food, habitation in their journey towards Nirvana or Heaven.’10
  
In a similar way, Sihanouk utilized Buddhist teachings to emphasize the 
importance of an ‘enlightened struggle against all forms of suffering and for the well-
being of others’ to justify Cambodia’s adoption of socialist principles.  For both leaders, 
Buddhism was a rallying call of sorts.  However, the difference lay in that while U Nu 
was trying to mobilize popular support among largely disjointed and disillusioned 
militant (PVO) and peasant (ABPO) groupings for his Socialist goals by rallying them 
around a common vision cast in traditional terms, Sihanouk’s goal leaned more towards 
mobilizing a society to perpetuate the status quo of Cambodia’s social relations by 
highlighting the social harmony and prosperity that would prevail if the consensus 
between ruler and ruled was left unmolested.  Again, Sihanouk conceived Buddhist 
Socialism as an ideology that would preserve Khmer societal culture and traditions – and 
hence, hierarchy. By 1965, Sihanouk was using the same line of argument to reassure 
critics that his sponsored institutions, and his socialistic nationalization programs already 
implemented were ultimately for the good of the people because they were done 
                                                
10 Land Nationalization Act, 1948, Trager (1966:151–52).
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according to Buddhist teachings and Khmer tradition: ‘Our Sangkum, in “reawakening” 
out people and enlisting them in an intense and continuous crusade of national 
constructions, has merely reverted to the source of Buddhism and to the traditions 
established several centuries earlier by our Great Kings.’11
Although both men linked Buddhist ethics to Socialist welfarism and idealism, U 
Nu was a far more committed Buddhist, and had a clearer aim and belief from the outset 
on establishing a welfare state that would alleviate suffering on earth; Sihanouk was 
relatively more vague in explaining Socialism as a blueprint ideological base, choosing 
more often to wax rhetoric about its benefits, and to say what it was not (it was not 
Marxian communism or socialism, but Khmer), rather than articulate his plans as clearly 
as U Nu did.  To be fair, however, Nu’s specific hopes, though well-articulated, dealt 
primarily with lofty moral issues related to Marxist concepts of society, rather than with 
practical economic strategies; he claimed that ‘Pyidawtha would only come into being if 
the causes of class conflicts, class exploitations, crimes, diseases, ignoramuses and all 
retrogressive steps and the evil system of exploitation of small countries by the strong are 
eliminated.’ 12  To U Nu, wrongful values and misplaced emphases on ‘transitory 
pleasures’ were hindrances to the promised bliss of Socialism in Burma; Buddhism was 
thus the solution.  
Comparatively, Sihanouk’s focus remained less on the moralistic, and more on 
the “practical”.  In claiming that U Nu’s Buddhist Socialism for Burma ‘was not 
                                                
11 Sihanouk, “Our Buddhist Socialism”, in Kambuja Review, November 15, 1965,  pp.37-38 
12 Burma’s Goal, 1953
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altogether similar to the Buddhist socialism of Cambodia’, Sihanouk stressed that ‘our 
socialism proclaims itself pragmatic’.  Being “pragmatic”, however, often meant simply 
attaching Buddhist terminology to existing policies, or proclaiming that government 
actions were guided by Buddhist concepts, rather than actual attempts to preach the 
personal and societal application of Buddhist ideals.  This was most evident in 
Sihanouk’s interpretation of the Middle Way concept
The Middle Way
By downplaying the Buddha’s core teaching of the Four Noble Truths and the 
Eightfold Path that constituted the doctrinal Middle Way between pleasure and pain to 
achieve enlightenment, Sihanouk took the term in its literal sense and translated it into a 
declaration for ideological impartiality, and a religious justification for political 
neutrality. He claimed, ‘I attempt in all ways to apply the great Buddhist principle: the 
road of the middle.  Domestically, to be halfway between Capitalism and Marxism.  In 
foreign policy, to establish and respect a scrupulous neutrality.  This is not a choice; there 
is no alternative.  It is simply a matter of existing.’13
  In terms of foreign policy, such neutrality was, in Sihanouk’s eyes, vital to
Cambodia’s survival.  Despite facing external pressure to resume ties with the United 
States in 1965, the rising tensions between the neighboring communist state and the US 
ensured Sihanouk would not risk a partnership that might drag his country into war.  As 
such, he turned to Buddhism to deflect criticisms of selfishness and cowardice by 
showing that his decision to remain neutral was simply obeisance to religious instruction 
                                                
13 quoted in Simonne Lacouture, Cambodge, Lausanne, Rencontre, 1963.
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to escape suffering via the “Middle Way”.  U Nu, in comparison, while not strictly 
interpreting this concept as Sihanouk did, did also incorporate Buddhist values into his 
choice of foreign policy. For instance, Buddhism emphasizes personal responsibility 
rather than reliance on others; it also considers all human situations impermanent; 
neutrality thus became a ‘natural’ choice for U Nu as a flexible policy that allowed 
Burma to make impartial and independent decisions that could adapt to changing 
circumstances, without necessarily following or offending others.14 With reference to the 
Middle Way concept, however, U Nu took it to emphasize the ‘spirit of compromise and 
mutual adjustment of opposing beliefs and interests’ that was ‘clearly central to the 
functioning of democracy.’  Since democracy as both principle and practice was highly 
regarded by U Nu as the road to a welfare state, the use of religion to lend credence to it 
made sound strategy in garnering support for his push towards democratic socialism.  
Such selective interpretation of Buddhist doctrine between Sihanouk and U Nu was again 
reflective of the separate national realities they faced.        
Interestingly, despite these differences in interpretation, it was also within the 
Middle Way concept that Sihanouk and U Nu found common ground.  Both took the 
Middle Way teaching to justify their positions in Socialism, located halfway between the 
political spectrum extremities of Capitalism and Marxism.  Both leaders had reason to 
relate each extremity to evil:  Capitalism was linked to the imperialistic colonial powers 
whose yoke had only just been broken; and Marxism was linked to the Communists who 
continued to pose an increasing threat to both men.  In implementing his brand of 
Socialism, Sihanouk had claimed to take what was best in communism, and nothing from 
                                                
14 Liang Chi-shad, Burma’s Foreign Relations: Neutralism in Theory and Practice, p.64
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Karl Marx, so as “to prevent the triumph of communism in Cambodia.”15 By 1965, 
Sihanouk was relatively passive in describing Communism as ‘simply a different 
religion’ that Cambodia could ‘coexist with’, a tone reminiscent of his Middle Way 
neutrality and reflective of his unwillingness to provoke his Communist neighbours and 
so risk losing the heavy amounts of financial and military aid he was receiving from 
Socialist bloc countries like China and the Soviet Union.  By incorporating Buddhist 
doctrine into his political ideology, Sihanouk was also able to justify the domestic 
exclusion of Marxism by claiming its incompatibility with Buddhist teachings.  This form 
of ideological defense was exercised more aggressively by U Nu, who justified his 
decision to ban the Communist Party in 1953 on the religious grounds that Marxian 
Materialism was at odds with the Buddhist belief in Impermanence.  
Although both men incorporated Buddhist teachings to support their ideological 
views, the differing motivations and extent to which they did this were indicative of 
domestic situations that either inspired or inhibited them.  For instance, the permeation 
and translation of Buddhist beliefs into political action in Burma was fueled by the 
Buddhist revival that was taking place around this time as U Nu consolidated his 
government’s domestic position.  In a similar context of choices inspired by 
circumstance, Sihanouk also turned to the middle path as a political tool at a time in the 
mid-1960s when he feared the rising popularity of leftists like Hou Youn, Hu Nim and 
Khieu Samphan.16 Not content with applying pressure on such individuals, Sihanouk 
employed Buddhism to attack the ideology they subscribed to.  By the end of 1966, wary 
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16 Ibid, p.153
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that increasing tensions between political factions on the left and right would lead to his 
isolation, Sihanouk used Buddhism’s middle path teachings to appeal to the people over 
the heads of their elected representatives, informing them that they were neither right nor 
left but like him, ‘socialists following the Buddha’.17
“Individualism” vs “Mobilization”
This trend of using Buddhist-styled Socialism to garner widespread activism, or at 
least, public approval, was one of the primary aims of both U Nu and Sihanouk.  Both 
men were able to do this, despite the clear emphasis in Theravada Buddhism on the 
individual’s efforts and journey toward enlightenment that was not only independent of 
others, but was in fact considered a necessary part of divorcing oneself from the concerns 
and hindrances of the material world.  U Nu, for instance, managed to reconcile these 
individualistic tendencies of self-acquired Theravadic salvation, with the mass 
mobilization and communal co-dependence needed for Socialism.  He did this by arguing 
that Socialism would remove the forces of Capitalism that encouraged people to ignore 
the Buddhist truth of material impermanence.  Therefore, by working together toward a 
Socialist welfare state free from Capitalistic hindrances, people were, in effect striving 
toward a religious goal where men would have more time and opportunity to work at 
attaining nibbana.  In other words, the communal effort that came first would be directly 
beneficial for the individual later.  By incorporating this religious reasoning into his 
ideology, U Nu’s efforts in 1953 to mobilize the peasant-based ABPO to “form the 
vanguard” in Burma’s march toward a welfare state was thus given a vital spiritual 
inspiration.  
                                                
17 Ibid, p.161
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Sihanouk, too, embarked on a similar form of mass mobilization.  Apart from his 
efforts to label and mobilize the general populace as “socialists following the Buddha”, 
he also continued to seek domestic approval for his policies through religion.  For 
instance, he sought to develop a new activist aspect to Buddhism in Cambodia where the 
sangha was encouraged to break with individual isolation and instead participate in 
nation-building programs such as education projects which were credited to Buddhist 
teachings.  Sihanouk described the Buddhist clergy as ‘very cooperative and dynamic.  
Without attempting to interfere in the exercise of power, they assist me by using their 
great influence on the people to mobilize them for public work projects.’18Such support 
by the sangha in turn translated into a tacit religious endorsement of Sihanouk’s policies 
that the layman could relate to.
   For both U Nu and Sihanouk, the resulting socio-political syncretisms that 
emerged in Burma and Cambodia respectively, each bearing the name “Buddhist 
Socialism” were neither completely alike, nor poles apart.  Each man’s choice, 
interpretation and application of traditional beliefs to a Western-originated ideology were 
shaped by relative national realities in each country.  As efforts that embodied both 
religious tradition and political modernity, however, they bore common testimony to a 
strand of historical continuity in which Southeast Asian rulers not only derived authority 
from religion, but also incorporated new concepts to suit their political needs.
                                                
18 Statement by Samdech Head of State to the London Times and the New Delhi Statesman, 
Kambuja, Feb 1969, p.22
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4.3 Assessment of Buddhist Socialism
From such a perspective, it is plausible that Buddhist Socialism was more 
effective as symbolic rhetoric and imagery than it was as practical policy.  It was useful 
as a cultural reference for all that U Nu and Sihanouk tried to accomplish; whether it was 
to motivate and rally the people, to justify and explain decisions, or simply to give their 
economic policies a moral and religious distinction to differentiate them from the ills of 
Western capitalism and Marxist Communism.  
Buddhist Socialism could not however, provide a sustainable economic 
development plan for either U Nu or Sihanouk.  The “brand” of “Socialism” was an 
attractive political ideological counter and alternative to Capitalism and Communism.  
The merging Socialist principles with Buddhist ideology however, arguably diluted the
clarity and conviction of U Nu and Sihanouk’s economic policies.    
In U Nu’s case, the belief that virtue, piety and ethical principles could somehow 
lead to an egalitarian economic outcome was no substitute for sound economic planning 
and process.  Buddhist Socialism was more useful for launching the Pyidawtha
campaign than it was for ensuring the initial ambitious 8-year plan –that was 
subsequently discarded and revised in both 1955 and 1957 –would work; especially 
since fundamental issues like law and order and a lack of coordination between 
government departments remained unresolved.19  In U Nu’s case, particularly, Buddhist 
Socialism could not provide the political direction and doctrine that Burma needed.  
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What began initially as an optimistic, “modern” melding of economic method and 
religious philosophy became, by the end of the 1950s, a crude rejection of Marxism as 
party doctrine on one hand, and a reversion to the moralistic fundamentals of Buddhism 
on the other.  In 1954, the official philosophy of the Pyidawtha Government was stated 
thus: ‘The new Burma sees no conflict between religious values and economic progress.  
Spiritual health and material well-being are not enemies: they are natural allies.’20 By 
1958, the seeming implausibility of trying to incorporate economic changes within 
specific Burmese cultural traditions had become painfully apparent.  In a speech that 
year, Nu rejected the incompatibility of Marxian materialism with Buddhist values, ‘the 
more scientific knowledge advances, the more support there is for the Buddhist belief 
that in nature there is no such thing as Matter, but only inherent properties…the AFPFL 
does not believe that Marxism is a doctrine that is infallible and is true without 
reservations’ and therefore ‘rejects Marxism as a guiding political philosophy or as the 
ideology of the AFPFL.21  Having broken completely with Marxist doctrine did not 
mean that U Nu had something else to replace it. Rather, this marked a move towards 
politics based on morality and tradition that culminated in Nu’s decision in the 1960 
elections to campaign on moral grounds to establish Democracy and make Buddhism the 
state religion.  The potential and practical goals of Buddhist Socialism had not been 
fulfilled; rather, the phrase could hardly be mentioned without recalling Nu’s failure to 
deliver on a theme that was so symbolically useful initially.       
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1958, p.375-376)  
89
To Sihanouk, Buddhist Socialism was, in many ways, a fashionable slogan that 
masked his nationalistic, autocratic and, at times, idiosyncratic economic decisions. 
Socialism was useful as a broad slogan for promising increased national production, to 
justify state intervention and nationalization of the economy and to rally his countrymen 
towards self-reliance.  Sihanouk also stirred the nation’s imagination by conjuring up 
images of a golden age in Cambodia’s Angkorean past where harmony existed between 
ruler and ruled, which his policy of Socialism was attempting to revive.22  In this, he 
mirrored the tactic of historical symbolism that U Nu had used in promoting Socialism as 
a means of returning to Burma’s past glory of “Pyidawtha”. In practice however, 
Sihanouk never explained in detail how Buddhist Socialism could be applied or translated 
into tangible economic progress.  In fact, as pointed out by Roger Kershaw, the 
philosophical inconsistencies in Sihanouk’s Socialism were blatant, and Sihanouk 
himself was aware that despite his efforts, real socialism and the monarchism he 
represented could never mix. 23   Without clarity of method or objective, Sihanouk’s 
application of “Socialism” to the economy resulted only in myopic reactionary measures 
instead of a clearly defined blueprint.   
JLS Girling aptly summed up Sihanouk’s failure, and posed the more important 
question on the usefulness of Buddhist Socialism –  ‘in contrast to the promise of his 
early years, the last stages of Sihanouk’s rule (especially from 1967) were marked by 
corruption, agrarian neglect, economic stagnation, educated unemployment, over-
centralisation, police repression, and finally the institutional and foreign crisis of 1969-
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23 Roger Kershaw, Monarchy in South-East Asia: The Faces of Tradition in Transition, , 
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70.  The degeneracy of Sihanouk’s regime raises the gloomy question whether the type 
of “Buddhist socialism” in Cambodia…can possibly present a genuine alternative to 
dictatorial communism on the one hand and to capitalist exploitation or Rightwing 
authoritarianism on the other.’24
“Buddhist Socialism” had been adopted in Burma and Cambodia with 
precisely the intent to offer an alternative between communism and capitalist 
exploitation.  As the ideology was modified and adapted, it became specific to, and 
reflective of, its architect. Sihanouk himself, recounted this process while in exile in 
1972 -   
“In the Third World, at the moment when history took cognizance of it, around 
the mid-1950s, at the time of the Bandung Conference, socialism was, one may say, in 
fashion – if only because it was opposed to capitalism which one tended to identify more 
or less with colonialism from which we had just freed ourselves with so much 
suffering…So we all began to talk of socialism, Sukarno…U Nu, myself, we felt in our 
rather confused way that here was an instrument of national development and a weapon 
against colonialism and imperialism…Each one of us had ‘his’ socialism, which we 
related to a powerful current of history – more, or less, correctly comprehended or 
emulated.”25
With the benefit of hindsight, and through a comparative lens, Sihanouk’s words are 
correct insofar as U Nu and Sihanouk each came up with “his” own form of Socialism.  
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25 Cited in Kershaw, p.58
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In application however, neither man was able to effectively translate his philosophy into a 
viable policy.  
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Chapter 5: Neutralism and Neutrality
Another example of how both men took on modern concepts to suit their needs 
was in the way they adapted the themes of the non-aligned movement of the 1950s, to 
defend their respective country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. U Nu sought a 
foreign policy that would cultivate goodwill with other countries while keeping Burma 
free to navigate its own path, independent of the demands and dangers of Cold War 
affiliations.  Sihanouk needed a way to keep Cambodia safe from the Indochina conflict, 
and he believed the best way was to play off one party against another, while seeking the 
attention and agreement of the Great Powers to guarantee his country’s borders. Although 
both men approached foreign policy decisions with a broad attitude of non-alignment 
more accurately described as ‘Neutralism’ – which was a state of non-involvement during 
peacetime –, both preferred to speak of and demand the rights of ‘Neutrality’ – a term 
more technically used to describe a country’s legal status and rights in times of war.
This chapter will trace the reasons for U Nu and Sihanouk’s choice of foreign 
policy and assess whether it was a feasible decision for their counties.  It will also assess 
the viability of the policy in practice by comparing the way each man interpreted and 
implemented neutralism.  By viewing neutralism through the comparative lens of U Nu 
and Sihanouk’s careers it becomes apparent that the policy was inherently adaptable to 
geo-political variations; but did these adaptations prove effective in ensuring security, or 




U Nu’s foreign policy choice resulted from an acute awareness of his country’s 
vulnerability; in addition to being sandwiched by India and China, Burma was situated 
between contending Cold War spheres, represented by Communist China, and pro-
Western Thailand.  Nu lamented in 1950 that Burma was: “like a tender gourd among the 
cactus.  We cannot move an inch.  If we act irresponsibly…and thrust the Union of 
Burma into the arms of one bloc, the other bloc will not be contented to look on with 
folded arms.”1  Against this backdrop, U Nu outlined a foreign policy of Neutrality 
centered on non-alignment and independent action; Burma’s intention was to “play our 
role in world affairs to the fullest extent of our ability.  We are like the proverbial prawn, 
which despite its tiny proportions, could yet swim in the ocean.  But we abhor the very 
idea of acting as a disciple to any big power or as a satellite of any political bloc.  We do 
not like to lift our fingers or nod our heads at a signal from anyone.  For these reasons we 
have steered clear of membership in any bloc and have openly declared our policy of 
strict Neutrality.”2  
Although this path of “strict Neutrality” led U Nu to participate actively in the 
Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s, his aim for Burma to play an independent role in 
world affairs also meant advocating peaceful co-existence, and trying to mediate Cold 
War rivalries – such as the antagonistic US-China relationship – that might threaten 
Burma’s security.  In engaging its larger neighbours, Neutrality was a key component as 
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English trans. Printed by the Government of the Union of Burma, Ministry of Information 
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well;   India, for example, served as a model for democracy, neutralism and non-
alignment3  and was a key reason for cordial Indo-Burmese relations.  Relations with 
China, however, were more tricky due to an un-demarcated border, illegal immigration, 
and the presence of Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) troops on Burmese soil 
seeking sanctuary from the ruling Chinese Communists.  In dealing with these issues, 
Burma sought to use its ‘positive neutrality’ to prevent China’s interference in Burma’s 
internal affairs – first obtaining a UN resolution in 1953 for KMT troops to leave Burma, 
then signing, with the Chinese, an agreement of “Peaceful Co-existence” in 1954. 
(Subsequently the caretaker government under Ne Win even managed to secure a border 
agreement and treaty of friendship and non-aggression with China in 1960.) 
Cambodia’s Foreign Policy
     Sihanouk’s foreign policy of non-aligned and independent action also emerged in 
the mid 1950s as a means to preserve his country’s security.  Faced with the impending 
regional threat of Communism after the Viet Minh’s victory over France at Dien Bien 
Phu in 1954, Sihanouk had initially considered joining the American dominated 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), but subsequently grew uneasy about 
entering a partnership that included traditional rivals, Thailand and South Vietnam, and 
was eventually swayed by U Nu and India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru towards a 
strategy of non-alignment.  Sihanouk distinguished Cambodia from all commitments and 
blocs, even the ‘neutralist ones’, when he stated that  “In our foreign relations we have 
favored neutrality, which in the United States is all too often confused with ‘neutralism’, 
although it is fundamentally different.  We are neutral in the same way Switzerland and 
                                                
3 U Nu, Saturday’s Son, New Haven: Connecticut, London: Yale University Press, 1975, p.231
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Sweden are neutral –not neutralist like Egypt or Indonesia…our votes in the United 
Nations…are not often ‘aligned’ with those of the bloc of ‘neutralist’ nations.”4
By the 1960s, Sihanouk was convinced that non-alignment and the ability to act 
independently in foreign policy were crucial for Cambodia.  Where U Nu likened Burma 
to being surrounded by cactus, Sihanouk described a Cambodia surrounded by expanding 
conflicts in Laos and South Vietnam during the early 1960s “like a stack of hay placed 
between two other stacks already set on fire”.5  To escape being “burnt”, Sihanouk’s 
brand of neutralism in the 1960s involved trying, but ultimately failing, to obtain 
international guarantees for Cambodia’s borders and legal rights as a neutral state.  
Sihanouk also sought to negotiate and manipulate the currents of Great Power relations; 
first choosing to break relations with the US in 1963 after being convinced of American 
involvement in Thai and South Vietnamese plots against him; then warming to the 
Communist bloc to the extent of tolerating North Vietnamese bases on Cambodian 
territory; before turning back to the US in 1969 as a last resort when Sihanouk realized 
belatedly that his mercurial and impulsive balancing act had isolated himself both 
domestically and abroad.  Most critically, conservative elements within his government, 
concerned that Sihanouk’s brand of Neutralism had put Cambodia too much at risk of a 
Communist takeover, had cause to plot his downfall by the end of the decade.
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Although both U Nu and Sihanouk claimed to adopt “Neutrality”, the essence of 
each man’s foreign policy was, in practice, an “adaptive” form of “Neutralism” based on 
non-alignment and the right to exercise independent sovereign action.  Each man carved 
an independent path, constrained neither by the strict legal restrictions on state activity 
usually associated with permanently neutral states6, nor by the passive aloofness towards 
world affairs which some critics identified as traits of neutralism.7  Rather each actively 
sought to parade his ideals and agenda before a global audience. 
Broad Comparisons
In comparing their foreign policies, three fundamental themes stand out – those of 
non-alignment, pro-activity and adaptation.  With these three markers, it is possible to 
trace the reasons, interpretation and development of their policies.  Given the somewhat 
ambiguous definitions of their ideas, the terms – ‘Neutralism’, ‘Neutrality’ and ‘Neutral’ 
shall be used interchangeably to refer to each man’s policies.  As with their practice of 
Buddhist Socialism, U Nu and Sihanouk’s decisions in foreign policy were influenced by 
national and historical realities. 
5.2 Non-Alignment
Non-alignment was a logical choice for U Nu, given Burma’s historical and 
geographical vulnerability.  Historically, Burma’s political and military ties had scarred 
the country.  British colonialism had brought economic and social discrimination, 
transferred resources to outsiders – Indian money-lenders – under the plural society, and 
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wreaked irreparable damage on Burma’s cultural institutions – such as the monarchy. 
Burma’s ill experiences with outsiders continued during the Second War, when its ties 
with the British made it a Japanese target; the resulting oppression and destruction of the 
Japanese Occupation left Burma even more wary of affiliations.  Geographically, U Nu 
had to contend with the 1500-mile Sino-Burmese border which was a historical source of 
potential aggression. Up till the 19th century, China still regarded Burma as a vassal 
state8 – the Chinese launched four unsuccessful expeditions against Burma between 
1765-69 to rein in Burmese territorial ambitions in the Shan and Lao areas.  To Nu, there 
was historical basis to avoid making allegiances that would either bring Burma closer 
into China’s sphere of influence, or antagonize it.  After all, China still claimed 
sovereignty over areas in the Kachin, Shan and Wa border states that the British had 
leased from China in 1897. . 
The same combination of geographical and historical vulnerability also influenced 
Sihanouk’s decision, whereby Cambodia’s proximity to traditionally antagonistic 
neighbours –Thailand and Vietnam – had resulted in centuries of political and territorial 
erosion.  Although French rule had provided a period of seeming stability, the end of the 
protective colonial era meant Cambodia had to cope independently with the 
reappearance of traditional antagonisms, albeit in modern guise.’9  When Thailand and 
South Vietnam chose to ally themselves with the Western bloc, Sihanouk did not follow 
suit for lack of trust of his neighbours’ intentions; not wanting to pit himself directly 
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against either the West or Communist blocs, however, Sihanouk decided in the mid 
1950s that his country should follow both India and Burma’s example of  non-alignment. 
 Passive non-alignment was, however, insufficient for Sihanouk’s needs.  
Although he, like U Nu, had participated in the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference of non-
aligned nations in 1955, each man’s experience with non-alignment arose under different 
circumstances, and led to different results.  U Nu’s practice of non-alignment had 
elevated Burma to prominence in Asian –and even global – politics by setting a standard 
of seeming impartiality and idealism in the midst of Cold War tensions.  His professed 
objectives of world peace and attempts to mediate between superpower rivals stood both 
as a testimony to Burma’s good intentions and as a reason for it to thus be left out of 
ideological and regional conflicts. These efforts culminated in the Bandung Conference 
where Nu arrived as one of the principal founders of the non-aligned movement.  In 
comparison, Sihanouk’s attempts to mirror the way Nu (and Nehru) had avoided conflict 
and coalitions through non-alignment, did not meet with equal success.  
One explanation lay in the contrasting geopolitical situations they faced.  As 
mentioned, U Nu likened Burma to a “tender gourd amongst the cactus”, while Sihanouk 
compared Cambodia to a “stack of hays placed between two other stacks already set on 
fire”.  Although both analogies meant that neither could take sides without fear of 
reprisal, Cambodia faced a more urgent threat of encroaching violence from neighboring 
Laos and Vietnam.  Cambodia was caught at the crux of a tug-of-war between 
superpower interests; although non-alignment proved useful in wooing China, which 
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valued Cambodia’s neutral status as a buffer against American expansion on the 
peninsular; it was viewed with suspicion by the US who worried that Cambodia might 
succumb to Communist pressure if left on its own.10  In this sense, non-alignment itself 
was insufficient to ensure security, if the Cold War blocs and their proxies were not 
dissuaded from spreading their struggle to his country’s borders.
In this sense, Sihanouk could not afford a passive or aloof foreign policy; neither 
could U Nu.  Although Burma’s foreign relations were relatively less complex than 
Cambodia’s, U Nu did not sit simply wait and hope the Cold war would pass by.  Rather, 
Nu took initiatives to mediate and preach against superpower rivalries that could 
destabilize regional security.  While Nu was not entangled by such rivalries in the way 
Sihanouk was, both men took proactive steps to enhance their countries’ long-term 
survival and success.
5.3 Pro-activity
Both U Nu and Sihanouk took proactive steps to engineer favorable geo-political 
conditions for their countries’ security.  U Nu often implied that neutralism should not 
dictate a passive role for his government in foreign relations.11  Similarly, for Sihanouk, 
neutralism was not simply staying out of the affairs (and alignment) of others, but was a 
means of enabling a small nation to exert a disproportionate amount of influence by 
playing off one great power against another.  Both men interpreted neutralism to mean 
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having the sovereign right to independent action, free from external interference.  In this 
regard, they actively leveraged on their status of neutrality to gain advantages; initiated 
and cultivated relationships with other countries for specific aims; and even gained 
enough confidence to seek roles as neutral mediators in international relations.
Foreign Aid
During the early days of fragile independence, U Nu and Sihanouk respectively 
leveraged on their status of neutrality to extract favor and establish strategic relations 
with more powerful.  To justify receiving aid from the United States and Britain in 1950, 
U Nu described it as ‘aid from friendly countries to help restore peace and development 
in Burma’; and ‘an act of cooperation that did not violate his country’s policy of non-
alignment’.12  Sihanouk also leveraged on his country’s neutral status to extract aid, 
beginning with a military aid agreement with the US in 1955 that secured funds and 
equipment for the Cambodian army; by the early 1960s, US aid constituted 30 percent of 
Cambodia's defence budget and 14 percent of total budget inflows.  Observers in 1956 
noted that ‘it is clear that Sihanouk, as is his right, has interpreted neutrality as a means of 
securing maximum economic benefits from the rival power blocs.  Already in receipt of 
French and American aid (the latter running at $50 million a year and making the 
Cambodian aid programme one of the two biggest on a per capita basis), Cambodia under 
Sihanouk set about acquiring comparable benefits from Communist sources.’13  
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U Nu and Sihanouk applied a similar proactive approach in terms of initiating and 
cultivating relations with other countries, albeit with different aims.  U Nu, for instance, 
was guided by the desire to contribute proactively to international peace, in order to 
facilitate the secure conditions needed for national development.  Burma would seek to 
do this through ‘an independent foreign policy, designed to maintain the friendship of all 
nations and to avoid big-power alliances.’14 U Nu explained that Burma’s non-aligned 
foreign policy had two additional goals   – that of ‘friendship with all countries’ and 
‘positive endeavors to bridge the gulf between opposing blocs and to promote peace.’15  
To that end, the Burmese leader conducted a series of goodwill tours to foreign capitals –
especially during 1954-1955.  ‘At each stopover, he emphasized Burma’s friendship and 
support for the country he was visiting, and his conviction that international problems 
could be resolved without war.’16 U Nu sought to firm up such relations without being 
tied down, through treaties of Friendship that carried no commitment to joint action but 
merely guaranteed that the two nations would live in peace, promoting mutually 
advantageous programs.  By 1957, Burma had concluded treaties with Indonesia, India, 
Pakistan and Thailand.17 U Nu’s non-aligned status gave him the flexibility to balance 
Burma’s relations with others by seemingly spreading friendly relations as far as 
possible.  
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Sihanouk: Attention Seeker
In contrast, Sihanouk’s activities were not primarily aimed at generating goodwill, 
but more at ensuring that Cambodia would receive sufficient international attention to 
guarantee its fragile borders, especially against – as perceived by Sihanouk – Vietnamese 
and Thai expansionism.  Writing in 1965, Bernard Gordon described three essential 
elements of Cambodian foreign policy: its goal was survival, its principle, to maintain 
Cambodia’s value to states which had potential to control its destiny, and its method was 
to keep Cambodia constantly in the forefront of thought of leaders directly concerned 
with Southeast Asia.18 To achieve the third aspect, one strategy was to keep countries 
guessing where Cambodia’s loyalties lay; unlike U Nu’s brand of neutralism that offered 
friendship to all, Sihanouk often cautioned that good relationships with Cambodia were 
not to be taken for granted, but could be affected by attempts to interfere in Cambodia’s 
internal affairs.19 To bolster Cambodia’s security, Sihanouk campaigned enthusiastically 
during the 1960s – as the Vietnam conflict escalated –for an international conference to 
guarantee Cambodia’s borders and status of neutrality, equivalent to that which had been 
accorded to Laos in the 1954 Geneva conference.20 Failing to do so by the mid 1960s, he 
resorted to seeking statements from any and all countries to at least formally recognize 
Cambodia’s frontiers, eventually obtaining recognition from 52 countries.21  Like U Nu, 
Sihanouk – though having more specific agenda and demands –undertook a personal 
mission to proactively woo the attention, favor and friendship of other countries.  
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Through such posturing and projection of their personalities on the global stage, 
U Nu and Sihanouk garnered more attention than their relatively small nations would 
otherwise have received.  Both became respectively renowned for their pro-active steps 
to promote specific causes, whether it was for world peace, or for territorial guarantees. 
Mediators
This increase in international stature, coupled with domestic stability, emboldened 
U Nu and Sihanouk to seek the roles of neutral mediators.  Burma’s relative stability by 
1954 allowed Nu to travel to the capitals for East and West, where he boldly and politely 
commended one to the other to reconcile the cold war blocs.22  During his visit to the US 
in June 1955, Nu assured the Americans that “the present government of China truly 
wants peace”23 and that ‘Burma was fully prepared to mediate between the two countries, 
if they should so desire.’24 This was in line with his prior promise to Chinese Premier 
Chou En-lai in Peking six months earlier that he would exert his utmost ‘to bring about 
an understanding between the People’s Republic of China and the United States of 
America.’25  U Nu’s boldness was driven by his idealism and perception of Burma’s role; 
he stated, “We are a small nation and the big powers may not take much notice of us but 
it is our duty to speak out and we will not shun that duty.”26
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Sihanouk’s domestic success also gave him the clout to express himself on a 
wider stage.  His self-appointment as Chief-of State in 1960 emboldened him to embark 
on pro-active ventures in foreign policy; and ‘like other neutrals, Sihanouk was never so 
happy as when he was able to play the mediator.’ 27  Sihanouk’s principal 
accomplishments included helping to convene the International Conference on Laos in 
Geneva in May 1961, and attempting to mediate the Sino-Indian dispute of 1962.  It was 
clear that both men’s mediation efforts were to ensure their countries’ security. U Nu’s 
easing of international Cold War tensions would reduce the risk of spillover conflicts into 
Burma; and Sihanouk hoped to make his case for a conference on Cambodia more 
credible and plausible by first convening conferences on other regional trouble-spots. 
  
5.4 Adaptation
The ability to remain non-aligned and undertake proactive action meant that 
neither man regarded their foreign policy as static; neutralism could be adjusted to meet 
specific needs. Sihanouk said in 1956: ‘Our policy will adapt itself essentially to the 
circumstances and events of the world and to the position which will be taken in our 
regard by the various powers.’ 28   This adaptive nature was also evident in U Nu’s 
insistence that his government ‘would judge an issue or situation on its own terms, taking 
the action it believed to be “right” in each case.’29 Both leaders adapted their policies by 
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adjusting the mood of engagement with other nations depending on changing 
circumstances. 
 These circumstances comprised both internal and external developments.  In 
Burma’s case, neutralism was useful to ward off potential external aggression, but was 
also ‘suited to its internal politics, in which pro-West rightists conflicted with pro-East 
Leftists.’30 Neutralism enabled U Nu to balance the opposing views, and also outflank 
Communist subversive elements by quelling any allegations of links to the “Imperialist 
West”.31  Similarly, in Sihanouk’s case, neutralism was also necessitated by both internal 
and external problems. Based on domestic political circumstances in 1954, prior to 
Sihanouk’s consolidation of power, it was possible that ‘Sihanouk and his advisors saw 
that a foreign policy of neutrality was the least likely to meet with the resistance of those 
whose cooperation was sought.  A neutral policy would not only facilitate unification of 
diverse parties but would also deprive those who chose to remain in opposition of an 
important political issue.’ 32   Later, this policy found its justification in external 
circumstances; namely, Sihanouk’s fear of aggression from Thailand and South Vietnam, 
such that ‘by adopting a policy of neutralism, Cambodia hoped to gain “assistance from 
the Cold War enemy of whatever country threatened it.”33
U Nu and Sihanouk’s respective adaptation of Neutralism also took place against a 
transitional backdrop of changing circumstances:  First, a stage of uncertainty – when it 
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was necessary to seek external help or maintain a low profile–; then to a stage of 
confidence – when neutrality became a justification for shifting, mediation and even 
manipulation between the blocs; and finally, to a stage of resignation, when each 
concluded it was still necessary, even as neutrals, to openly seek great power patronage. 
Uncertainty 
During their early years in power when domestic stability was uncertain, both U 
Nu and Sihanouk sought some extent of external alignment and assistance.  Although U 
Nu claimed in 1960 that Burma had  ‘followed since independence, the policy of positive 
neutrality, nonalignment with any bloc’ 34 , the fact remained that at the time of 
independence, Burma was too weak and chaotic to refuse Great Power influence in the 
form of economic and military assistance from India, Britain and the United States.  For 
example, at the height of the civil war in 1950, India and Britain provided the Burmese 
government with small arms and loans, such that U Nu later acknowledged that ‘without 
the prompt support in arms and ammunition from India, Burma might have suffered the 
worst fate imaginable.’35   Furthermore, despite declaring in the 1948 that Burma would 
‘reject any foreign aid which would be detrimental to the political, economic and 
strategic freedom of Burma,’ Nu signed the US-Burma Agreement in September 1950, 
providing for grant aid of US$8-10 million.  So Burma’s ‘neutralist’ policy did not (adapt 
and) develop fully until a few years after independence.36
                                                
34 quoted in Liang, p.59
35 Nu, Saturday’s, p.227
36 Liang, p.59
107
Similarly, Cambodia was not immediately ‘neutral’ after gaining its independence 
from France in 1954; instead, Sihanouk initially desired an alliance with the United 
States, partly due to the observation that neighboring rival Vietnam was being shaped 
into a bastion of American power, and that it was prudent to side his enemy’s backer.   It 
was only in 1955, that Sihanouk, partly due to the influence of U Nu, Nehru, and Chou 
En-lai at the Bandung Conference, decided to declare a policy of neutralism.’37  Despite 
that, Sihanouk continued to receive aid from the US up to the early 1960s, when the US 
was paying for 30 percent of his country’s military budget, providing most of its arms 
and supplies, and even stationing a Military Assistance Advisory Group in Cambodia –
the only professedly neutral country in the world where this was done.38
  
In the initial periods of instability, neutralism was also interpreted mostly as a 
non-aligned and relatively ‘passive’ strategy. For instance, it was clear that Burma’s 
foreign policy during 1950-51, was ‘an unstable compound of internal concern and 
external fear based on a desire to avoid “entangling alliances.” 39  The Cambodian 
government too, when articulating its foreign policy in the mid 1950s, had an ‘initial 
statement of neutrality that implied no more than a decision to abstain from alignment 
with the West.  The neutrality to which Cambodia subscribed was passive; the king did 
not at that time seek to counterbalance Western influence in Cambodia with that of the 
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Communist bloc.’40  Sihanouk made no attempt at that time to enter into diplomatic 
relations with Communist China or North Vietnam. ‘Returning from a state visit to 
Burma in November 1954 – where he was doubtlessly influenced by U Nu’s beliefs –
Sihanouk’s view towards neutrality seemed somewhat benign (unlike his later barbed 
statements) when he urged that ‘in order to safeguard themselves, the large and small 
nations of Southeast Asia should deploy all of their good will in order to create a center 
of pacific resistance to all pacts or alliances susceptible to provoking world conflicts.  
That is to say, a large group of nations should observe neutrality strictly.’41
Confidence and Clout
As U Nu and Sihanouk grew in political control and confidence however, their 
style of neutralism changed as well.  In 1960, the year Sihanouk became Chief of State, 
The Times described his ‘policy of so-called neutrality’ as one where he ‘played one 
power off against another, constantly trimming his sails to take best advantage of the 
prevailing political winds.’  Such was the combination of confidence and circumstances 
that, by the 1960s, allowed Sihanouk to adapt neutralism into a policy of proactive 
partiality rather than passive un-involvement.  As Sihanouk cultivated external relations 
that he deemed beneficial to Cambodia, he also became increasingly aggressive towards 
those he distrusted.  Sihanouk had, by 1960, established a ‘strong bias towards Peking for 
he was convinced that China would ultimately rule over the whole of Southeast Asia’42. 
In 1960 Cambodia and China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression.  
Emboldened by his links to China, and as his domestic standing peaked during the early 
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1960s, Sihanouk broke diplomatic ties with Thailand in 1961, with South Vietnam in 
1963, and with the US in 1965 – as he became increasingly convinced that these 
countries  were plotting against him.   Towards the mid 1960s, however, as the North 
Vietnamese and Vietcong troops exploited this shift in Sihanouk’s position to 
significantly increase their use of Cambodian territory, and as China’s Cultural 
Revolution threatened to export subversive communist influence and violence to the 
region, Sihanouk turned back to the West to restore equilibrium. At the end of 1966, the 
master manipulator began to hint indirectly– via the Filipino Ambassador in Phonm Penh 
– at the possibility of normalizing relations with the US.43
Throughout this period, even as Sihanouk continued to profess Cambodia’s 
‘strict’ foreign policy, it was clear that ‘neutrality’ had evolved to entail independent, 
flexible and even threatening behavior in order to keep pace with the security shifts in 
Indochina.  Driving this policy was an impulsive and increasingly volatile Sihanouk.  For 
instance, when campaigning to secure international recognition of Cambodia’s borders, 
Sihanouk  confessed that he ‘went so far as threatening friendly countries with breaking 
our diplomatic relations if their respective governments refused to send me a written 
declaration officially recognizing the sea and land boundaries of my country’44 By 1968, 
Bernard Gordon observed ‘in the international environment, Sihanouk has sought to 
benefit from the instability that characterizes international and regional politics in 
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Southeast Asia.  His approach in this respect is by now familiar: he threatens first one 
side, and then the other, and 1968 showed no departure from this pattern or style.’45
Unlike Sihanouk’s combative and manipulative style, U Nu’s increase in 
confidence was marked by positive overtures in Burma’s foreign relations. At a time 
when the Burmese government had surmounted the worst of the Communist insurrection 
and had received crucial UN support to deal with the KMT troops on its border, the major 
elements in Burma’s foreign policy began to be clearly and ideologically formulated.’ 
Beginning around 1953, with the adoption of a formula for “peaceful coexistence” in 
Asia,46 Burma’s foreign policy entered a stage between 1954-1958, known as ‘Positive 
Neutralism’, which entailed an expansion of foreign economic relations, mediation 
efforts, and a general extension of friendship.  At the 1955 Bandung Conference, U Nu 
articulated his ideals for global peace: ‘how are the nations of the world to be guided in 
their relations with each other? I believe that the answer is to be found in the five 
principles comprising respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in 
the internal affairs of another state, equality, and mutual benefit. The sum of these 
principles adds up to our concept of peaceful coexistence.’47 After participating in the 
1955 Bandung Conference, Burma went on to become one of the official founding 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement at the first meeting in 1961.  In the lead-up to 
this, U Nu traveled extensively and became one of the most well known and respected 
leaders of the third world.  While Burma’s neutralism did not involve playing one power 
off against another, the similar aspects of personalized diplomacy, and an international 
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influence and clout that far outweighed the size of the country that Sihanouk 
demonstrated so clearly, were first evident in U Nu’s conduct of foreign policy. 
   
Resignation – Unavoidable Allegiances
Despite these activities that seemed to imply a certain degree of autonomy and 
flexibility, it was clear that U Nu and Sihanouk’s respective form of neutralism did in fact 
lean and was swayed by dependency towards ideological blocs.  Such ‘alignment’ was 
most apparent in times of crisis or stagnation, when neutralism moved away from strict 
non-alignment, back to the resignation that security threats could only be handled by 
cooperating with a stronger country.  Although both men tried to maintain an image of 
non-alignment, their respective inability to resolve internal and external security concerns 
towards the end of their tenures, made it necessary for allegiance and cooperation with 
outside powers.  
In 1960, for example, Burma drew closer to China than it had ever been –as 
evidenced by an unprecedented number of goodwill missions and the subsequent signing 
of a Sino-Burmese border agreement, as well as a Treaty of Friendship and Non-
Aggression. U Nu’s inclination towards China was primarily due to unresolved security 
concerns over the shared border.  The un-demarcated Sino-Burmese border was still a 
thorny issue. Furthermore, the KMT forces (backed by Taiwan, Thailand and the US 
CIA) still operating against China from within Northeastern Burma, continued to a pose a 
threat of conflict breaking out on Burmese territory; the 1953 UN Resolution that had 
demanded the evacuation of KMT troops, could not prevent the flow of KMT 
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reinforcements being flown secretly into Burma on CIA-provided planes.  To address 
both the border and KMT issues, the Sino-Burmese agreements not only demarcated the 
border, but also allegedly paved the way for a joint Burmese-Chinese campaign against 
the KMT in 1961.48   To U Nu, such cooperation with a Cold War power did not 
necessarily detract from Burma’s non-aligned foreign policy, but rather, was an act of 
‘friendship’.   
For Sihanouk, the threat of unmanageable security concerns also led him to 
cooperate with various Cold War power blocs.  Although his break in ties with 
Washington and its allies in the mid-1960s had been positioned as a move towards 
neutrality, Sihanouk soon found this neutrality eroding, and himself a supporter of the 
Communist cause, when he tolerated the increasing trespass of North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong forces, who used Cambodian territory for sanctuaries and logistical supply 
routes. Predicting that the Saigon government would soon collapse, Sihanouk wanted to 
be on the victors’ side.  However, as the Vietnam War dragged on, Sihanouk began to re-
evaluate the situation, and sought to counterbalance his alignment with Hanoi by 
improving relations with the US; not only did he explicitly allow the ‘hot pursuit’ of 
communist troops by US and South Vietnamese forces on Cambodian soil; Sihanouk 
even allegedly (according to the Nixon administration) permitted or encouraged the US to 
conduct air strikes on the communist-sanctuaries in his country from March 1969 
onwards.49  The dilemma Sihanouk was in by the end of the 1960s, and the extent to 
which his supposed neutrality had polarized both ways, was apparent to all when in the 
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single month of June 1969, full diplomatic relations were restored between Phnom Penh 
and Washington, even as Cambodia became the first foreign government to recognize the 
newly established Viet-Cong led Provisional Revolutionary Government.
Given how both U Nu and Sihanouk adapted their foreign policies to suit their 
immediate circumstances, it was not surprising that such opportunism would be cause for 
criticism. Sihanouk was often described as a ‘mercurial’ tight-rope walker – a portrayal 
he was proud of – whose foreign policy was fraught with danger and brinkmanship;50 he 
was also less glamorously described in terms of a reactionary melodramatic who lacked a 
long-term plan, but whose foreign policy actions resembled ‘a small, intelligent trapped 
animal desperately seeking exit from trap, dashing back and forth all directions, and 
keeping up continuous high-pitched shrieking’51.  Burma was accused of sitting on the 
fence’, with the implication that it was ‘waiting to jump on the winning side.’  U Nu was 
‘accused of spreading himself too thin in too many directions’ as ‘Burmese neutralism 
seemed to lean left and then right, to “swim with the tide”, out of an anxiety to preserve 
Burmese independence.’52  Both leaders were criticized for adopting a form of neutralism 
that could endanger their countries. 
It should be assessed therefore, whether these criticisms were justified; if 
Neutralism was truly a viable option for U Nu and Sihanouk and whether it helped or 
threatened the security of their nations.  
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5.5 Assessment of Neutralism 
On balance, it can be argued that neutralism was certainly a feasible foreign 
policy option for both men from the outset.  It promised a “safe road” through the 
intensifying Cold War tension; and was a logical choice for countries just emerging from 
colonialism, that did not want to become subservient to yet another foreign power or 
influence.  In practice however, the viability of neutralism, as interpreted and 
implemented by each man, was more debatable, depending how one weighs the pros and 
cons of U Nu and Sianouk’s respective approach to foreign policy.  
Benefits
Neutralism benefited Burma and Cambodia in various ways. It helped Burma 
achieve status in the world community; it permitted Burma to offer friendship to all, 
without burdensome obligations; and during the formative period from 1948-53, it was a 
policy that, in Burmese minds, allowed them considerable freedom of action.  In 
September 1954, U Nu, at the peak of his career, took proud count of its results; Burma 
had good relations with almost every country – Nationalist China was an obvious 
exception – and was playing its “little part in the establishment of friendly relations 
between countries and in the promotion of mutually advantageous activities.”53 That 
same year, Nu told a National Day mass rally, that Neutrality had ‘saved Burma from 
becoming a second Korea, Indochina, or Guatemala’ even though Chinese Nationalist 
troops were present on its territory.54  Nu was referring to neutrality having reduced the 
country’s potential as a pawn or threat in the Cold War, thereby removing any reason for 
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external powers to fight on its soil.  Ironically, a decade later, such a conflict was the 
reality facing Sihanouk, who was unable to use his neutrality to prevent the North 
Vietnamese presence from dragging Cambodia into the Second Indochina war.  
At Sihanouk’s peak too, in 1960, neutralism seemed a workable formula to 
protect his country’s international interests.  As it had done for Burma, ‘neutrality’ 
brought benefits of foreign “aid-without –strings” to Cambodia from foreign powers, 
which competed for influence through the provision of financial, technical and advisory 
assistance.55 Up till the mid-1960s, the policy of neutralism also seemed to be able to 
keep the escalating Indochina war out of Cambodia.
Hindrances
From another angle however, the effectiveness of being neutral was debatable; 
afterall, the neutral status of their countries was not much of a deterrent to would-be 
trespassers in a world structured along Cold War divisions:   Burma ‘suffered from a 
legacy of the Chinese civil war as the presence of Chinese Nationalist Party/Kuomintang 
(KMT) irregulars created a virtually autonomous and hostile state within Burma’; and 
Cambodia suffered from the legacy of the First Indochina war as North Vietnamese 
increased their unauthorized use of Cambodian territory for logistics and sanctuary 
purposes.  
Despite the initial benefits, the path of Neutralism led to difficulty and danger.  In 
Cambodia’s case especially, Neutralism, while initially a label that implied a positive 
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desire to be free of Cold War entanglements, became in Sihanouk’s hands, a convenient 
excuse for him to indulge in shifting allegiances.  Neutralism was Sihanouk’s “passport” 
that allowed him to break ties as easily as he forged them.  As his decisions in this regard 
were often guided by his own erratic personality, Cambodia’s security became 
compromised.  
For instance, Sihanouk contributed to the destabilization of regional security by 
playing up the intense personal and historical rivalry that Cambodia had with South 
Vietnam and Thailand, leaving no room for constructive engagement. Rather, he elevated 
a tense situation into a larger Cold War issue, first by seeking international guarantee for 
Cambodia’s borders in the early 1960s, then threatening to side with the Communist bloc 
if his demands were not met.  ‘Regional rivalries were so prevalent that the US 
President's Military Representative, General Maxwell Taylor, concluded in September 
1962 that Sihanouk's "morbid fear" of Thailand and South Vietnam had "created a 
situation of tension and emotionalism which might blow up at any time.”’56
Instead of the immunization against conflict that Sihanouk had hoped for, his 
practice of a proactive and adaptive neutralism resulted in his, and Cambodia’s, 
increasing isolation and vulnerability as he swung from one allegiance to another based 
on personal beliefs.    For instance, when Sihanouk undertook a campaign of anti-
American abuse in public statements in the early 1960s, his actions were “rationalized” 
by suspicions that the US was plotting his downfall (as the CIA did against South 
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Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem) and that the US “endorsed” Thai and Vietnamese 
conspiracies against Cambodia.  True to form, when Sihanouk decided to cut economic 
ties with the US in 1963, an act triggered by personal affront taken to a Newsweek article 
alleging the Queen Mother ran a “string of bordellos” near the Capital.   When Sihanouk 
broke diplomatic ties with the US in 1965, he knowingly subjected his country to the loss 
of a vital source of military and economic aid (around US$400 million between 1955 and 
1963) that would never be fully replaced.  Considering the US State Department’s claim 
that the US strategic interest was only to keep Cambodia safe and neutral, but had found 
it almost impossible to work with Sihanouk,57 it would seem that Sihanouk’s highly 
personal and volatile practice of neutralism had jeopardized his country’s security again.  
Although Sihanouk sought to remedy this by leaning toward his “friends”, France 
and China, he came away disappointed.  De Gaulle’s visit to Cambodia in August 1966 
and offer of aid was less than Sihanouk had hoped.58  The outbreak of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, followed by Sihanouk’s anti-Maoist campaign in 1967 dashed any 
hopes of closer ties with China; for fear that ideological fanaticism would spread to 
threaten Cambodia’s government.59  As the situation in and around Cambodia worsened –
with an escalation of North Vietnamese troop activity on Khmer soil – Sihanouk grew 
desperate enough to re-establish ties with the US in 1969, but it was too little too late, as 
the Americans had grown wary of Sihanouk’s unreliability and were beginning to 
consider alternative options.   By 1970, his frequent shifts in loyalties had left him 
without a strong foreign voice willing to back him against internal opposition. More 
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damagingly, his toleration of – or impotence in the face of – the  presence of Viet Cong 
troops in Cambodia frustrated and angered Khmer rightists and military elites who 
favored an American alliance to solve the Indo-china crisis. 
   
In comparison, U Nu did not have to contend with such risks of being isolated in 
times of crisis.  On the contrary, the primary danger of Burma’s neutralism was that it 
actually led the Burma government perilously close to alignment with Communist 
China.60 Despite the assertions to an ‘independent foreign policy’, the reality was that the 
‘Chinese communists could exercise a virtual veto on Burma policy and actions and 
Burma’s ‘positive neutrality’ could become nothing more than a verbal declaration.61 The 
policy therefore, was less than fully effective in securing Burma’s independent future, as 
Burma was trapped in a state of semi-dependency on China.  Fortunately for Burma, 
China never put strong pressure on Burma; and to U Nu’s credit, despite his country’s 
close ties with China, he did continue to make conscious efforts to limit such dependence 
even as late as 1961, such as in choosing to purchase arms from either the British or the 
Americans rather than from the communist countries.62
   
 Different Circumstances, Different  Personalities, Different Outcome
Neutralism as adapted respectively by U Nu and Sihanouk, led to different 
outcomes for each man.   Was the policy more effective for one but not the other?  If so, 
what were some possible reasons for this?
                                                





On one hand, the answer could be found in their different circumstances.  
Although the risk of a Chinese communist invasion of Burma to quell renegade KMT 
forces was real and did in fact take place in 1956 when Chinese troops clashed with 
Burmese patrols in Northeast Burma, U Nu never had to contend with the high level 
stakes or the degree of intensity  that were  associated with the Indochina conflict.  
Furthermore, the reason neutralism ‘worked’ for Burma may have had less to do with the 
‘rightness’ of the policy63 and more to do with ‘a variety of changing circumstances 
where the major contestants in the cold war were unwilling to use their power to force a 
change in Burma.’64
This was not the case for Sihanouk, much of whose posturing and petitioning in 
the 1960s was due to real and perceived attempts by other powers to impose change on 
Cambodia.  For instance, although Sihanouk had tolerated Viet Cong bases inside the 
Cambodian border since 1965, it was partly due to Chinese (in addition to North 
Vietnamese) pressure that Sihanouk secretly allowed the Viet Cong to open a smuggling 
route via the port of Sihanoukville in 1966.65  Granted, Sihanouk often interpreted others’ 
intentions through a lens of suspicion and over-sensitivity – such as his allegations of 
American-led “imperialism” and conspiracies against Cambodia – but it was also true 
that the US took undue interest in Cambodia’s political development, due to its strategic 
value and location in the US’ “domino theory”.  By comparison, the US acknowledged 
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that Burma was not as influenced by the insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam as the 
rest of mainland Southeast Asia was.66  As such, when faced with increasing evidence 
that Cambodian territory was being used as Vietcong supply trails and sanctuaries, the 
US resorted to drastic measures, including cross-border raids, and ultimately covert 
bombing, to disrupt communist operations, thus dragging Cambodian directly into the 
Indochina conflict.  In this sense, it would be unfair to say neutralism ‘worked better’ for 
U Nu, given the demanding conditions facing Sihanouk.  
Different Personalities
On the other hand, perhaps the answer also lay partially in the personality of each 
man, in the way each projected his characteristics, beliefs and idiosyncrasies on foreign 
policy.  For instance, Michael Leifer observed that the choice of neutrality in Cambodia 
was partly because it satisfied Sihanouk’s personal aspirations of being able to dictate 
and initiate, rather than adopt a subservient stance, in foreign policy.67  Due to the legacy 
of kingship and the adoration accorded to him in Cambodia, ‘such reverence was part of 
his psychological sustenance’. Leifer went on to observe that ‘Sihanouk is congenitally 
incapable of acting as a member of an alliance or the subordinate of a larger grouping’.68
A Sihanouk did not want Cambodia to be a neutral ‘also ran’, he never saw it necessary 
to play by the rules of strict neutrality, but enjoyed manipulating and keeping the Cold 
War powers on their toes and second-guessing about his next move.  Such issues of 
personal vanity and self-esteem influenced the style of neutralism adopted by Sihanouk 
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and the combative and suspicious manner in which he dealt with other nations.  Not 
easily trusting, Sihanouk swayed from one power to the next; after breaking with the US, 
Sihanouk secretly allowed first the North Vietnamese supplies through the port of 
Sihanoukville, then the US and South Vietnamese to pursue Vietcong forces into 
Cambodian territory, before casting his lot with the US and closing Sihanoukville to the 
North Vietnamese in 1969, when he realized that the communist presence was leading to 
US bombing raids on his country. Throughout, he continued to publicly deny 
involvement with either power; which made it difficult to guess his next move. By 1969, 
however the damage had been done. Under Sihanouk’s precipitous decisions and 
unpredictable personality, ‘neutrality’ had allowed his country’s territorial sovereignty to 
be compromised by the Indochina conflict.  
In contrast, U Nu’s life was grounded in Buddhist piety and moral values; and this 
helped shaped his idealistic understanding towards foreign policy. Nu truly believed in 
world peace and co-existence with both his neighbours and the major powers, and it was 
perhaps partly due to his relatively affable and positive outlook on foreign relations 
helped influence others to treat Burma in the same way.   For instance, after Chinese 
forces invaded Burma’s border areas in 1956, Burma was able to utilize moral pressures
from friendly nations to resolve the issue through diplomatic channels and to negotiate a 
Chinese withdrawal and continued talks on the Sino-Burmese border demarcation.
To U Nu and Sihanouk therefore, the choice of “Neutralism” or “Neutrality” as a 
foreign policy was as much determined by national and historical realities, as it was by 
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preference or personality.  Although the policy initially provided both men a theoretical 
“moral high ground” and “exclusivity” from Cold War rivalries,69 it changed in practice 
and goals, over time.  Burma ‘adapted’ itself towards a ‘limited non-alignment’ through 
having to remain constantly in China’s shadow, and Cambodia, rather than staying active 
and relevant to the major powers, had to adapt to an unenviable position by the end of 
the 1960s where it ‘seemed to be withdrawing from its earlier participation in 
international affairs; not into isolation, but into a “Cambodia against the rest” strategy.’70
Perhaps ‘neutralism’ thus had less practical value than either U Nu or Sihanouk had 
hoped. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
“If you fail to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered and waste your valuable 
time in fights and struggles and playing with insurrection, then the country will go to the 
dogs…”1
U Nu and Sihanouk had been accorded unique opportunities to lead their 
respective countries through independence, towards a promise of stable and secure 
nationhood.  To that end, each man adopted ideologies that reflected his worldview and 
personality.  The previous chapters compared how each leader moved from fortuitous 
appointments, to a consolidation of power, before reaching a stage of stagnation.  From 
that point, the decline of their respective careers was marked by the loss of initiative and 
control to other political players.  U Nu and Sihanouk were important symbols of 
leadership, but their magnified public personas could not make up for a decline in actual 
political power and control of the state.  As authority slipped through their grasp and 
conditions in their countries spiraled out of control, both men were unceremoniously 
removed from power by opponents who viewed their continued leadership as threats to 
national security.  In essence, the opportunity that had been given them was lost; the 
potential of their symbolic leadership was left unfulfilled.  
This chapter will compare the reasons and pattern of each man’s decline in 
political legitimacy, and explain why, in spite of – or perhaps due to – the strong 
symbolism attached to their leadership, neither was able to achieve lasting success.   It 
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will also address the extent to which each man’s decisions and failures during his years in 
power contributed to the subsequent crises that engulfed his country.  
6.1 Loss of Authority
U Nu’s Decline
U Nu and Sihanouk’s decline were set in motion by a loss in authority and control 
over the state. Burma faced a constitutional crisis after the 1958 AFPFL split into the 
“Stable” faction led by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein, and the “Clean” Faction led by Nu.  To 
seek a resolution to the crisis, Nu stepped down as prime minister on 26 October and 
requested that General Ne Win form a caretaker government to restore political 
conditions under which new elections could be held.  The caretaker period lasted till the 
April 1960 elecctions, when U Nu  returned to power with his renamed “Union Party (Pyi 
Daung Su) after campaigning on the promise of upholding Buddhism and Democracy.  
Even though he was Prime Minister again, Nu’s stature and political legitimacy had been 
significantly reduced, however.  Observers noted in 1961 that ‘U Nu is in a less 
commanding position…he has failed to display decisive authority or to eliminate 
factionalism in the Union Party.’2  When Nu decided to make good on his campaign 
promises to establish Buddhism as the State religion, he further alienated many of the 
non-Buddhist minorities who interpreted this as another unitary attempt by the central 
government to assimilate the non-Burman states.  To make matters worse, Burma’s 
economic difficulties worsened in 1961; oil production had fallen, and the monsoons had 
                                                
2 FO 1961 
125
drastically reduced rice production.3  This combination of political infighting within the 
Union Party, coupled with problems of inflation and mounting secessionist pressure from 
minority and ethnic groups who wanted a federal, instead of unitary, state structure, gave 
the increasingly critical Burmese military, under Ne Win, the excuse to intervene through 
a coup in March 1962, and remove Nu from power.       
Sihanouk’s Decline
In a similar trend, Sihanouk’s decline was also triggered by the relinquishing and 
dilution of authority under conditions of political stress.  Following the 1966 elections, 
the first where Sihanouk did not pre-select the candidates, the Cambodian General 
Assembly became dominated by right-wing elements, led by the strongly anti-
Communist and anti-Vietnamese Sirik Matak and General Lon Nol.  Lon Nol would go 
on to head governments from October 1966-1967, and again from August 1969, even as 
Sihanouk remained Chief of State.  The reason Sihanouk endorsed Lon Nol’s rise was to 
curb the growing opposition to his policies amongst the middle class and leftists, whose 
leaders included Ieng Sary and Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot).   Beginning with the 
1967 uprising in the Samlaut district in the Battambang province over high taxes, unrest 
spread through Southern Cambodia, affecting eleven of Cambodia’s eighteen provinces 
by 1968, all of which Sihanouk blamed on insurgents he termed “Red Khmers” (Khmer 
Rouge).  The security situation was heightened and made more confusing by Sihanouk’s 
continued dalliance with the North Vietnamese presence in his country’s borders, which 
led to the US decision in 1969 to begin covert bombing of communist sanctuaries in 
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Cambodia.  In a meeting with US Senator Mike Mansfield in August 1969, Sihanouk 
insisted that North Vietnam would inevitably be the victor over Saigon and advised the 
US to withdraw completely; at the same time ‘he went on to say that he knew of 
American bombing of the sanctuaries and would not protest such bombing as long as the 
areas under attack were not inhabited by Cambodians –  "It is in one's own interest, 
sometimes, to be bombed," he said, "in this case, the United States kills foreigners who 
occupy Cambodian territory and does not kill Cambodians"4
By the end of the 1960s, Sihanouk was perceived as having surrendered 
Cambodia’s territorial sovereignty to Vietcong sanctuaries, compromised Cambodia’s 
security by indirectly causing and “allowing” US bombing raids, and relinquished 
personal authority for dealing with the security crises to “strongmen” like Lon Nol.  In 
April 1969, Sihanouk stated that "to deal with the Viet Cong and Viet Minh," he had 
ordered General Lon Nol "to give up the defensive spirit and adopt an offensive spirit"; 
unfortunately for Sihanouk, Lon Nol decided that an effective offensive against the 
Communists was only possible with US help, and without Sihanouk’s accomodation of 
the North Vietnamese.  On March 18 1970, while Sihanouk was on an overseas trip to 
Beijing and Moscow, Lon Nol convened the General Assembly for a vote to depose 
Sihanouk, and for himself to assume emergency powers.    
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Decline – Comparative Factors
When asked during an interview in 1968, how Cambodia had managed to remain 
independent, neutral, peaceful and prosperous, Sihanouk cited three reasons – Unity, 
Leadership and Vigilance.  Cambodia was strong, firstly because of the unity of the 
Khmer peoples and their combined faith in him; secondly because of a strong dedicated 
leadership which delivered results and was not based not on empty promises; and thirdly, 
because he had maintained a constant vigilance against external threats and subversive 
elements. 5 While the accuracy of the Khmer leader’s claims about himself are 
questionable, the three factors he stated – Unity, Leadership and Vigilance – provide a 
useful comparative framework with which to analyze the decline of U Nu and Sihanouk’s 
political careers.  Both men rose to power as symbols of unity, but became victims of 
domestic infighting and splintering;   both were accorded strong leadership mandates to 
fulfill lofty visions of stability and security, but repeated failure to deliver on their 
promises greatly undermined their political credibility. As for the last factor, despite their 
best intentions and ideals, both men were not sufficiently vigilant to realize either the 
extent of their problems, or the negative consequences of their decisions.     
6.2 Unity
U Nu and Sihanouk regarded national unity as crucial to their countries’ success 
and stability; after all, they were initially elevated to their respective positions, to provide 
symbolic national unity in the midst of political turbulence.  Burma’s immediate post-
colonial crisis had been the threat of civil war fuelled by attempts at secession and 
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rebellion from various political and ethnic parties. Under such circumstances, U Nu was 
regarded as the man most able to mediate and bring balance to the dissenting forces in his 
country due to his piety and personality. In Cambodia’s case, the newly granted 
independence by France in 1953 made it necessary for a leader who could rally and tide 
the country peacefully through this transition, without being affected by the rising 
violence against colonial rule in other parts of Indochina.  From the Khmer perspective, 
there was also the need to rally national opinion to ensure that Cambodia ‘would be in a 
position to demand the complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, if 
and when the parties to the Indochina conflict agreed to seek a diplomatic settlement.’6  
Sihanouk, by virtue of his kingly status and youth was seen as the rallying symbol who 
could maintain stability and loyalty amongst the Cambodians throughout this turbulent 
period.
Both men gradually embraced their roles as public symbols, and began to shape 
their careers around the goal of unity and nationalism.  U Nu made it his personal 
mission, not only to mediate between dissenting parties, but also to enlighten and 
enhance the moral fiber of the nation –particularly through religion– as the basis for 
unity.  Sihanouk, after ‘achieving’ independence, continued his personal crusade to 
explain and emphasize Cambodian national identity.  Internally, he stressed the 
importance of the monarchy, without which, he believed, Cambodia would fall to the 
divisive class conflict of communism; to his external audience, Sihanouk expounded on 
Cambodia’s ideology of Buddhist Socialism and status of Neutrality that distinguished 
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Khmer from Cold War ideologies.  Despite these efforts, however, it was the lack of 
political and national unity that proved a crucial destabilizing factor at the end of their 
respective tenures.
Burma – Internal Disintegration
In U Nu’s case, internal disintegration – at both the political and national level –
was the main reason for his decline.  Politically, U Nu’s inability to prevent either the 
AFPFL split or infighting within his subsequent Union Party demonstrated to the military 
that parliamentary democracy under his leadership was unworkable.  The British Foreign 
Office in Burma observed at the end of 1960 that, ‘More time and energy has ostensibly 
been devoted by U Nu to peace-making than to working out government policy and 
pushing on with administration’7.  Following the military coup in 1962, General Ne Win 
was even viewed by the US State Department as a ‘dedicated nationalist’ who ‘took 
power in a Burma that had used the forum of parliamentary democracy as an opportunity 
for endless political squabbling and corruption.’8  This demonstrated the extent to which 
the political legitimacy of Nu’s government been affected by internal dissension.  
A more damaging factor was Nu’s failure to draw Burma’s ethnic nationalities 
into his vision of national unity.  Burma’s ethnic states had initially been promised the 
right to equality, self-determination and wide autonomy within the proposed Union of 
Burma by Aung San at the signing of the Panglong Accords in 1947; yet, after Aung 
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San’s death, the eventual Union Constitution provided a non-federal structure in which 
the states’ relations to Burma were asymmetrical and subordinate.  Despite these
unsatisfactory terms, the Shan, Kachin and other ethnic nationalities leaders cooperated 
out of necessity as Burma sank into civil war, but also due to Nu’s assurance that the 
terms could be amended in the future, with the right to secession after 10 years of 
independence as “insurance”.  Up till the AFPFL split in 1958 and the establishment of 
the caretaker military government, U Nu was still ‘tolerated’ for his apparent ability to 
keep Burma’s various races (except the Karen) united. 9  This did not last, however, 
especially after Nu’s promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion in 1961. The 
Christian Kachins, and other non-Buddhist nationalities regarded this as a betrayal of 
Aung San’s promise at Panglong and his vision of a secular, pluralist state; instead of a 
symbol of unity, Nu’s policy was vilified as a symbol of Burman tyranny.  As the 
Kachins resorted to armed rebellion, and the Shan, with other nationalities pressurized Nu 
for a federal structure, ‘the political ability of U Nu to unify the various ethnic groups 
declined dramatically in 1961.10   Nu’s seeming inability to stem the tide of secession was 
the immediate occasion for the coup in 1962’11; the military intervened before a federal 
seminar to resolve the minorities’ issue – which might have risked the Union’s 
disintegration – could conclude.  U Nu had lost his value as a symbol of unity;  ‘Ne Win 
and the military leaders ‘had come to see themselves as the lone protectors of the Union’s 
national integrity and the Federal Movement as merely another guise for the insurgents’ 
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Compared to U Nu, Sihanouk did not have to deal with crises of ethnic divisions; 
rather, his challenge was to keep the various political players united in support of, or at 
least in subservience to him.  In Sihanouk’s case, it was a splintering in the unity of the 
ruling elite, rather than the general population, that caused his downfall. Sihanouk had 
previously “united” the various schisms of Cambodian politics under the banner of the 
Sangkum, and under his dominant personality as Chief of State.  By the mid 1960s, 
however, there were wide and threatening cracks in the edifice of the state.13  With a 
rising educated middle-class whose sons found it increasingly difficult to gain 
employment, and a polarizing of left and right elements that resulted in a right-wing 
government and a move by the leftists to incite rural unrest, Sihanouk tried to rise above 
domestic dissension by appealing directly to the general populace.  Although he 
continued to be revered by the majority of peasants and workers due to his periodic tours 
of the provinces, dismal conditions in Cambodia, including economic stagnation, 
persistent corruption and perceptions of social inequality gradually alienated the elite and 
middle class whose support was vital for his survival.14 Many of the military and political 
elites blamed their country’s economic and security problems on Sihanouk’s termination 
of US aid in 1963, his nationalization policies, and his tolerance of the increasing North 
Vietnamese presence in Cambodia’s borders.  Believing that he would not be threatened 
                                                
12 Smith, p.196
13 Milton Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia: The Sihanouk Years, Australia: Longman, 
1973, p.82   
14 Ibid, p.204
132
as long as the general population continued to have faith in him, Sihanouk made the 
mistake of leaving the traditional Khmer elite free to occupy office and eventually use 
their traditional power against him.15
Symbolic Unity: the AFPFL and the Sangkum 
A similar trait between U Nu and Sihanouk in their quest for unity was their 
inability to translate symbolic unity into actual cohesion.  This was evident in their use of 
respective political vehicles that they claimed to be united movements, rather than 
political parties, namely the AFPFL and the Sangkum.  Both organizations aimed to 
subsume political and ideological differences under national interest and goals.  
U Nu’s idealism was reflected in his claim in 1949 that  ‘the AFPFL is the best 
instrument for securing peace, for under its banner the Burmese masses are united as 
never before… so long as the AFPFL can hold the Burmese masses, I am convinced that 
the danger of internal security cannot be serious.’16  Yet less than a decade later, years of 
political struggle and corruption within the AFPFL turned it into the main cause for the 
Burmese government’s instability and paralysis.  Under Aung San, the AFPFL had 
represented a conglomerate of diverse political ideologies and affinities, joined by the 
immediate common goal of achieving Independence for Burma; but in the vacuum of 
Aung San’s demise, and after independence was achieved, the AFPFL became a tired 
symbol that had served its purpose, but which U Nu had little choice but to maintain as 
part of his predecessor’s legacy.  As opposing personalities and ideologies were forced to 
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co-exist under this façade of “unity”, Nu was unable to contain or appease rivalries, 
despite resigning as Premier during the mid 1950s. The AFPFL entered a stage of power 
struggle up to the split in 1958 that shattered its image as an organization of national and 
political unity.  ‘What had begun as an all-embracing nationalist movement for Burma’s 
independence, degenerated over the years into a struggle for power among the leaders, 
disagreement over ideology and a growing pattern of irresponsibility and corruption.’17
The AFPFL was not, however, ‘orchestrated’ like the Sangkum, where Sihanouk 
personally oversaw selection of election candidates (up till 1966) and projected an image 
of a just and popular ruler to the people who brought their grievances to the Sangkum’s 
twice yearly Congresses.    Overt rivalry and power struggle did not arise in the Sangkum 
as they did in the AFPFL due largely to Sihanouk’s over-powering presence. On the other 
hand, Sihanouk’s dominance and intolerance within the Sangkum may have blinded him 
to the reality of increasing domestic opposition.  In this sense, the Sangkum represented a 
“façade” of sorts as well since Sihanouk believed that the Sangkum represented  his 
political mandate to rule.  Up till 1969, he still claimed that ‘the power which I assumed 
in the name of the Sangkum is not mine but results from the will of more than 90% of my 
countrymen.’18  In reality, however, by the end of the 1960s, the Sangkum was dominated 
with right-wing conservatives that opposed Sihanouk’s courting of Vietnamese 
communists; fearing a split in the Sangkum, Sihanouk resorted to   forming a counter 
“shadow” government comprising his most loyal personal followers and leading leftists, 
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to restrain Lon Nol.  This only drove another wedge into Sihanouk’s splintering political 
platform. 
Failure to recognize that symbolic unity was not enough de-railed both U Nu and 
Sihanouk’s careers.  U Nu’s decade-long attempts to maintain a semblance of AFPFL 
unity in the face of overwhelming odds distracted him from the task of governance, and 
gave the military cause to impose a more authoritarian alternative.  Sihanouk’s misplaced 
confidence in the carefully orchestrated processes of the Sangkum caused him to 
underestimate the threat posed by the disgruntled Cambodian elite and middle class; and 
his desire to keep the symbolic unity of the Sangkum intact by balancing the different 
political elements indirectly led to further polarization and chaos in Cambodian politics.  
6.3 Leadership
Personal Politics 
U Nu and Sihanouk rose to power on strong symbolic mandates; Nu as successor 
and would-be fulfiller of Aung San’s legacy and vision; and Sihanouk as the god-king 
who had won independence for his “little people.” Neither man was able to build on this 
initial advantage and authority, however, but instead, as time passed, both were perceived 
as incapable of either effective leadership or sound judgment.  Two reasons stand out; 
firstly, U Nu and Sihanouk engaged in “Politics by Personality”, meaning that they often 
led more by heart, emotion and personal appeal than by considered and pragmatic effort.  
As a result, both men excelled at expounding on their personal visions and beliefs, their 
goals and roadmaps, but fell short when it came to delivering on promises and practical 
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solutions.  Secondly, their respective responses to the realities of problems and challenges 
were found lacking; faced with critical challenges, both men either retreated, or they 
delegated authority and tasked others to overcome the country’s problems – U Nu had 
asked Ne Win to set up a caretaker government to restore stable conditions necessary for 
elections; Sihanouk had moved Lon Nol into power to deal with mounting problems of 
civil unrest.  By delegating authority, even temporarily, not only did they weaken their 
own control of the state, but it was tantamount to admitting their failure and impotence.     
Beliefs and Worldview
U Nu and Sihanouk’s leadership styles were affected and steered by their beliefs 
and character. As a staunch believer in Buddhism and moral values, U Nu thought it 
more crucial for leaders to have integrity rather than enforce control.  He claimed that ‘if 
we have good men it does not matter if we have no power.  The country cannot be ruined.  
Whether we get power or not we must only strive to show that the men we have are all 
good men.’19  As Nu sought to establish his party and politics on the basis of his beliefs 
and moral code, the tendency to over-value the personal and discount the systematic and 
technical, became his Achilles heel.  Where the controlling philosophy was that ‘good 
men make good government’ and personal character was often set over against plan and 
technique, such ‘government by character rather than by principle, may have disguised 
the government’s indisposition or inability to plan and execute intelligently.’20
Through relying on his religious and moral beliefs as guiding markers, Nu’s 
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leadership and policies came to be severely criticized.  For instance, after establishing
Buddhism as the state religion in 1961, he was accused of using religion, ‘not as the 
opiate of the people, but as his own opiate – a convenient escape from hard realities.  
Unstable politics, a stagnant economy? Propitiate the nats, build 60000 sand pagodas.  
“Buddhism and worship of the spirits have become the solace for U Nu in the midst of all 
the political and economic troubles which are today confronting his government and his 
party.”21  More damagingly, Nu’s government was distracted, as ‘economic questions 
were of secondary importance during the 1961 budget session of the Parliament, which 
was primarily concerned with making Buddhism the state religion.’  Nu’s desire to 
advance his country through moral and social transformation was also evident in his 
understanding and adoption of socialism ‘more as a device for social equalization than 
for economic development.’22  This became a point of contention for his critics amongst 
the military, whose mission statement of “The Burmese Way to Socialism” in the wake 
of the 1962 coup emphasized the economic and developmental aspects of Socialism 
which they felt had been lacking in Nu’s interpretation and practice.  
Just as Nu stubbornly followed his heart and morals in implementing policies, 
Sihanouk’s judgment was clouded by a sincere – even if misguided – sense of patriotism 
and justice. Sihanouk’s unchanging goal, he claimed, was for ‘the preservation of all that 
is good in our national heritage.’23  Under this self-proclaimed mandate, critical opinions 
– even when constructive – were dismissed as disloyalty and lack of understanding.  
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Sihanouk stated that ‘it is difficult for outsiders to understand the depth of Cambodian 
patriotism.  It is a matter of survival, imposed upon us by our fate of being squeezed in
between stronger, hostile neighbours. In the past we invariably had to fight or disappear 
as a nation.  Today it is the same…we fight to survive.’24 The result of this defensive 
worldview was a combative and inherently suspicious approach to foreign relations that 
was not always rational. Sihanouk also believed that ‘there could be no political 
independence without economic and financial independence.’25 This led to his costly 
decisions to break economic ties with the US in 1963 that deprived the disgruntled
military of a precious income source, and further depleted the national budget. Believing 
in the infallibility of Khmer culture and tradition, Sihanouk did not waver from his faith 
in Cambodia’s ‘recourse to socialist formulae, inspired by Buddhism, for social and 
economic development…just as Cambodian society had for centuries past, lived 
according to the precepts of Buddha.’  In practice, however, the nationalization of key 
economic sectors and industries, coupled with a corrupt bureaucracy, only led to 
economic mismanagement and stagnation. By 1969, Cambodia’s list of problems 
included rising rural indebtedness, declining rice yields and severe inefficiency and waste 
in the industrialization and developmental programs.  Yet, Sihanouk’s nationalistic faith 
in Khmer socialism was so strong that he was unable or unwilling to consider practical 
solutions based on cost-benefit analysis.26
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Nu’s leadership lacked decisiveness and forcefulness, a perceived weakness 
caused by his benign character.  British Governor Hubert Rance noted, "the only thing I 
would every say against Nu is that he utterly lacked a capacity for ruthlessness in the 
months leading up to, and following, independence.  If he had been of a more ruthless 
mould, I think Burma might have escaped a great deal of its post war insurgent 
difficulties". ‘U Nu often told the story of the cobra that got away because he spent so 
long deciding whether or not he had the right to take its life.’27 Hesitation and indecision 
led to an inefficient government and a Union that constantly remained vulnerable to 
ethnic and political secession throughout his tenure. U Nu’s preference for consultation 
and compromise over authoritarian decisions was eventually seen by the military as a 
weakness of the civilian government.  As Gustaaf Houtman notes in his study of 
‘Burmese Mental Culture’,28 Burma’s Buddhist-influenced ideal of political leadership 
comprised both “distributed influence” (awza) and “centralized authority” (ana). When U 
Nu’s style of predominantly awza leadership was deemed insufficient for Burma’s 
political problems, Ne Win’s replacement of Nu’s regime (itself explainable by the 
Buddhist concept of “impermanence” (anicca ) effectively shifted Burma’s political 
model to the other extreme of an ana influenced dictatorial model. 
In contrast to Nu’s passive personality, Sihanouk was aggressive and outspoken: 
when combined with his other traits of double-minded impulsiveness, vanity and 
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sensitivity to criticism, his leadership style was often rash, irrational and confrontational.  
This indirectly endangered Cambodia and his own position, as it made it difficult for 
countries to dialogue, much less extend any cooperation to Sihanouk, at a time when 
Cambodia needed international backing to ensure its security.  For instance, when the US 
began to re-initiate links to Cambodia in January 1968, diplomat Chester Bowles stated 
that the US aim at this point was ‘to keep Cambodia neutral, to keep the Viet Cong and 
NVA out of its territory and, with an eye to the future, to improve our own relations with 
this small but important country’; at the same time, he cautioned that he was ‘fully 
conscious of mercurial and unpredictable characteristics of the Prince. In any dealings 
with Cambodia we must expect sudden switches and caustic and unfair criticism. 
However, we should not let Sihanouk's intemperate and sometimes childish outbursts 
deter us from the main business at hand.’ 29
Unfortunately, Sihanouk did deter the process, continuing to lambaste the US 
publicly for its misguided policy in Indochina, even as he began to consider improving 
ties to counterbalance the increasing North Vietnamese threat.  Although the main issue 
of contention with the US was over the lack of a satisfactory declaration to guarantee 
Cambodia’s borders against its neighbors, Sihanouk’s attitude and ambiguity did not help 
matters. By the end of 1968, the US Pacific Commander in Chief highlighted Sihanouk’s 
unreliability and inconsistency when he concluded that ‘Sihanouk has been of more value 
to the Communists as a "neutralist" than as a declared ally; the Communists have been 
getting all the support they can use plus the bonuses of sanctuary and a secure, natural 
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extension of the Lao line of communication. At various times, Sihanouk has both 
admitted and denied that Cambodia is a Viet Cong sanctuary. He has never admitted, or 
perhaps has failed to recognize, Cambodia's ultimate role in the Communist design for 
Indochinese hegemony’.30  By the time Nixon took office as President in 1969 and began 
to re-evaluate (with Kissinger) American involvement in Indochina, the US had grown 
weary of Sihanouk’s temperament and leadership. To this day, Sihanouk remains 
convinced that the CIA conspired with Lon Nol and other conservatives to topple him. 
What Sihanouk does not recognize, however, is that even if his allegations were true, it 
may have been his own personal style of aggressive and erratic foreign policy that drove 
the US to see Lon Nol as a viable alternative.   
Alternative Leaders 
The practice of personalized politics by U Nu and Sihanouk thus opened them to 
criticism and comparisons. Towards the end of their tenures, both U Nu and Sihanouk 
found themselves positioned alongside military leaders who contrasted with them in 
various ways.  Where U Nu was indecisive and philosophical, Ne Win’s track record till 
then portrayed him as indomitable and pragmatic; where Sihanouk was emotional and 
unconvincingly vague about his affections and ability to keep Cambodia free from unrest 
and intrusions, Lon Nol was coldly, but firmly, committed to quelling domestic 
insurgencies, and to driving the Vietnamese out of the country with US assistance.  In U 
Nu’s case, the military had been bolstered by its successful role in turning the tide of 
Burma’s civil war in the 1950s, such that by the end of the decade, it had gained enough 
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organizational and administrative experience to consider itself a viable and stronger 
leadership alternative to the ineffective civilian government.31 Ne Win’s hand in restoring 
order, both during the civil war, and later after the AFPFL split in 1958, only contrasted 
with and highlighted the failures of Nu’s leadership.  In Sihanouk’s case, not only had 
Lon Nol been “given” complete military control by the end of the 1960s32 to quell the 
insurrections, the administration he formed in August 1969 was termed the government 
of “National Salvation”, to rescue Cambodia from its security and economic woes. 
Together with deputy premier Sirik Matak, Lon Nol held sway over the right-wing 
National Assembly and aimed to reverse Sihanouk’s damaging nationalization and 
isolation policies, in favor of greater privatization and closer links with the US, that 
would help restore the Cambodian elites’ wealth and influence.   
Both U Nu and Sihanouk had inadvertently allowed these “alternate” leaders to 
gain state and administrative control by handing them authority during periods of crises 
or challenge.  Although both had begun their careers as strong symbolic leaders, the 
debunking of the myths surrounding their leadership was accelerated by ‘temporary’ 
governments that inadvertently highlighted the flaws of the previous administrations.  Ne 
Win’s caretaker government, and Lon Nol’s ‘Salvation Government’ had a common aim 
of restoring national order, but also had a similar effect of subjecting the legacies of U Nu 
and Sihanouk to critical assessment.  U Nu was “exposed” as a visionary who lacked the 
institutional influence and administrative ability the military had demonstrated.  In 
Sihanouk’s case, ‘the image of the Prince as the bulwark of security and progress, 
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although true for the early years after independence, became increasingly dubious.’33 As 
comparisons and contrast between leadership style, ability and agenda mounted, U Nu 
and Sihanouk’s respective positions were further weakened by the increasing public 
impression that they tended to seek emotional refuge when under stress, instead of 
dealing with problems at hand. 
Retreat from Reality
Specifically, U Nu and Sihanouk were prone to ‘refreshing’ themselves through 
creative – and some termed ‘distractive’ – pursuits. U Nu’s refuge was found through 
Buddhist meditation: ‘it too often happened that the nation’s business stood virtually still, 
while U Nu spiritually refreshed himself at his inner springs.  It was perhaps as much the 
artist-creator as the religious devotee in him who required from time to time these 
escapes, to permit him to muse and re-establish contact with his essential self.  But with 
this element in his personality, the Prime Minister came at a heavy price to the nation.’34  
Perhaps the same could be said of Sihanouk, where the need to ‘re-establish contact with 
his inner-self’ and pursue his “artist-creator” instincts, took place through his increasing 
obsession with movie-making even as his country’s problems mounted.  
Such “retreats” were cause for criticism that U Nu and Sihanouk had lost the will 
and legitimacy to govern.  To U Nu, meditation was a necessary discipline for a 
statesman to avoid the pitfalls of politics and to formulate policies.  After the AFPFL split, 
Nu spent considerable time in meditation; and before beginning the 1959–1960 campaign 
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that returned him to power, he also spent five or six weeks in solitary meditation.35  The 
timing and appropriateness of his retreats was questioned however; from 1960-61, when 
faced with infighting within the Union Party between the older ‘Thakins’ and the younger 
‘U-Bos’, Nu was unable to mediate between the two sides; rather, his increasing 
preoccupation with Buddhism, including a Buddhist retreat for 45 days in mid-1961 
when economic and political problems remained unresolved, suggested that he had lost 
the will to govern.’36 In Sihanouk’s case, he claimed in 1969 that  ‘movie-making…is 
achieving a useful purpose … It enables me to show to foreign friends all aspects of both 
modern and traditional Cambodia, and to present truthful pictures so different from those 
suggested by the Western press. It further enables me to create and promote a new 
cinematographic style to oppose invading and stifling foreign trends.’37  The reality, 
however, was that Sihanouk’s amateurish films often depicted lavish lifestyles and 
settings completely unrepresentative of general Cambodian living standards; when 
screened outside of Phnom Penh, not only was the awareness of social inequality 
heightened, but it also left Sihanouk’s critics wondering if he should devote more effort 
to deterring actual foreign invasions instead of making films.  Sihanouk’s excessive 
devotion to artistic pursuits was noted by Nixon, who observed that Sihanouk, "seemed 
prouder of his musical talents than of his political leadership, and he appeared to be 
totally unrealistic about the problems his country faced."38
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U Nu and Sihanouk’s character flaws, and their devotion to activities outside of 
government, combined with the delegation of duty for some of the biggest issues facing 
their countries, led opponents and observers alike to assume that in many ways, they were 
incapable of grasping the realities and responsibilities of political leadership.  
6.4 Vigilance
This lack of understanding of realities eventually translated into a lack of 
vigilance towards political threats.  Bolstered – but perhaps blindsided – by their 
popularity and symbolic standing with the people, U Nu and Sihanouk underestimated 
their opponents, and also underestimated the negative impact of their policies.   
Opponents
When U Nu handed state power to Ne Win in 1958, the general promised to 
return it within 6 months, but ruled for almost two years before elections could be held.  
Throughout, Nu was confident that the democratic process would prevail in Burma; he 
failed to heed the warning signs as the caretaker government operated relatively 
successfully and comfortably outside the democratic process; Ne Win ruled without party 
support, filling the cabinet and bureaucracy with senior military officers and civil 
servants.  Nu underestimated the general’s ambitions and his closely-knit network of 
second generation officers who would later adopt totalitarian rule. Nu’s government, 
engrossed with infighting and economic problems, had not taken the military’s rise in the 
1950s seriously; even when the army became the only institution capable of building 
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nationwide structures of authority.39
Sihanouk also underestimated the ambitions of his country’s political figures; as 
he ‘could not believe, or refused to accept, that any serious opposition or criticism could 
be genuinely Cambodian in origin.  To him, all such opposition must derive from the 
hostile pressures of outside powers, or of their local agents within the country.’40 As 
such, local insurgencies were Viet Minh-inspired; local critics were misled by the lies of 
foreign press; and challenges to his economic or foreign policy were the result of 
“imperial”, most notably, American manipulation.  Sihanouk was supremely confident 
that he ruled according to the people’s in the form of “democracy” he had introduced.  As 
such, he believed that he was the only alternative to an external conqueror; no one else in 
Cambodia could rise to the task or embody the people’s will; he thus had no qualms 
about literally handing over state power as long as he remained Chief of State.  Sihanouk 
even claimed confidently in 1967 that “our army will not revolt; it understands my 
attitude perfectly.”41 Interestingly, during his 1955 abdication speech that explained his 
disconnectedness from the masses when he remained king, Sihanouk had lamented that “I 
could only see the flowers and hear the lies.  The true face of the people was hidden from 
me.”42 Ironically, fifteen years later, it was the true face and intentions of Cambodia’s 
political elites to unseat him that Sihanouk was unable to see; the ex-King chose instead 
to continue drawing affirmation and feedback of his performance from the “flowery” 
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reviews given by his people each time he toured the countryside. 
In this regard, neither U Nu nor Sihanouk was vigilant to the changing political 
climate or to the capabilities and intentions of political rivals.  Where Nu had been 
distracted by other problems, and perhaps genuinely trusted the military; Sihanouk was 
misled by overconfidence in his own indispensability.  Both believed, however 
erroneously, that popular mandate alone was sufficient ballast to keep them afloat and 
above any tides of dissension. Such faith in their symbolic leadership was misplaced.  In 
a sense, this was also partly a result of the unrealistic way each man interpreted and 
adopted “Democracy”.  
Democracy – The Will of the People
In the same way they held up “Neutralism” and “Socialism” as seeming formulas 
that would produce idealistic results, so too did U Nu and Sihanouk advocate 
“Democracy” as a lofty vision and basis for their governance.  Again, each man 
interpreted the concept differently. U Nu saw Democracy as the solution to Burma’s 
governmental inefficiency and infighting, particularly after his 1960 electoral victory; 
Sihanouk regarded it as a legitimization for his power and policies.  But both were alike 
in allowing their skewed belief in Democracy to blind them to negative political realities. 
For instance, Nu did not foresee that his fervent belief in democracy would 
undermine his authority.  Nu had an unrealistic expectation that democracy meant 
“universal consent” and this inadvertently ‘condemned his new government to indecision, 
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weakness and dissension.  It threatened fragmentation and opened the door, for the 
second time, to the rule of the military.’43 He failed to grasp the essence of democracy, 
that ‘within the conventions of majority rule that did not infringe on basic rights of the 
minority, the majority still needed to have the courage and the will to make the decisions 
needed.’44  Instead, Nu hampered his government’s ability to perform, when he declared 
in his “Crusade for Democracy” that ‘henceforth, every major problem will be submitted 
to thorough examination and discussion by all who are concerned therewith.’45  This only 
reinforced the military’s critical perception that Nu, ‘as in the years of his leadership 
before the 1958 split, had failed to use democratic institutions for the effective governing 
of his country.’46
In comparison, Sihanouk’s belief that his power was the result of “direct 
democracy”, clouded him to the possibility of dissension and alternative opinions.  More 
damagingly, Sihanouk’s ‘personification of power’ on the pretext of ‘Democracy’ 
undermined Cambodia’s state institutions and processes of check and balance.  Sihanouk 
had proposed in 1956 a form of ‘direct democracy’ hearkening back to the ‘Greek 
pattern’ such that ‘the will of the people can really be imposed and heard’ and that the 
National Congress should become the nation’s supreme policy-making body.  Sihanouk 
claimed that ‘my enemies had brought about the downfall of the government on the 
pretext of ‘lack of democracy’. I threw democracy back at them in a much purer form, 
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and they were dumbfounded.’47 This ‘purer form’ was based on the ‘motto of his royal 
ancestors’ – ‘of the people, for the people, by the people’ –but in practice, was  generated 
by the political structures that were created around his person.  In his book, The 
Demigods: Charismatic Leadership in the Third World, Jean Lacouture described how 
Sihanouk developed a symbol signifying the “relationship between him and his people”, 
first by abdicating, then by assuming the role of a Chief of State, theoretically backed by 
the “people’s will”. Through his domination of the media, public speech and political 
vehicles, Sihanouk created a structure in Cambodian society that had him as the central 
supporting pillar who had been “democratically elected” to represented the people.48  The 
generated idea that he was a manifestation of the people’s choice and will, blinded him to 
the fact that his unilateral decisions and authoritarianism were fuelling resentment among 
the middle-class and elite. Up till the end of his tenure, Sihanouk still claimed that ‘I do 
wield extensive power…But in no time in my career have I sought to monopolize this 
power or even to maintain it.’49
Compared to Sihanouk, the application of “Democracy” did not create such a 
“delusional cloud” of personality cult around U Nu. Rather, it was in his unrealistic 
interpretation of the concept, and the idealistic hope in its promised outcomes, that U Nu 
failed to see the consequences of his policies.  As much as Sihanouk believed that his rule 
was truly “democratic”, U Nu believed in the “rightness” of “true democracy”.  In that 
sense, both men lacked the ability to discern the ideal from the practical, and the 
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imagined from the real. 
Other Policies and Circumstances
U Nu and Sihanouk also miscalculated the consequences of their policies, and 
underestimated the severity of their respective circumstances.  In U Nu’s case, two 
critical miscalculations were in the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion, and 
the issue of a Federal state structure.  In the first instance, U Nu was convinced that it was 
the government’s responsibility to help the people improve their lives from one cycle to 
the next, till eventual salvation, according to Buddhist teachings. He stated:  Religion was 
a beneficial institution and those who would gainsay it were wrong. If the government 
could provide for a life of one hundred years on earth, why should it feel deterred from 
providing for countless existences afterwards?50, U Nu had earlier stated in 1956 that 
when the non-Buddhists were convinced that their rights would not be compromised, 
“then it would be right and safe to undertake the move of making Buddhism the State 
religion.”51  Nu decided the “right moment” was after securing electoral victory in 1960.  
Unfortunately, the ethnic nationalities were not, in fact, ready; and Nu was unprepared 
for the backlash of insurrection and demands for secession that followed.  To appease the 
ethnic minorities, Nu agreed in 1962 to open discussions on setting up of separate 
sovereign states within a federal structure, most notably for the Mons and Arakanese, 
with consideration for the Shan and Kayah to exercise their rights to secession.
Unfortunately, Nu again did not take heed of how the military perceived federalism as a 
guise for separatism, and the extent to which Ne Win’s generals would go to prevent any 
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potential break-up; ‘to the Defence Services the unity of the country and preservation of 
the Union were matters which were not negotiable.52 The Burmese army had been built 
primarily to cope with domestic unrest; the most-feared outcome of a potential failure by 
the military to fulfill its mandate had been, and always was portrayed in terms of a 
disastrous disintegration of the Union.53
Whereas U Nu’s problems stemmed primarily from within the country, 
Sihanouk’s challenge lay in Cambodia’s external and regional relations, and how those 
relations impacted internal developments. In that regard, Sihanouk’s miscalculations at 
the end of his tenure were mostly in his practice of “neutrality”.  By the end of the 1960s, 
Sihanouk’s country was a place where regional Cold War developments were 
inextricably linked to Cambodia’s internal political dynamics.  In practice, this meant that 
even as Cold War players were stepping up their interventions into Cambodian affairs, 
elements within Cambodia were also being pressured to seek Great Power support.  In 
such a situation, Sihanouk’s particular brand of neutrality became a target on his back. To 
the Americans, any state’s adoption of such a posture could only weaken the international 
position of the United States, to the certain benefit of the Communist powers.’54  To 
right-wing Cambodians like Lon Nol, Sihanouk’s so-called neutral policy was to blame 
for allowing tens of thousands of North Vietnamese to occupy sanctuaries in Cambodia.55
Sihanouk was aware of the problem, but chose to downplay its severity.  In any case, the 
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US assessed that even if Sihanouk had wanted to, he could not have dealt with the 
situation effectively – at the end of 1967, Cambodia only had about 9000 troops manning 
a 700-mile border along which over 20,000 Communist troops were arrayed.56  Sihanouk 
chose to manage the situation by manipulating Cambodia’s internal political dynamics. 
By tacitly allowing the right to form the government on one hand, he sought to portray an 
external image of affinity with the Communist powers on the other, thereby keeping 
himself in power between the two poles.  Unfortunately, Sihanouk was not privy to the 
lack of trust his actions had generated within Cambodia’s elite; especially amongst those 
who did not share his confidence that such a perilous balancing act could be maintained 
indefinitely.  Sihanouk also miscalculated the extent to which the right-wing elements he 
had endorsed would swing beyond his control, to eventually see him as a threat.  
6.5 Concluding Comparisons
Opposites and Overlap
Despite their individual failings in the areas of national unity, leadership and 
vigilance, U Nu and Sihanouk had admirable intentions. Molded in the fires of transition 
from colonial rule to independence, both were fervent patriots and nationalists who were 
somewhat miscast for the roles required of them.  U Nu had a genuine love for his fellow-
man and his country. Unfortunately for Burma, Nu was also ‘a saintly man who abhorred 
violence and detested politics, not a strong man who had learned that force was necessary 
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to uphold freedom and unity.’57  Sihanouk had a sincere love for his nation; but he also 
loved himself, such that ‘he seemed to have believed – from time to time at least – the 
mythology about himself to the point of confusing himself with Cambodia, and of 
mistakenly thinking that he could outwit Cold War players like the United States.’58  
Where Burma may have better dealt with its problems of internal dissension had there 
been a leader with Sihanouk’s bravado and initiative, Cambodia may have been able to 
navigate the various Cold War tensions more safely had its leader possessed U Nu’s 
sincerity and humility.  (Interestingly, where “Sihanouk” could be translated as “lion-
jaws”, “U Nu” meant “soft, or tender”.)   
At a glance, both men were seeming opposites; U Nu’s exemplification of 
Buddhist piety and humility, contrasted with Sihanouk’s materialism, aggression and 
arrogance.  U Nu represented a colonial-era “New Elite” whereas Sihanouk hailed from a 
traditional Southeast Asian monarchy.  Yet in a sense, both were political products of a 
“modernizing”era, and demonstrated that in their choice of policy and terminology. Both 
men also overlapped, in terms of style and situation. Their leadership styles were highly 
charismatic and personal, with an emphasis on symbolism and ideals rather than 
pragmatic realities.  To guide their countries’ transition from ex-colonies to strong 
nation-states, U Nu and Sihanouk tried to embody the ideals of traditional leadership, 
while simultaneously espousing the benefits and workings of modern ideologies.  While 
this may have given immediate relevance to their policies, the over-emphasis of form 
over substance meant that neither was able to translate imagery and rhetoric into 
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meaningful results over the long run.  Whether it was an over-ambitious “Buddhist 
Socialism”, or a professed “Neutralism” that had lost its credibility after repeated 
adaptations, U Nu and Sihanouk’s good intentions and doctrines brought few lasting 
benefits.
More significantly, when placed alongside each other, their respective situations 
reflected the crux of nation-building and security concerns in post-colonial Southeast 
Asia –the challenge of building and uniting a nation internally on one hand, while 
warding off external threats from neighbours and Cold War powers on the other. The 
history of Burma and Cambodia in the 1950s and 60s represented extreme examples of 
such security concerns. No other Southeast Asian country faced such a degree or duration 
of violent ethnic division and strife the way Burma did. And no other country had to bear 
the magnitude of encroaching forces and threats the way Cambodia did.  Perhaps 
Sihanouk’s words could be taken as a reminder to those who would venture to assess the 
legacies of either U Nu, or Sihanouk himself: ‘It is, therefore, permitted for us to ask 
ourselves if other countries would have done better than us and realized more had they 
been placed under the same conditions…after the restoration of independence.’59
Aftermath Assessment 
In comparing the circumstances and character under which U Nu and Sihanouk 
rose to and fell from power, it is clear, on balance, that their character flaws contributed 
partially, but directly to their downfall.  On the other hand however, their choices were 
often constrained or conditioned by their circumstances.  It is, of course, possible to 
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hypothesize if a different reaction or decision by a man of different caliber would have 
produced an alternative result; but a better assessment of what their respective tenures 
meant to their countries could be drawn from the immediate aftermath of their careers. 
To an extent, both U Nu and Sihanouk were figures who had brought balance to 
potentially  volatile situations.  Sihanouk, for example, was fond of recounting that he 
was the link to over 90% of the Cambodian population; and claiming that after his 
departure, the persecution of pro-Sihanouk elements by Lon Nol and Sirik Matak ‘cut the 
Cambodian government from the real Khmer people, thus throwing them into the arms of 
the Polpotian Khmers Rouges and opening to the latter the door for their complete victory 
(in April 1975)”60  Perhaps it would have been more accurate to say that with Sihanouk’s 
departure, the absence of the figurehead, no matter how self-absorbed and authoritarian, 
opened the door to the simmering political divides in Cambodian society.  Both the 
conservative and communist elements saw an opportunity to transform Cambodia.  As a 
result, even as the new right-wing government swept (with South Vietnamese and US 
support) to eradicate North Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, the communist insurgency 
within the country grew to unmanageable proportions, and by 1975, Pol Pot’s Communist 
Party of Kampuchea had taken control of the country, thus marking the beginning of a 
tragic chapter in Cambodia’s history.  As long as Sihanouk had been present, it is 
arguable that even if his policies and performance were unsatisfactory, at least his 
overpowering personality kept the lid on Cambodia’s cauldron of potential chaos that had 
been brewed and heated by the fires of the Indochina conflict.  
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http://www.norodomsihanouk.info/mes%2004/mars/2003txt5.htm
155
In comparison, U Nu’s personality, while large, could never supplant that of Aung 
San. For most of his career, U Nu tried to fulfill the promises and vision left by his 
predecessor. Aung San had crafted the vision of a united Burma built on socialist 
principles; but it was left to U Nu, by no means a skilled administrator, to realize the 
dream. When Nu was deemed to have “failed”, it was as much due to his personal 
inabilities, as it was to the unrealistic standards and goals by which he was judged.  
Nevertheless, throughout his career, Nu’s symbolic leadership provided Burma with a 
semblance of consultative government, and reasonably positive external relations that had 
proved crucial to Burma’s development and stability in the post-colonial years.  As long 
as U Nu remained, there was always room for dialogue and compromise (even though not 
every dissenting party chose these options) because of the values of harmony and 
democracy that he embodied.  After Ne Win took over, parliament was dissolved, and the 
new military regime declared its inward-looking “neutrality” to concentrate on quelling 
the “separatist tendencies” of the ethnic minorities; thus beginning a period of 
authoritarian and isolationist government in Burma that continues largely to this day. 
By looking at the periods of instability that followed after their departure, it would 
seem from one angle that U Nu and Sihanouk had been relative bastions of sensibility 
and stability.  On the other hand, it is also arguable that each man helped create the 
conditions for his country’s crises that followed.  
In Burma, U Nu’s perceived failures inadvertently set the “stage” for Ne Win  - or 
gave him the excuse – to take extreme measures. Nu had failed to consolidate power and 
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parliamentary democracy under Nu had proved to be an avenue for dissension, 
divisiveness and potential dissolution of the Union.  Ne Win thus put in place draconian 
measures to enforce his authority and ‘protect national unity’, going to the extent of 
turning Burma into a one-party state by dissolving all political parties in 1964, except for 
the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) which he chaired.     Nu had failed to quell 
communist and ethnic insurgencies, so the military government turned its full attention to 
eradicating all ethnic and political dissent, to the extent of establishing a near-totalitarian 
state.  As for Nu’s two strategies of socialism and neutralism, Ne Win took both 
ideologies to extremes. Ne Win retained Nu’s policy intent of “neutralism”, but 
interpreted it through an anti-western and xenophobic stance, by cutting US aid, and 
eventually alienating Burma from external contact altogether.  Ne Win’s fear of external 
influences also manifested itself through his attempt to “purify” the ideology of 
“socialism” that U Nu had sought to establish in Burma;  Ne Win’s “Burmese Way to 
Socialism” led to the nationalization of virtually every aspect of the economy, and 
eventually turned Burma into an autarchy.  
In Cambodia, Sihanouk’s autocratic rule and his failure to maintain the security of 
his country’s borders helped set in motion events that eventually led to civil war.  The 
backlash against Sihanouk’s policies by the Lon Nol-led right-wing conservatives in the 
immediate aftermath of the coup had been fuelled by Sihanouk’s undermining of Phnom 
Pehn’s political elites.  The swing towards American aid and arms by Lon Nol was 
intended to reverse the perceived encroachment of Communist Vietnam and leftist forces 
within Cambodia that Sihanouk had been accused of siding.  Unfortunately the untenable 
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balancing act that Sihanouk had tried to maintain over the years had not only given 
enough leeway for communist forces to take root in rural Cambodia, but  had reached a 
point of collapse.  Sihanouk’s removal from power and his subsequent alliance with the 
Khmer Rouge while in exile further set the stage for civil war.  As Sihanouk endorsed the 
Khmer Rouge, and as Lon Nol abolished the much-revered monarchy and allowed the US 
to extend its bombing raids against the Viet Minh into rural Cambodian territory, the 
Khmer Rouge were able to rally many more disaffected rural Cambodians in revolt 
against Lon Nol’s regime.  While Sihanouk cannot be blamed for the atrocities that 
followed after the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, he did have an indirect hand in 
their ascension. Sihanouk’s strategy in dealing with right and left-wing extremism during 
his tenure had been to play one side against the other, as the situation demanded, as long 
as he maintained a central role in Cambodian politics.  With Sihanouk gone, there was no 
one and no reason to maintain the balancing act he had orchestrated and it was almost 
inevitable that years of political tension that Sihanouk had allowed to go unchecked 
would boil over into violent conflict.  
One key failing shared by U Nu and Sihanouk was thus the inability to deal 
effectively and conclusively with political divisiveness.  U Nu could not achieve unity or 
quell separatist demands and this provided impetus for the rise of a more dominant means 
of government.  Sihanouk’s persona dominated Cambodia’s political scene, but he could 
not effectively stem the underlying opposing currents of political tension that became 
tragically apparent in his absence.     
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Symbolic Leadership: Boon or Bane?
Perhaps it is fitting then, to conclude this paper on the note it began.  Upon U Nu 
and Sihanouk’s departures from their respective political scenes, their absence was 
immediately felt by the lack of a popular symbol around which the nation could rally.  
The alternative to such symbolism was authoritarianism, a path taken by both Ne Win 
and Lon Nol, to command subservience, because their personality and prestige could not
command loyalty.  Decades later, when commentators remarked on U Nu and Sihanouk’s 
symbolic significance, it was a testament to what they had brought to their countries 
during their years in power; that despite their flaws in character, decision making and 
administrative ability, the goals and ideals that each embodied, were seen as vital 
symbols that gave their people meaning and direction, and even became part of their 
respective legacies.      
Interestingly, however, present-day commentators would also draw comparisons 
between the Khmer Rouge and the military Government of Burma – “In many ways, the 
Burmese regime is already turning Burma into a country like Cambodia under 
Democratic Kampuchea…the Burmese rulers may ignore the world's calls for its return 
to the democratic path and, as happened in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge, Burma's 
would then become an isolated nation with China as the main military and economic 
ally…As in the case of the Khmer Rouge, the Burmese military junta has become 
overwhelmingly paranoid about its people and has killed and imprisoned hundreds of 
people suspected as its dissidents…the Burmese military regime has imposed heavy 
restrictions on both civil and political rights and freedoms, as the Khmer Rouge had 
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done.”61  U Nu and Sihanouk cannot be blamed for the atrocities that followed in their 
wake, but as “predecessors” to the respective periods of calamity that befell their nations, 
their careers represented missed opportunities for Burma and Cambodia that may have 
led to a different, more positive outcome.  
In that sense, leadership style that drew heavily on political symbolism may 
actually have hindered each man’s country from developing into a strong nation and 
state.  In defining a “national populist” regime, Jean Lacouture mentioned three 
components – the charismatic authority of the leader whose person unites and mobilizes 
the people; the leader who maintains direct contact with the masses, thus relegating the 
various elites to the background; and the lack of distinction between social and national 
objectives.62  U Nu and Sihanouk’ displayed these traits: both were symbols of unity; 
both had a deep connection to the general public that their usurpers did not; and both 
were sufficiently “distracted” by national objectives of ensuring internal and external 
security, such that their social and economic policies could not be thoroughly developed.  
However, Lacouture also mentioned that a regime of this type, ‘whether or not it has a 
doctrine to justify it, is capable of creating both nation and state; but it cannot make 
them endure.  It offers no real solution to the fundamental problem of replacing a society 
that had been divided by feudalism, tribalism or colonialism with a political society based 
on participation and responsibility.’63   These words seemed applicable to U Nu and 
Sihanouk; for their style of symbolic leadership may have cost their countries the 
opportunity to develop sustainable and stable political institutions and processes, which 
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in turn might have saved Burma and Cambodia from the respective periods of 
authoritarianism and anarchy that followed.  From this perspective, the careers of U Nu 
and Sihanouk represented, not a “golden age” before the darkness, but rather, a period of 
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